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In Defense of an End-Relational Account of Goodness 
Abstract 
 
 
What is it exactly that we are attributing to a thing when we judge it to be good?  
According to the orthodox answer, at least in some cases when we judge that something 
is good we are attributing to it a monadic property. That is, good things are “just plain 
good.”  I reject the orthodox view. In arguing against it, I begin with the idea that a 
plausible account of goodness must take seriously the intuitive claim that there is 
something in common between moral and non-moral goodness—something in virtue of 
which it makes sense to call ‘good’ both the things that are morally good and the things 
that are non-morally good. However, it is implausible that all judgments about the 
goodness of things attribute a monadic property to those things, as this does not capture 
what we mean when we judge something to be non-morally good. Instead, I propose and 
defend my own relational theory of goodness according to which goodness is a relation 
that holds between things and ends (or goals).  That is, goodness is a relational property 
such that to be good is to be related in the relevant way to some goal or another.  This is 
true in both the mundane everyday cases and in loftier cases concerned with moral 
goodness. 
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Before turning to those moral and mental aspects of the matter which present the 
greatest difficulties, let the inquirer begin by mastering more elementary 
problems.     
 
Sherlock Holmes, Study in Scarlet, Part 1, Ch. 2 
 
Introduction 
!
I. Preliminaries 
What is it exactly that we are attributing to a thing when we judge it to be good? 
This is the principal question I will be investigating in this dissertation. Since Plato, the 
orthodox answer to this question has been, at least in some cases, that when we judge that 
something is good we are attributing to it the monadic, non-relational property of 
goodness. That is, some good things are “just plain good.” I reject the orthodox view.1 I 
argue instead that goodness is a relation; a thing is good just in case, and because, it is 
related in the relevant way to a goal or end. Goodness is end-relational.2 This is true of 
both the mundane everyday cases, and of the cases concerned with moral goodness. 
To clarify how my view differs from the orthodox view, let me explain some 
terminology by way of an illustration. Consider the coffee in the mug that is sitting on my 
desk. That coffee has many qualities or attributes: for instance, it is brown in color, it is !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1 There are a growing number of philosophers who have rejected the orthodox view. For instance: 
R.B. Perry (1926), Peter Geach (1956), Paul Ziff (1960), Georg Henrik von Writght (1963), J.L. 
Mackie (1977), Phillipa Foot (1985, 2001), Judith Jarvis Thomson (1992, 1993, 1997, 2008), 
David Copp (1995), Christine Korsgaard (2013), and Stephen Finlay (2001, 2004, 2005, 2006, 
2008, 2014).  
2 Stephen Finlay is the first to elaborate and defend an end-relational account of goodness.  See 
(2001, 2004, 2006, 2008, 2014). While I had developed much of my own end-relational account 
prior to reading the fullest statement of his view—developed in his 2014 book—I found that book 
to be a helpful foil for my arguments.!
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bitter, hot, it was made a few minutes ago, and it is currently sitting in a ceramic mug on 
the desk in front of me. All of these features are either properties or relations that the 
coffee has, or instantiates. So what is the difference between a property and a relation? 
Properties are attributes that are monadic—which simply means that there need only exist 
one thing to instantiate that quality. The color brown, then, is an example of a monadic 
property. This coffee is brown. Coffee could instantiate the property of being brown by 
itself, without requiring the existence of another object. Relations, on the other hand, 
typically are instantiated by more than one thing—a relation holds between two or more 
entities. Coffee cannot occupy a mug unless there is a mug to occupy, so occupying is a 
relation that holds between the coffee and the mug. Now I said that relations ‘typically’ 
relate two or more objects because there are some relations that a thing can stand in to 
itself.  These relations are reflexive. An example of a reflexive relation is the relation of 
identity. An entity can only stand in the identity relation to itself.3 As I stated above, the 
account of goodness that I will be arguing for says that goodness is a relation—but on my 
account, it is not a reflexive relation. So for our purposes, we can mostly ignore reflexive 
relations, and continue speaking as if relations hold between two or more entities.4  I 
bring up reflexive relations merely to note that some relations could be instantiated by a 
single entity. 
At first glance, there is a strong presumptive case that goodness is (at least in 
some instances) a monadic property. Sentences like: “Coffee is good,” appear to ascribe 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
3 Other examples of relations that are reflexive: Being the same shape as, being the same size as, 
etc. While it may sound strange to say that the coffee mug is the same shape as itself, it is 
nonetheless, true of the coffee cup that it is the same shape as itself.!!
4 The issue of reflexive goodness will be discussed in Chapter Five when I discuss Stephen 
Finlay’s end-relational account of goodness. On his view, a state of affairs can be good relative to 
itself. I argue otherwise. 
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goodness to coffee. This sentence appears to only be about coffee; it does not appear to be 
about anything else. That is, the sentence does not appear to be relating coffee to some 
further entity. Thus, it certainly looks like this sentence is ascribing to coffee the monadic 
property of goodness. 
The previous argument trades on the fact that the predicates, or adjectives and 
adjectival phrases that we use to express properties and relations, can also be monadic or 
polyadic. For instance, the predicate ‘is brown’ requires only one noun—or noun 
phrase—to form a complete sentence. It has one empty place; it is thus a monadic 
predicate. On the other hand, the predicate ‘is in front of’ requires at least two nouns (or 
noun phrases) to form a complete sentence. It has two empty places, and is thus dyadic. It 
is tempting to think that monadic predicates always express monadic properties, and that 
polyadic predicates always express relations, but this is not quite right. Compare, for 
instance, the polyadic predicate ‘is in front of,’ with the monadic predicate, ‘is in front of 
me’.  The latter predicate is monadic because it only has one empty place; but being in 
front of me is a relational property. The attribute of being in front of me is the kind of 
attribute that only needs one entity to instantiate it, and is thus, a monadic property, but it 
is nonetheless relational; it is constituted by a relation to me. Being in front of me is thus 
a monadic relational property. 
There are two lessons to draw from this last example.  First, the example shows 
that there can be monadic relational properties. For the sake of simplicity, I will continue 
to use the phrase ‘monadic property’ to refer only to non-relational monadic properties, 
and will add the qualifier ‘relational’ whenever I wish to speak about monadic relational 
properties. So when I say that the orthodox view in philosophy is that goodness is a 
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monadic property, I mean that it is a monadic, non-relational property. Second, since the 
predicate used to express the monadic relational property of being in front of me was a 
monadic predicate, it follows that in some cases, monadic predicates can express relations 
or relational properties. The presumptive argument for the claim that goodness is a 
monadic property is thus, inconclusive. Although ‘good’ is a monadic predicate, it might 
nonetheless express a relation or a relational property.  And that is precisely what my 
thesis is:  that ‘good’ always expresses a relation that holds between things and goals.   
Having clarified my thesis, let me now state briefly how I go about supporting it. I 
began this introduction with a quote from Sherlock Holmes that quite succinctly and 
beautifully describes the method of doing philosophy that I pursue in this dissertation. 
Questions about the nature of goodness are difficult, philosophical questions with broad 
implications. The way we answer them will have implications for both meta-ethics and 
normative ethics. And although those are the areas where philosophers are most eager to 
get answers about the nature of goodness, I have opted to begin elsewhere; I have opted 
to begin my inquiry with the ‘more elementary’ questions. My thought was that I should 
start in familiar territory, and only venture further out into the unknown after having a 
good understanding of the lay of the land close to home. To be less metaphorical: I 
thought that I should begin by investigating the everyday, common occurrences of the 
word ‘good,’ and see what they reveal about the nature of non-moral goodness.5  
After all, everyday we judge countless things as good in ways that are not 
(typically) regarded as moral. We judge the goodness of newspapers, websites, parking !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
5 G.E. Moore was perhaps the first philosopher to pursue such a strategy. Since Moore, most 
philosophers concerned with describing the nature of goodness have pursued this strategy. 
Notably:  R.M. Hare (1952), Paul Ziff (1960), Georg Henrik von Wright (1963), J.L. Mackie 
(1977), Paul Ziff (1960), Peter Geach (1956), Judith Thomson (1992, 1993, 1997, 2001, 2003, 
2008), and Stephen Finlay (2001, 2004, 2006, 2014). 
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spaces, restaurants, conversation topics, clothing, hairstyles, routes to work, student 
papers, etc, etc. Due to the pervasiveness of our non-moral goodness judgments, one 
would expect that we would be well situated to answer questions about the nature of non-
moral goodness. So why not begin our investigation into the nature of goodness with an 
investigation into non-moral goodness? Only after having developed an adequate theory 
of non-moral goodness do I then move onto investigating the philosophically vexing 
questions about moral goodness. I call this the ‘Bottom-Up Strategy.”  
 I believe that much more can be said about the virtues of the Bottom-Up Strategy, 
or about the perils of pursuing the opposite strategy (the ‘Top-Down Strategy’).  I will 
save that discussion for another time.6 Ultimately, the true test of a methodology is 
whether or not it gets the right results. I believe that my pursuit of the Bottom-Up 
Strategy delivers a plausible, elegant theory of all goodness—both moral and non-moral. 
It is hard to argue with those results. 
 
II. Chapter Summaries 
In Chapter One, I review the contemporary discussion of the nature of goodness.  
I frame the discussion by focusing on the views of G.E. Moore, who defended the view 
that goodness is a simple, indefinable non-natural property, and Peter Geach, who argued 
that goodness is a relation between things and kinds. I begin by evaluating Moore’s 
arguments. I argue that he was unsuccessful in showing that ‘good’ is undefinable. I then 
present Geach’s argument, and consider some objections to it offered by R.M. Hare and 
Michael J. Zimmerman. Ultimately, I end up agreeing with the objectors: Geach’s 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
6 I discuss the issue very briefly in Chapter Two. 
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argument simply does not fully support the conclusion that all goodness is relational. I 
take the shortcomings of Geach’s argument as instructive, however, of what more is 
needed from an argument to fully support the claim that all goodness is relational. 
In light of the lessons learned from Geach’s failed argument, in Chapter Two, I 
construct my own argument that goodness is relational. Briefly put, I argue that the best 
account of the nature of non-moral goodness is that it is a relation that holds between the 
things that are good and ends. I then argue that the word ‘good’ is univocal—and thus we 
should conclude that our moral uses of the word ascribe the same attribute to things that 
our non-moral use of the word does. Thus, all goodness is end-relational. There are three 
possible ways of objecting to this argument: (a) deny that non-moral goodness is end-
relational, (b) argue that ‘good’ is ambiguous, or (c) point to something other than their 
end-relational nature that non-moral goodness and moral goodness have in common, in 
virtue of which it remains appropriate to insist that ‘good’ is univocal.  I argue that each 
of these options conflict with too many of our pre-philosophical judgments about 
goodness. We are thus correct to conclude that all goodness is end-relational.   
In Chapter Three, I look at what I believe is the most glaring and troubling 
(apparent) shortcoming of an end-relational account of goodness:  according to such a 
view, there is no such thing as intrinsic goodness. After all, on an end-relational account 
of goodness, things are good because of how they relate to goals. They are good for the 
sake of goals and thus cannot be good for their own sakes. The fact that my view requires 
denying the existence of intrinsic goodness might make my view seem too revisionary to 
be true. However, I argue that the roles that intrinsic goodness has been taken to play in 
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our practical lives and practical reasoning can be filled even if we only posit end-
relational goodness. It is thus unnecessary to posit intrinsic goodness. 
In Chapter Four, I further defend my premise that non-moral goodness is end-
relational. A handful of philosophers (Peter Geach, Judith Thomson, Philippa Foot, 
Richard Kraut, to name a few) have defended relational views of goodness where 
goodness is not relative to goals, but to other things instead. Notably, they have defended 
the views that goodness is relative to kinds, or relative to interests. I describe these 
different views and evaluate the motivations for them, and the theoretical virtues they 
enjoy. I argue that these theories either conflict with our pre-philosophical intuitions, or 
lack important theoretical virtues that an end-relational theory of goodness enjoys. I 
conclude that a theory that views goodness as relative to ends is thus the most plausible 
relational account of goodness. 
Finally, having settled that an end-relational theory of goodness is the most 
plausible relational theory, the last task remaining is to develop and defend my preferred 
end-relational account of goodness in greater detail. I do this in Chapter Five. In doing so, 
I distinguish my view from that of Stephen Finlay. I focus on his view because it is the 
most developed end-relational theory that can be found in the literature. As I read him, 
Finlay disagrees with me about three key components of an end-relational theory of 
goodness:  (1) What type of things can be good, (2) How we should characterize ends, 
and (3) What the goodness relation is like. I provide reasons to think that my view is 
more plausible than Finlay’s in regards to all three of these points, thus showing my view 
to be the more plausible end-relational theory of goodness overall.  
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Finally, in the last section of the dissertation, I discuss the possibility of extending 
my end-relational account of goodness to account for moral goodness. I sketch a couple 
of ways in which someone taken by my account of goodness might develop a moral 
theory. The goal of that section is not to argue for these moral theories, but merely to 
show that sensible and plausible moral theories can be developed, even if we only posit 
end-relational goodness.  Further developing and defending those theories will have to be 
left for future work. This last section, I hope, vindicates my pursuit of the Bottom-Up 
Strategy. If that section is successful, it shows that one can construct a philosophically 
plausible moral theory by starting from the ‘elementary’ questions and working up.  
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Chapter One – The Debate Over the Nature of Goodness 
 
 
 
 
I. Introduction 
 
In the last few decades, a handful of philosophers have argued against the 
orthodox view that goodness is a property, insisting instead that it is a relation (although, 
they tend to disagree about the details). These relationalists, 7 for lack of a better term, 
noticed that some monadic predicates, like ‘in front of me,’ express relational properties. 
The surface structure of these predicates was not a good indicator of what kind of 
attribute they express. Since the surface grammar of sentences can be misleading, the 
relationalists insist that we need to inquire into the meaning of sentences to understand 
the nature of goodness. We should not conclude that goodness is a monadic property 
simply because ‘good’ is a monadic predicate in sentences like: ‘Coffee is good.’  
The first such relationalist was Peter Geach, who in his article, “Good and Evil,” 
made a very interesting observation about the behavior of certain adjectives. 8 Geach 
observed that sentences containing the adjective ‘good’ had very different logical 
properties than the sentences containing adjectives that clearly express monadic 
properties. Thus, he concluded, ‘good’ does not express a monadic property.  For better 
or for worse this argument has been used as a starting point for many of the relationalists 
who have followed Geach.  
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
7 For instance: R.B. Perry (1926), Peter Geach (1956), Paul Ziff (1960), J.L. Mackie (1977), 
David Copp (1995), Philippa Foot (2001), Judith Jarvis Thomson (2008), Richard Kraut (2007, 
2011), Christine Korsgaard (2013), and Stephen Finlay (2014). In Chapter Four I will discuss to 
what extent it is proper to call some of these philosophers ‘relationalists’. 
8 Geach (1956) 
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In this chapter, I will evaluate Geach’s argument that all goodness is relational. 
Before looking at the details of his argument, however, I will first discuss the views of 
G.E. Moore—a defender of the orthodox view of goodness, and one of Geach’s primary 
targets in “Good and Evil.” In fact, in that article Geach was less concerned with 
developing a positive account of goodness as he was with arguing against the view of 
goodness offered by G.E. Moore.9 This is understandable; Moore’s arguments revitalized 
an interest in the question of the nature of goodness. Moore’s conclusion, however, was 
that not much could be said about the nature of goodness—goodness is unanalyzable. If 
Moore is correct, then the project of this dissertation is doomed from the start. After all, I 
wish to analyze goodness as a relation that holds between things and ends. If goodness is 
unanalyzable, then my theory of goodness is mistaken. Thus, my first task in this 
dissertation is to argue that Moore’s argument that goodness is unanalzyable is unsound. 
Once I have dealt with Moore’s argument, I will turn my attention to Geach’s. 
After explaining the argument in more detail, I will consider some of the criticisms that 
have been offered by R.M. Hare and Michael J. Zimmerman.10 They argue that Geach’s 
observation about the logical properties of sentences containing ‘good’ is limited to a 
much smaller class of sentences than Geach imagined. His argument thus only supports 
the claim that goodness is relational—in some cases. Ultimately, I will side with Geach’s 
critics. Geach’s argument does not adequately support his thesis that all goodness is 
relational. My hope is that by identifying what goes wrong with Geach’s argument, I 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
9 Geach also spent much of that article arguing against the theory of goodness offered by R.M. 
Hare. I will discuss Hare and his view of goodness in the next chapter, when I discuss non-
cognitivist views of goodness. 
10 Hare (1957), Zimmerman (2001) 
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stand a better chance of constructing my own argument that is not vulnerable to similar 
objections.   
 
II. Moore’s Account of Goodness 
 G.E. Moore’s work, Principia Ethica, launched the contemporary meta-ethical 
discussion of goodness. Contemporary debate over the nature of goodness has largely 
been a response to G.E. Moore—with one side defending, extending, and developing the 
views he offered in Principia Ethica, and the other side criticizing those views and 
offering alternatives. While I disagree with much of what Moore and his followers have 
written, I will concede that there are a few points on which we agree. For instance, Moore 
and I agree that the question about the nature of goodness is of central importance for 
moral theorizing. He writes: 
Ethics is undoubtedly concerned with the question what good conduct is; 
but, being concerned with this, it obviously does not start at the beginning, 
unless it is prepared to tell us what is good as well as what is conduct.  For 
‘good conduct’ is a complex notion: all conduct is not good; for some is 
certainly bad and some may be indifferent.  And on the other hand, other 
things, beside conduct, may be good; and if they are so, then, ‘good’ 
denotes some property, that is common to them and conduct; and if we 
examine good conduct alone of all good things, then we shall be in danger 
of mistaking for this property, some property which is not shared by those 
other things: and thus we shall have made a mistake about Ethics even in 
this limited sense; for we shall not know what good conduct really is… 
(G.E. Moore, Principia Ethica, 1903, p.54) 
 
In this passage, Moore expresses two other thoughts with which I agree.  First, he claims 
that there must be something in common between those things that are morally good and 
those that are non-morally good, and that the word ‘good’ denotes this shared property.  
My only wish is that he did not use the word ‘property’ when making this point. After all, 
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I claim that it is a relation—not a property—that all good things share in common. 
However, were we to use a neutral term like ‘feature’ or ‘attribute’ that could equally 
apply to properties as well as to relations, then Moore and I would agree that ‘good’ 
always ascribes the same attribute to things, whether we are talking about non-moral 
goodness or moral goodness. In the next chapter, I call this the Thesis of Commonality, 
and it is a crucial premise in my main argument. Second, Moore and I agree that there is 
‘danger’ in beginning an inquiry into moral goodness by focusing on moral goodness 
alone (what I called a ‘Top-Down Strategy’ in the Introduction). Doing so would likely 
result in a theory of goodness that is not unified—that is, a theory that denies the Thesis 
of Commonality. Such a view would claim that moral goodness is one type of property or 
relation, while non-moral goodness is another (or others). I suspect that Moore would 
agree with me that there is a presumptive case in favor of the Thesis of Commonality, 
and thus, in favor of a unified theory of goodness. It is those who wish to argue that 
‘good’ sometimes ascribes one type of attribute to things, and other times ascribes 
another, that owe us reasons for abandoning the presumption of the Thesis of 
Commonality. Despite these similarities between our views, Moore goes on to make 
many claims I disagree with, and consequently, offers a very different theory of goodness 
than the one I defend.  
For example, one of Moore’s central claims in Principia Ethica is that ‘good’ is 
simple and indefinable. This appears to be a claim about the word ‘good,’ and not about 
goodness itself, but Moore is clear that his conclusion is not about words or lexical 
definitions.  He writes:   
The most important sense of ‘definition’ is that in which a definition states 
what are the parts which invariably compose a certain whole; and in this 
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sense ‘good’ has no definition because it is simple and has no parts.  It is 
one of those innumerable objects of thought which are themselves 
incapable of definition, because they are the ultimate terms by reference to 
which whatever is capable of definition must be defined (G.E. Moore, 
Principia Ethica, 1903, p.61). 
 
This quotation clarifies Moore’s thesis in two ways. First, it shows that Moore was not 
looking for ‘definitions’ of words, but of the properties and objects themselves that our 
words pick out. His thesis is about goodness as an object of thought—not as a lexical 
item. It is thus the property of goodness that he thinks is simple. Second, the quote 
clarifies what Moore means by ‘definition’. A definition, in Moore’s sense, involves 
describing the nature of an entity by describing its component parts. In summary, we 
should really understand Moore’s thesis as claiming that the property of goodness is 
simple, and thus, not analyzable (at least not in the sense of ‘analysis’ that involves 
describing an entity by describing its constitutive components).   
According to this picture, some properties are complex, that is, built up out of 
more basic component parts. We analyze these properties by breaking them into their 
component parts. So for instance, being a horse can be defined, according to Moore, as 
being:  “A hoofed quadruped of the genus Equus.”11 Sometimes while analyzing an 
entity, we will discover that some of its component parts are themselves complex. 
However, Moore thinks we can simply analyze those components into their components. 
For instance, in the above analysis of what it is to be a horse, we can further analyze what 
it is to be a quadruped as “a being with four feet”.  Eventually, Moore thinks any 
successful analysis will reveal the set of simple properties or entities (that cannot be 
broken down further into more basic entities) that constitute the complex entity that is 
being analyzed.  Moore believed that goodness was one of these simple, unanalyzable !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
11 Moore (1903) p.60 
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properties. If Moore is right about this, then my entire project is doomed from the start. 
After all, I believe that we can give an end-relational definition of goodness. If goodness 
is simple, then it certainly cannot be given an end-relational definition. I need to show 
that there is something wrong with Moore’s arguments for this claim. 
Moore’s primary (and most famous) argument for the claim that goodness is 
simple and unanalyzable is what has come to be called the “Open Question Argument.”  
In brief, Moore proposes a test we can use to determine if we have reached the correct 
analysis of a complex entity. Suppose we are attempting to analyze a kind of entity, E, 
and we propose the analysis A.  If A were the correct analysis of E, says Moore, then the 
question: “I recognize that X is A, but is X really E?” when asked of a particular entity, 
X, will sound closed.12 When a question is closed anyone who understands the question 
cannot fail to thereby know the answer. So for instance, “I recognize that Brett is an 
unmarried man, but is Brett really a bachelor?” should sound closed to us. We know that 
by definition bachelors are unmarried men. Since we understand this fact, there is really 
no way for us to wonder about whether or not Brett, the bachelor, is an unmarried man. 
The question is settled—and thus closed. A question is open, on the other hand, if a 
person can understand what the question is asking and can sincerely entertain more than 
one possible answer to it. Moore’s thought was that if A were the correct analysis of E, 
then A would mean the same thing as the word we use to refer to E.  Thus, the test 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
12 This is not exactly the form of the question that Moore proposed. His Open Question Test was 
of the form: “Is E really A?” I believe that nothing crucial turns on my decision to formulate the 
Open Question Test in the manner that I have. Notice that if Moore’s test question were open, it 
would explain why my test question is too: “Is a horse really a hoofed quadruped of the genus 
Equus?” sounds closed, thus, so would, “I recognize that Mr. Ed is a hoofed quadruped… but is 
Mr. Ed really a horse?” 
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question: “I know that X is A, but is X really E?” should sound closed. Moore concludes 
that if the test question sounds open however, then A is not the correct analysis of E. 
Moore claimed that any possible analysis we could give for goodness would fail 
the Open Question Test.  He writes: “whatever definition be offered, it may be always 
asked, with significance, of the complex so defined, whether it is itself good.”13  So for 
instance, my account of goodness claims that when we judge that X is good, we are 
judging that X promotes a goal G.  We can apply Moore’s test to this analysis by asking:  
“I recognize that X promotes G, but is X really good?”  This question sounds open, so 
Moore would conclude that my analysis of goodness is mistaken.  Now of course, Moore 
does not go through each and every possible analysis of goodness, showing them all to 
fail his Open Question Test. Instead, Moore challenges us to think of an analysis that 
would make the test question sound closed. He holds that there is no such analysis; 
therefore, there must not be a correct analysis of the property of goodness.  That is, 
goodness is simple. 
In response, I must concede to Moore that the question: “I recognize that X 
promotes a goal G, but is X really good?” does indeed sound open. In order to defend my 
proposed analysis14 of goodness and simultaneously show that Moore is wrong to 
conclude goodness is unanalyzable, I need to explain how (a) we have the intuition that 
the test question is open (what I will be referring to as the ‘Openness Intuition’), even 
though (b) my analysis is still the correct one. 
There is a vast literature on the Open Question Argument; it would be another 
book length project to address the plentitude of alleged problems (and solutions) that !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
13 Ibid, p.67 
14 In the sense of analysis that Moore has been calling a ‘definition’ 
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philosophers have raised with respect to this test. Instead, I will focus on one response 
that is open to relationalists—one that has been given by J.L. Mackie and Stephen 
Finlay.15 Their response involves identifying another factor that could (at least in the case 
of goodness) generate the Openness Intuition when we are confronted with the test 
question. They argue that certain questions with the same grammatical structure as the 
test question can sound open when they are asked of words that are context-sensitive.16  
Since contextual clues are required to understand the meaning of the questions, our 
having the Openness Intuition can be explained, at least in these cases, pragmatically. In 
short, they claim that the Open Question Test will occasionally give us false negatives. 
This shows that Moore was wrong to conclude that ‘good’ was unanalyzable simply 
because it fails the Open Question Test.  The Openness Intuition we have when we run 
the test question on a proposed analysis of goodness could be an indication that our 
proposed analysis is incorrect, or it could be that ‘good’ is context-sensitive.   
Consider the relational property of tallness. Now, whatever tallness is, it is not 
merely a quantitative measure of height. We can measure height with a ruler—and give 
more or less precise quantitative judgments about a thing’s height.  However, given any 
particular measurement of height, that height can be rightfully called both tall, and not 
tall (relative to different standards). This is because tallness is always relative to some 
class of entities, whereas height is not relative. A height of five feet is pretty tall for a 
kindergartner; it is not, however, very tall for a basketball player.  It is extremely short 
for a redwood tree, and extremely tall for a blade of grass.  A height of five feet is thus !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
15 Finlay (2014) p.21, Mackie (1977) p.60 
16 Finlay calls these ‘incomplete predicates.’ His examples are ‘tall’, ‘old’, ‘fast’, ‘cold,’ and 
‘eager’ (2014) pp.20-21. Geach uses the example of ‘big,’ (1956) p.33, Ziff uses the example of 
‘heavy’ (1960) p.203, and Thomson uses the example of ‘famous’ (2008) p.14. In what follows, I 
stick to the example ‘tall’. 
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not just plain tall.  The same could be said of the height of 500 feet, 5,000 feet, or even 
five million feet for that matter. A height of five million feet would be extremely tall for a 
building on Earth. However, we can imagine a race of giant aliens for whom a building of 
five million feet is quite short. Tallness, I conclude, must always be understood as 
relative to some comparison class.   
Often, we will use sentences to express the thought that something is tall, without 
explicitly stating which group relative to which we are judging that thing’s tallness. In 
those cases, our audience will have to determine, by contextual clues, which comparison 
class we are using. Standing in front of a rollercoaster that my friends are trying to coax 
me to ride, I might say:  “I don’t know; it looks pretty tall.”  It would be inappropriate for 
my friends to respond:  “You think that is tall?  Have you ever seen Mt. Everest? Now 
that’s tall!” This response is inappropriate because my friend’s claim invokes the 
standards of tallness for mountains (or perhaps of terrestrial objects), and it is 
uncharitable for my friend to think I was judging the tallness of the rollercoaster relative 
to those standards (surely I know that even the tallest rollercoaster is short compared to 
mountains!). This interpretation is uncharitable since it requires interpreting me as either 
an incompetent judge of tallness, or as blatantly flouting one of Grice’s Conversational 
Maxims.17 One Gricean maxim—the Maxim of Relation–states that one’s contribution to 
the conversation should always be relevant. Given that we were talking about 
rollercoasters, and more specifically, about riding this particular rollercoaster, it would 
have been irrelevant to our conversation for me to suddenly start comparing rollercoasters 
to mountains without signaling the change of topic in any way. More charitably then, one 
should interpret my comment about the ride’s tallness to reflect a judgment about the !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
17 Grice (1989) 
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rollercoaster’s tallness relative to the group: rollercoasters (or perhaps, the group: 
structures I would feel safe sitting atop of with little more than a seatbelt securing me).  
These interpretations of my comment do not require either interpreting me as an 
incompetent judge of tallness, or as flouting any Gricean maxims.  
I hope that my rollercoaster example illustrates why I am calling our judgments 
about tallness context-sensitive. Since I did not explicitly state it, my audience needed to 
appeal to contextual clues to determine which comparison class it was that sets the 
standards for tallness that I was using when judging the rollercoaster as tall. In this case, 
there was no real mystery; we were talking about rollercoasters after all. In fact, it is often 
unnecessary to explicitly state which group it is relative to which we are judging an 
object to be tall. I do not need to say, “It’s tall for a rollercoaster,” I can just say, “It’s 
tall.”  However, we should still understand the latter sentence to include an implicit 
reference to the standards of tallness for rollercoasters. No explicit reference to standards 
is necessary if the context of the utterance provides sufficient clues to determine what 
standards are being utilized. 
Now consider a child, Kevin, who is 5 feet tall. That is quite tall for a 
kindergartener. However, the following question still sounds open: “I know that Kevin is 
tall for a kindergartener, but is he tall?” My claim is that ‘tall’ introduces a context-
sensitive relation.  Notice, that for the first occurrence of ‘tall’ in that question we are 
alerted to which group of entities sets the criteria for tallness—kindergarteners. However, 
the second occurrence of ‘tall’ lacks an explicit reference to which group it is that sets the 
standards for tallness. The hypothesis that Finlay and Mackie propose is that the reason 
we hear this question as open is due to pragmatics. We hear the question as if the second 
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occurrence of ‘tall’ introduces a different standard of tallness from the first occurrence. 
Why do we hear the sentence this way? Were we simply to interpret both occurrences of 
‘tall’ as introducing the standard of tallness for kindergartners, then the question would 
clearly be closed. “I know that Kevin is tall for a kindergartener, but is he tall for a 
kindergartner?” is a closed question. Since this question is closed, we know that the asker 
already knows the answer to the question (unless she does not understand the words she 
is using). Why would she ask this question if she knew the answer to it already? 
Interpreting the sentence as closed thus requires interpreting the asker as either 
incompetent with respect to the words she uses in the question, or as flouting the Gricean 
Maxim of Relation that requires that our contributions to a conversation be relevant. To 
avoid interpreting our interlocutor as intentionally flouting Grice’s maxims, we 
consequently avoid interpreting both occurrences of ‘tall’ as introducing the standards of 
tallness for kindergartners. Instead, we interpret the second occurrence as introducing 
some further standard. The Openness Intuition we have in response to the question about 
Kevin is due to this imagined switch in standards.18 After all, the question, “I realize that 
this thing is tall relative to this set of standards, but is it tall on this other set of 
standards?” will always sound open. Thus, there is at least one possible confounding 
factor in the Open Question Test—if the term we are judging in the Open Question Test 
is one that is potentially sensitive to the same kind of contextual standard-shifting as 
exhibited by ‘tall,’ this standard shifting will make the question sound open. 
It is worth noting one shortcoming of my description of the argument so far. The 
question about Kevin’s tallness is not one where the first part of the question contains a !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
18 Stephen Finlay (2014) pp.21-2 and Mackie (1977) p.60 both explain the Openness Intuition we 
have in response to the Open Question Test as being a result of perceived standard-switching.!
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putative analysis of ‘tallness’.  My example is thus not perfectly analogous with the Open 
Question Test. My opponents might conclude that no lesson about the Open Question 
Argument can thus be extracted from consideration of my example.  
Insofar as the Open Question Argument relies on our intuitions about which 
questions sound open, however, I see no problem in drawing conclusions about the Open 
Question Argument by considering different ways in which questions might sound open.  
If a presumed shift in standards of evaluation can generate the Openness Intuition in 
cases that do not involve analysis, why couldn’t a presumed shift in standards also 
generate the Openness Intuition in cases of analysis? I agree there is a difference between 
my example question and the Open Question Test—but it is a difference that makes no 
difference. 
In summary, because there is no such thing as just plain tallness and that tallness 
must always be understood as relative to a standard, the term ‘tall’ in the second clause of 
the test question can be understood in many different ways (by simply switching what 
standard relative to which we understand it).  When confronted with the question: “I 
know he is tall, but is he tall?” we could of course assume there is no switch in standard, 
and thus that the question is closed. This requires us interpreting our interlocutor in an 
uncharitable way. Alternatively, we could interpret our interlocutor as intending to switch 
standards—thus explaining both the fact that the question sounds open, and why anyone 
would ask such a question in the first place. We expect that our interlocutors are making 
a genuine effort to communicate with us in an efficient and informative manner—and 
thus expect that their contributions to our conversation will be made in accordance with 
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Grice’s Conversational Maxims. Thus if we can interpret their question as involving a 
switch in standard—instead of being a trivial, closed question—we will do so.   
My analysis of goodness fails the Open Question Test (which, again, I am 
granting to Moore) since the question, “I know that X promotes G, but is X good?” 
sounds open. I have been arguing that this does not mean that my analysis is incorrect.  
The Open Question Argument returns false negatives in the case of putative analyses of 
certain relations—namely, those relations that are ascribed by context-sensitive terms.  
Moore’s argument is thus inconclusive. If goodness were a relation that introduced 
different standards of evaluation in different contexts, then it might be the case that 
goodness is not simple. In the next chapter, I will provide reasons for thinking that our 
judgments about goodness are in fact context-sensitive in the same way that our 
judgments about tallness are. 
 
III. Geach’s Linguistic Argument 
In the last few decades, a handful of philosophers have challenged the traditional 
view that goodness is a monadic property.19 Most of them, at one point or another, rely 
on an observation about the “the peculiar logic of the term ‘good”20 described by Peter 
Geach in his now seminal article, “Good and Evil.” There, Geach distinguished between 
two kinds of adjectives: those that were logically predicative, and those that are logically 
attributive.21  
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
19 See footnote 1  
20 Geach (1956) p. 40 
21 For simplicity’s sake, I will henceforth simply use ‘predicative’ and ‘attributive’ to mean 
‘logically predicative’ and ‘logically attributive’ respectively.   
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Predicative adjectives, Geach tells us, exhibit two noteworthy logical features.  
First, consider sentences of the form: “That is a ADJ NOUN” where ‘ADJ’ is a 
predicative adjective. If such a sentence is true we can infer the truth of the sentences 
“That is ADJ” and “That is a NOUN”.   So for instance: 
(1a) That is a gray car. 
(1b) That is a car. 
(1c) That is gray. 
 
Because (1a) is true, it follows that (1b) and (1c) are also true. 
 
Second, Geach observed that if there are two or more (common) noun terms that 
correctly describe the same thing, then we can interchange these noun terms in sentences 
of the form ‘That is a ADJ NOUN’ without loss of truth, if the adjective is predicative. 
So for instance, my car is both a car and a Toyota Corolla.  Thus, if “That is a gray car” is 
true of my car, so is: 
(1d) That is a gray Toyota Corolla.   
The other type of adjective, what Geach calls an attributive adjective, does not 
exhibit these same logical features. Consider the following example: 
(2a) George is a big flea.  
(2b) George is a flea.  
 ** (2c) George is big. 
** (2d) George is a big animal. 
 
Because ‘big’ is an attributive adjective, we cannot infer the truth of (2c) from (2a).  And 
even though all fleas are animals, and it is true that George is a big flea, we cannot 
conclude that (2d) George is a big animal. 
Geach noticed that the predicate ‘good’ does not exhibit the logical features of a 
predicative adjective, and thus concluded that it is an attributive adjective.  Consider: 
(3a) That is a good chess move. 
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(3b) That is a chess move. 
 ** (3c) That is good. 
 
And although a chess move is a human act, even though it is true that some particular 
move is a good chess move, it does not follow that: 
** (3d) That is a good human act. 
Why do these two types of adjective exhibit different logical features? Geach 
suggests an answer. Attributive adjectives like ‘big’ do not pick out a property. There is 
no such property as that of being just plain big. Instead, any judgment of bigness must be 
understood as relative to some criteria, and the criteria for bigness judgments are 
determined by what kind of thing we are talking about. A big atom might only be a few 
picometers across (that is, a few trillionths of a millimeter), whereas a big galaxy will be 
measured in light years (that is, in trillions of kilometers). So for any particular 
measurement of length, a thing of that length will be big for some things, but small for 
others. There is thus no particular size that is just big. Similarly, concludes Geach, there 
is no such thing as just plain goodness. The criteria for goodness are determined by what 
kind of thing it is we are talking about. So, sentences of the form “That is good” or 
“Pleasure is good” that do not specify what kind of thing we are talking about, are either 
meaningless, or are rendered meaningful by some contextually indicated kind term. As 
Geach puts it: 
Even when ‘good’ or ‘bad’ stands by itself as a predicate, and is thus 
grammatically predicative, some substantive has to be understood; there is 
no such thing as being just good or bad, there is only being a good or bad 
so-and-so  (Peter Geach, “Good and Evil,” 1956, p.34). 
 
Earlier, I noted that sentences like ‘Coffee is good’ on their surface, appear to be 
ascribing a monadic property. What Geach says is that this surface grammar is deceiving. 
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Although sentences like ‘Coffee is good’ appear to ascribe monadic properties—they 
have implicit references to kinds that suggest that ‘good’ actually ascribes a relation.  
Geach claims that ‘good’ is an attributive adjective. He concludes from this fact 
that all goodness, including moral goodness, is relational. How does Geach move from 
observation about the logical properties of sentencing containing certain kinds of 
adjectives to the metaphysical claim that all goodness is relational? Unfortunately, the 
article is very brief, and much of his argument is not explicitly stated. In the next section, 
I will do my best to extract an argument from what Geach does say explicitly. 
a) A Geach-Inspired Metaphysical Argument 
Geach might be taken to argue as follows: For every monadic property, P, and 
every entity, E, either E has P, or it does not.22 Any sentence, S, that ascribes P to E 
would be true if and only if E has P. It should not matter for the truth of S how E is 
described (so long as the description is accurate), nor should it matter what kind term it is 
that E falls under; all that matters for the truth of S is (a) that S ascribes P to E, and (b) 
that E instantiates P.  So, if the truth of S does depend on how we describe E, or on what 
kind term E falls under, then it follows that S does not ascribe a monadic property to E.  
The truth of sentences predicating an attributive adjective of a noun depends on what 
noun or noun phrase we use to refer to E (This premise is the one Geach spends much of 
his time arguing for). Thus, sentences containing attributive adjectives do not attribute a 
monadic property to E. Thus, attributive adjectives do not express monadic properties.  
‘Good’ is an attributive adjective (Geach argues for this premise as well).  Therefore, 
‘good’ does not express a monadic property.  !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
22 I should probably add, “at time T1, to allow for cases where E has P at one time, then loses it 
later (or lacks it at an earlier time, and gains it later).  To keep things simple in the main text, I am 
omitting these references to time.  
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Central to this argument is the claim that the truth of sentences that ascribe 
monadic properties to things does not depend on how we describe those things. What can 
be said to motivate this premise?  The thought is this. Suppose I have a term ‘X’ that 
successfully refers to an entity E, and an adjective ‘A’ that expresses a monadic property 
P. Suppose that it is true that E instantiates P. Any sentence that expresses the proposition 
that E instantiates P will be true, and any sentence that expresses the proposition that E 
does not instantiate P will be false, since E really does instantiate P.  When I predicate 
my referring term ‘X’ with my adjective ‘A’ to form a sentence, that sentence expresses 
the proposition that E instantiates P. That sentence is thus true. Notice, however, that I 
explained this in a way that was completely content-neutral. This argument will work 
with whatever referring term we plug in for ‘X’. Thus, the truth of sentences that ascribe 
monadic properties to things does not depend on how we describe those things. 
b) Objections to Geach’s Argument 
Geach’s argument also crucially depends on the claim that ‘good’ is an attributive 
adjective. This premise appears explicitly in the article, and is one that Geach spent a fair 
amount of time defending (That is, it is not a premise that I cooked up to make sense of 
Geach’s implicit argument). R.M. Hare was the first to take issue with Geach’s support 
for this premise.  In “Geach on Good and Evil,”23 Hare argues that the linguistic data that 
Geach relies on do not adequately support the claim that ‘good’ always operates as an 
attributive adjective. Recall, Geach supports this claim by way of examples—only a very 
small handful of examples at that. At best, then, Geach has shown us that some uses of 
‘good’ operate attributively.24 Perhaps the goodness of artifacts like cars must always be !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
23 Hare (1957) 
24 Hare, (1957) pp.107-8!
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relative to a kind term. However, unless he can show that there is no predicative use of 
‘good,’ it remains possible that ‘good’ sometimes behaves predicatively, and thus, 
possible that ‘good’ sometimes expresses a monadic property.  
 Michael Zimmerman expands on this objection.  He argues that not only is it 
fallacious for Geach to conclude from the fact that ‘good’ sometimes operates as an 
attributive adjective that it never operates as a predicative adjective, but he also claims 
that in fact, ‘good’ does sometimes operate as a predicative adjective.25  Consider, for 
example: 
(4a) Giving to charity is a good human action. 
If (4a) is true, it seems like so is (4b), (4c), and (4d): 
(4b) Giving to charity is a human action. 
(4c) Giving to charity is good. 
(4d) Giving to charity is a good way to spend one’s time and energy.26 !
What is most worrying about this objection, for Geach’s supporters, is that the kind of 
goodness that Zimmerman appeals to in (4a)-(4d) might be moral goodness. As I 
mentioned before, many of the people who believe that goodness is monadic are only 
really interested in discussing moral goodness—they thus often ignore non-moral 
goodness. If Zimmerman’s counterexample is successful, it remains open for the 
supporters of the orthodoxy to say that non-moral goodness is relational, while moral 
goodness is not.  Geach has not shown otherwise. 
Geach believes, however, that he has already explained why Zimmerman’s 
alleged counterexample falsely appears to be a predicative use of ‘good’.  He says that !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
25  Zimmerman (2001) p.18 
26 This is my own example. Zimmerman uses the sentence “X is an intrinsically good state of 
mind.” (2001) p.21.  I avoided using his example due to his focus on ‘intrinsic’ goodness (which 
he later goes on to equate with moral goodness).!
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when ‘good’ is used without an explicit reference to a kind term, we either contextually 
determine what kind term is implied, or we read a kind term into the sentence. Giving to 
charity belongs to the kind human action, so we naturally read into (4c) “Giving to 
charity is good (qua human action)”. Geach can accept that the truth of (4c) is guaranteed 
by the truth of (4a) when interpreted in this way (since they would mean the same thing).  
What Geach cannot accept, however, is that (4c) expresses that charity is just plain 
good—or in Zimmerman’s words ‘generically good.’  He must insist that despite 
appearances, (4c) really states that charity is good relative to a kind. 
Zimmerman has two replies to the previous defense of Geach’s position. First, 
suppose we agree that Geach is correct and that there is no such thing as generic (or just 
plain) goodness. Who cares? That is not the notion of goodness that is important for 
moral philosophy. We could be rid of it, and could still make all the goodness judgments 
we believe to be relevant to ethics. Those judgments, after all, are about moral 
goodness—not generic goodness.27 Second, since our interest is in moral goodness, the 
real question should be whether sentences of the form “X is morally good” exhibit the 
logical features that we expect from sentences containing predicative adjectives or not. 
We can thus set aside the issue of the relation of moral goodness to generic goodness. 
But, says Zimmerman, once we run Geach’s test on an example discussing moral 
goodness, we no longer see the entailments that Geach predicts for ‘good’: 
(5a) Giving to charity is a morally good human action. 
(5b) Giving to charity is a human action. 
(5c) Giving to charity is morally good. 
(5d) Giving to charity is a morally good way to spend one’s time and energy. 
 !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
27 Zimmerman in fact believes there is such a thing as generic goodness, but notes that this is 
“strictly by the by.” Ibid, p.21 
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(5a) appears to have all the logical features we expect from a sentence with a predicative 
adjective. Thus, ‘morally good’ is a predicative adjective—and it thus ascribes a monadic 
property. 
I am inclined to agree with Zimmerman that his counterexamples successfully 
show that ‘morally good’ operates like a predicative adjective. Yet we have to be careful 
about what conclusion to draw from this fact. One of Geach’s premises was that if a 
predicate ascribes a monadic property, it will operate as a predicative adjective. This is a 
necessary condition for a predicate’s ascribing a monadic property, not a sufficient one. 
That means that we are not licensed to conclude that any term that operates as a 
predicative adjective is thus one that ascribes a monadic property. Further, even if 
‘morally good’ introduces a monadic property, this property might still be relational. 
Recall that monadic properties are properties that have only one place. A relation that has 
two places, such as the relation expressed by ‘tall,’ can become monadic if we fill one of 
those places.  It would then be a relational property. So for instance, ‘tall for a 
kindergartner’ expresses a monadic relational property. Given that ‘tall for a 
kindergartner’ expresses a monadic property (albeit, a relational one), we would expect 
for ‘tall for a kindergartner to behave like a predicative adjective.  
Perhaps, then, a similar thing is happening in Zimmerman’s counterexamples.  
That is, perhaps goodness is a two-place relation, and in sentences about moral goodness, 
one of those places has been filled—making it a monadic, relational property. If this were 
the case, then even though ‘morally good’ expresses a relational property, it would still 
behave as a predicative adjective.  To test this hypothesis we need to run Geach’s test on 
a sentence containing a predicate that clearly expresses a monadic, relational property 
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and see if it behaves as an attributive adjective. One notion of goodness that is clearly 
relational is the notion of well-being, or goodness for. This is the notion of goodness used 
in sentences like:  “Eating a little bit of chocolate everyday is good for you.” We know 
this type of goodness is relational, since what is good for me is not always good for you, 
what is good for human beings is not always good for dogs, etc.28 There is no generic 
goodness for, it is always goodness for somebody.  Let’s try the following test sentence: 
(6a) Broccoli is a vegetable that is good for you. 
 
If (6a) were true, then it seems, the following sentences would be true as well: 
 
(6b) Broccoli is a vegetable. 
(6c) Broccoli is good for you. 
(6d) Broccoli is a snack that is good for you. 
 
We thus have a predicate, ‘good for you,’ that expresses a relational type of goodness, 
and yet behaves like a predicative adjective.  
The above example demonstrates that Zimmerman’s own counterexamples should 
not be taken to show that moral goodness is non-relational. After all, moral goodness 
could be a monadic, relational property. Zimmerman’s counterexamples merely show 
that Geach’s test is inconclusive. Adjectives that express monadic properties, whether 
they are relational or non-relational, behave like predicative adjectives. Thus our 
discovery that “morally good” behaves like a predicative adjective does not give us any 
insight into whether or not moral goodness is relational.  
 
 !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
28 Here I follow Richard Kraut in his claim that “it is a conceptual truth about a type of thing that 
is good for someone that possibly that same type of thing is not good for someone else” (2011) 
p.70. To support this claim, Kraut uses a cross-species example of horses and humans. I prefer the 
cross-species example of dogs and chocolate, given by Finlay (2014), p.25. 
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IV. Conclusion 
 I have here considered two different kinds of linguistic tests that were meant to 
support metaphysical conclusions about the nature of goodness.  Moore supported his 
claim that goodness is simple with his Open Question Argument.  He argued that 
incorrect definitions would fail his Open Question Test. But Moore needed to make the 
stronger claim that all and only correct definitions would pass his Open Question Test—
and this claim is not supported. As I argued, there can be other confounding factors that 
might make a question sound open: notably, if an adjective ascribes a relation where one 
of the places of that relation is filled by some contextually indicated entity.   
Geach’s linguistic tests did not fare any better. He proposed that there are two 
kinds of adjectives—predicative and attributive adjectives—and that sentences ascribing 
these different kinds of adjectives have different logical properties.  ‘Good’ does not 
behave like the adjectives that clearly express monadic properties, thus goodness is not a 
monadic property. I agreed with Hare and Zimmerman, however, that Geach’s argument 
does not support his conclusion that all goodness is relative to kinds.  For all that Geach 
has said it remains open that moral goodness might be non-relational.   
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Chapter Two – My argument that goodness is relational 
 
 
 
 
I. Introduction 
 
 In the last chapter, I argued that Geach’s famous argument in favor of a 
relationalist account of goodness was insufficient. The problem was that while ‘good’ 
clearly operates as an attributive adjective in most cases, it certainly seems to operate as a 
predicative adjective in others. Now, for may of the cases where ‘good’ operates as a 
predicative adjective, Geach wants to claim it nonetheless introduced a kind-relational 
attribute. For those cases that cannot be easily explained in this manner, Geach simply 
dismisses these predicative uses of ‘good’ as deviant. Unfortunately, this move is 
unwarranted and ad hoc.29 
 In this chapter, I propose my own argument in support of the relationalist view of 
goodness. I focus, not on the so-called ‘logical properties’ of judgments that ascribe 
goodness to things, but on a definition of goodness. Unlike Moore, I am optimistic that 
there is a common definition that applies to all good things. My argument supports the 
conclusion that when we judge something to be good we ascribe to that thing end-
relational goodness. That is, we judge that it stands in the relevant relation to a goal. 
After providing my argument I consider a series of potential objections. I consider what 
theoretical costs there are in denying one or more of the premises of my argument. 
Ultimately I conclude that denying any of my premises requires accepting a view of !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
29 As I will discuss in Chapter Four, Geach thinks that ‘good thing’ or ‘good event’ are 
meaningless expressions. He concludes that they involve an “illegitimate” use of ‘good’ (1956) 
p.34. 
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goodness that is less plausible than my end-relational account of goodness. There is thus 
good reason to affirm the premises of my argument, and consequently, to affirm an end-
relational account of all goodness. 
 
II. My Argument 
 
I begin this section with a brief statement of my argument that all goodness is (end)30 
relational. I will then proceed to explain and justify each premise in what follows. My 
hope is that by having this sketch of the argument come early in the chapter, it will make 
the next sections easier to follow. I do not want us to miss the forest for the trees, so to 
speak! 
(1) When we judge a thing to be non-morally good, we ascribe end-
relational goodness to that thing. 
(2) Unless the word ‘good’ is ambiguous, it would ascribe the same 
attribute in moral judgments as well as in non-moral moral ones. 
(3) ‘Good’ is not ambiguous. 
(C) Therefore, when we judge something to be morally good, we  
ascribe end-relational goodness to that thing. 
 
I should note that I have intentionally decided to gloss over a few complexities and finer 
points to keep this representation of my argument pithy. The messy details will all come 
out in the discussion that follows. 
a) Premise (2) – The ‘Thesis of Commonality’ 
 
 I will begin the defense of my argument with a discussion of the second premise. 
This might initially seem like a counterintuitive place to begin, but discussion of Premise  
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
30 While I speak of end-relational goodness in the premises, the argument of this chapter alone is, 
strictly speaking, not sufficient to show that all goodness is end-relational. The argument of this 
chapter shows that non-moral goodness is relational—but is inconclusive on what it is, exactly, 
that good things are good in relation to. In Chapter Four, I argue that it is ends—or goals—that 
good things are good in relation to.   
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(2) will be revealing of some of my philosophical and methodological starting points and 
background assumptions. I am of the belief that it is best to get these out into the open as 
soon as possible. Most importantly, my defense of premise two will reveal something 
about how I view the connection between language and metaphysics. My hope is that my 
claims about the connection between language and metaphysics do not require taking on 
too many substantive positions on controversial questions. I hope that the story that I give 
is one with which nearly everyone can agree. Unfortunately, I suspect that I am being 
naive in this wish. 
Premise (2) states that unless the word ‘good’ is ambiguous, it will ascribe the 
same attribute31 in moral judgments as well as in non-moral moral ones. At first glance, 
this premise might strike one as clearly false. My imagined objector might say that upon 
very little reflection, it becomes clear that our judgments about goodness ascribe very 
different attributes to the things we are judging. There is no common feature among good 
things that makes it appropriate to call them all ‘good.’ For instance, when we judge that 
a piece of sandpaper is good we are judging that it is gritty and scratchy to the touch, and 
could be used to scrape away the roughness of a piece of lumber.32 On the other hand, 
when we judge that a piece of silk is good, we are judging that it is smooth and soft. We 
would not want to run a piece of good silk over a rough piece of lumber (and were we to 
do so, surely we wouldn’t worry about the outcome the contact would have on the wood)! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
31 As in Chapter One, I am using the word ‘attribute’ instead of the word ‘property’ at least partly 
because, in what follows, I will be arguing that goodness is not a property, but a relation. I thus 
think it is false to say that our judgments about goodness attribute the same property to the things 
we are judging. However, it would also be premature to use the word ‘relation’. Instead, I opt for 
a neutral term, ‘attribute,’ that I have been using to stand for something that is either a property or 
a relation. 
32 Ziff uses the examples of sweetness (good strawberries are sweet) and sourness (good lemons 
are sour) to make this same point (1960) pp.202-3. Finlay uses the examples of 
sedatives/stimulants, and buoys/anchors (2014) p.20. 
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Thus, concludes my objector, sometimes our judgments about goodness ascribe softness 
to the thing we are judging, while other times they ascribe roughness. Further, given the 
variety of things that we can judge to be good, and the variety of attributes that make 
those things good, there will be many attributes, F, such that there will some things that 
are good in virtue of having F and some things are good in virtue of having non-F.33 
Therefore, concludes my objector, our judgments of goodness do not ascribe the same 
attribute—in fact, they not only ascribe a multitude of attributes, they even often ascribe 
opposing attributes! 
 This objection seems to be a specific instance of a more general argument given 
against conceptual analysis by Ludwig Wittgenstein in Philosophical Investigations.  He 
wrote: 
Consider for example the proceedings that we call ‘games’. I mean board-
games, card-games, ball-games, Olympic games, and so on.  What is 
common to them all?  -- Don’t say: ‘There must be something common, or 
they would not be called “games”’ – but look and see whether there is 
anything common to all… And the result of this examination is: we see a 
complicated network of similarities overlapping and criss-crossing: 
sometimes overall similarities, sometimes similarities of detail.  I can 
think of no better expression to characterize these similarities than ‘family 
resemblances’…  (Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, 1953, 
Aphorisms 66 & 67) 
 
As it is traditionally understood, conceptual analysis involves finding necessary and 
sufficient conditions for the analysandum. That an activity involves a board on which to 
place pieces, or the use of a ball, or teams competing, or a winner and loser, etc. are not 
necessary conditions for being a game; some games do not have those features. Further, !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
33 My objector might be attracted to the stronger claim: that for literally every attribute F, there 
will be some thing X, such that our judgment that X is good ascribes F to X.  I am doubtful this 
will be true. However, all my objector needs to make her point is that for many, if not most, 
attributes this will be the case.  We can thus expect a very wide variety of attributes that we 
ascribe to things when we judge them to be good. 
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none of those conditions are sufficient for an activity to count as a game. A person might 
use pieces on a board to demonstrate the relative locations of buildings downtown, a ball 
can be used when doing certain yoga positions, teams of researchers might compete to 
create and release the next great technical device, wars can have winners and losers, etc. 
So, concludes Wittgenstein, no set of necessary and sufficient conditions can be given 
even for simple, everyday notions like that of a game. If he is right, our chances of giving 
an analysis of a more complicated, philosophical notion—like goodness—will be bleak. 
According to Wittgenstein, just because we use the same word to refer to a group of 
entities, this does not mean they share some set of common features. More importantly 
for my project: If Wittgenstein’s argument is successful and generalizes, then ‘good’ does 
not ascribe the same attribute across both moral and non-moral uses.  
I believe that Wittgenstein is mistaken about this. In some cases, we can identify 
the common feature(s) among things that are appropriately grouped under a common 
term. Because I see my imagined objector as offering a specific instance of 
Wittgenstein’s objection (though specifically directed towards proposed analyses of 
goodness), a good response to Wittgenstein would be, at the same time, a response to my 
objector.  As such, I will now rehearse a few compelling refutations of Wittgenstein’s 
objection. 
First, it is difficult to see exactly how Wittgenstein’s objection is meant to lead to 
skepticism about conceptual analysis. He has not shown it to be impossible to give 
necessary and sufficient conditions for the concept of a game. He has merely shown that 
giving necessary and sufficient conditions can be a very difficult thing to do—a claim 
that I suspect few philosophers would deny! It is a big jump, however, from showing that 
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a task is difficult to accomplish to showing that it is impossible. One might further 
support Wittgenstein’s conclusion, however, by noting that if a good number of smart 
philosophers work quite long and hard at finding an analysis of a concept, and yet fail, 
this is good evidence that the task is impossible. This would be a strange defense of 
Wittgenstein, however, given his particular example: games. After all, part of the set-up 
of that alleged counterexample was that the concept of a game was an ordinary concept—
one that has not received much philosophical investigation. Thus, there is no long history 
of philosophers trying and failing to analyze the notion of game.  
In fact, quite to the contrary, in his book The Grasshopper: Games, Life and 
Utopia Bernard Suits appears to have succeeded at analyzing the notion of a game.34  
Suits claims that:  
To play a game is to engage in activity directed towards bringing about a 
specific state of affairs, using only means permitted by rules, where the 
rules prohibit more efficient in favour of less efficient means, and where 
such rules are accepted just because they make possible such activity 
(Bernard Suits, The Grasshopper, 1978, pp.48-9). 
 
Whether this analysis is correct or not is not for us to decide here. It is at least quite close 
to being successful at a task that Wittgenstein thought was impossible.35 One point worth 
noting, however, is that this analysis is general and attempts to identify essential features 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
34 Suits’ book was published after Wittgenstein’s death, so we cannot fault Wittgenstein for not 
discussing Suits’ analysis. 
35 Consider two of Suits’ examples: in the game of golf the goal is to get the golf ball into the cup. 
The easiest way to do so is probably just to walk over and drop the ball in. That method is 
forbidden, and only a less efficient manner of accomplishing this task (hitting the ball with clubs 
from a distance) is permitted. People accept this limitation in order to enjoy the game of golf 
(1978, p.38). Similarly, the goal of chess is to immobilize your opponent’s king. The easiest ways 
of accomplishing that might be to physically overpower your opponent or to glue her king to the 
board. These methods are not permitted by the rules of chess, and people who do not accept these 
limits would no longer be playing chess (Ibid, pp.67-9). 
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of games.36 As Thomas Hurka points out in the Introduction to The Grasshopper, the 
structural features that Suits points to could easily be true of many various types of game 
(including board games, card games, etc).37 On the other hand, Wittgenstein’s attempt at 
analyzing the concept of a game was superficial, resting “only [on] surface differences 
between games… without even wondering whether they may not be consistent with a 
deeper commonality”38 It is silly to think that an analysis of the concept of a game will be 
given by looking only at the very specific and superficial attributes of particular games.  
Similarly, it is silly to think that an analysis of goodness will be given by looking only at 
the very specific and superficial attributes of the things we judge to be good. In both 
cases, we would want an analysis that is quite general and that identifies some essential 
attribute(s) of the analysandum. If there is anything in common among all games, it will 
clearly not be the number of players, equipment used, scoring method, etc. Similarly, if 
there is anything in common among all good things, it will not be specific properties such 
as the roughness or softness of those things. 
The word ‘game’ refers to a general type of entity—one that admits of several 
different sub-types (e.g. ballgame, board game, card game, etc). The definition given by 
Suits suggests a general definition of games that serves as a way of distinguishing games 
from other entities. Once we have identified the more general definition of game, we can 
then give specific definitions for what it is to be a ballgame, board game, etc by tacking 
on additional necessary conditions. A board game, for instance, is a game (however that 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
36 Technically, it is an analysis of playing a game.  I suspect one could easily construct an 
analysis of games derivatively once she has an analysis of game-playing in her pocket. 
37 Ibid, p.12 
38 Ibid, p.12!
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is analyzed) that is played with a board.39 The mistake that Wittgenstein made was 
confusing the additional necessary conditions, which demarcate types of games from one 
another, with necessary conditions that demarcate games from other entities. Now we 
could have tried to arrive at a general analysis of game by first giving an account of board 
games and then trying to subtract all and only those conditions that are required to 
distinguish board games from other types of games. I suspect that this would be tricky. In 
doing so, it would be easier to make Wittgenstein’s mistake—thinking that features that 
are necessary for distinguishing board games from other types of games are the features 
that might distinguish games from non-games. Suits’ approach was more promising. He 
started by considering many types of game and looking for very general features they 
shared in common. He took seriously Wittgenstein’s advice to “look and see whether 
there is anything common to all”. It is very plausible that he was successful—there really 
is something that all games share in common, and in virtue of that fact, it is appropriate to 
call them all ‘games’. 
My argument for Premise Two (unless the word ‘good’ is ambiguous, it would 
ascribe the same attribute in moral judgments as well as in non-moral moral ones) is that 
we can give a very similar story about the nature of goodness as the one we just gave 
about the nature of games. Just as in the case of ‘game’, the word ‘good’ expresses a 
general type of attribute—one that admits of several different sub-types (or to use 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
39 Two caveats are needed. First, surfing is ‘played with a board,’ but is not a board game. For 
this reason, if I were really interested in giving an accurate account of board games, I would have 
to more clearly define what sense of ‘board’ I am talking about. Second, there are some who 
would want to categorize role-playing games like Dungeons and Dragons as a ‘board game’ since 
it is typically played sitting around a table, and rolling dice. There is no board in D&D, though, so 
on my definition, it would not be a board game. Whether or not that is correct would be an 
important issue to resolve were I sincerely trying to give an account of board games. Since I am 
merely using this as an example, I will not be taking stances on these issues. 
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Thomson’s language, varieties of goodness).40 There is moral goodness, prudential 
goodness, aesthetic goodness, etc. Most philosophers who discuss goodness are 
ultimately interested in saying something about moral goodness. They will, for that 
reason, focus their inquiry on just that variety of goodness. It is rare that these 
philosophers ever think about the other varieties of goodness. I call this the ‘Top-Down 
Strategy’—and it is one that can lead to the very same mistake that Wittgenstein made. 
That is, it can lead us into thinking that features that distinguish moral goodness from 
other kinds of goodness are also features that distinguish goodness from all the things that 
are not goodness. For example, it is widely agreed upon by moral philosophers that moral 
facts (like those about moral goodness) are normative. This feature of moral facts has led 
some philosophers (Derek Parfit and David Enoch, for instance) to conclude that moral 
goodness must be a non-natural property. Roughly, their argument is this: No facts that 
ascribe purely natural properties to things are normative; facts that ascribe moral 
goodness to things are normative; thus facts that ascribe moral goodness do not ascribe a 
purely natural property.41 That is, moral goodness is a non-natural property. Now to be 
clear, neither Parfit or Enoch were interested in saying anything about the other types of 
goodness other than moral goodness. Notice that if we were to think that normativity is 
an essential feature of all varieties of goodness, however, then Parfit and Enoch’s 
argument would push us into accepting non-naturalism about non-moral goodness. If on 
the other hand, we were to think that normativity is only a feature of moral goodness, 
their argument sheds no light on what distinguishes good things from those things that are 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
40 Thomson (1992, 1993, 1997, 2001, 2003, 2008) 
41 Derek Parfit gives a variant of this argument in On What Matters Volume Two, pp.324-7; David 
Enoch gives it in Taking Morality Seriously, pp.80-1. 
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not good.42 I do not raise this example to discuss the merits of Parfit and Enoch’s 
argument—I raise it to discuss the pitfalls of the Top-Down Strategy. I believe that we 
cannot know if normativity is a general feature that all goods share if we do not spend 
any time thinking about non-moral goods.  
For this reason, I suggest a ‘Bottom-Up Strategy’ similar to the one Suits uses in 
his discussion of games: start by considering many types of goodness and looking for 
very general features they share in common. We should not focus on moral goodness, 
thereby overlooking the fact that everyday we judge countless things as good in ways that 
are not (typically) regarded as moral. We judge the goodness of newspapers, websites, 
parking spaces, restaurants, conversation topics, clothing, hairstyles, places to eat lunch, 
student papers, etc, etc.43 Due to the pervasiveness of our non-moral judgments, one 
would expect that we would be well situated to answer questions about the nature of non-
moral goodness. So why not begin our investigation into the nature of goodness with an 
investigation into non-moral goodness? If we can identify very general features that many 
kinds of goodness share in common, then this is likely to be what it is in virtue of which 
it is appropriate to call them all ‘good.’  I call this the Thesis of Commonality—that there 
is something in common among all good things such that it is appropriate to call all of 
them ‘good.’44 It is my main justification for Premise Two.  My thought is that we should 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
42 This is not a problem for Parfit and Enoch’s projects—since they are not inquiring into the 
nature of goodness. It would be a problem for our project, however.!
43 Finlay provides a similar list (2014), p.19 
44 G.E. Moore explicitly endorses the Thesis of Commonality. He writes: “And on the other hand, 
other things, beside conduct, may be good; and if they are so, then, ‘good’ denotes some property, 
that is common to them and conduct” (1903), p.54. Other places we see philosophers asserting the 
Thesis of Commonality:  Ziff, (1960), p.203, Mackie, (1977), pp.51-2, Thomson, (2008), p.10, 
and Finlay, (2014), p.19.  
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expect that the Thesis of Commonality is true so long as the word ‘good’ is not 
ambiguous. In the next section I will turn to my argument that ‘good’ is indeed univocal. 
First, however, I would like to finish my response to my imagined objector. As 
you will recall, she was skeptical that there were any features in common among good 
things—since good silk must be soft, and good sandpaper must be rough. I think we are 
now in a position to give her the start of an answer to the question: what does good silk 
have in common with good sand paper? A first stab at an answer is that to say that a piece 
of silk is good is to say that it meets some standard of what is expected from silk.  
Similarly, a good piece of sandpaper meets some standard of what is expected from 
sandpaper.  We might then generalize and say that X is good if and only if X meets some 
standard of what is expected from things of its kind. While I don’t think this analysis is 
quite right, it is at the very least, the kind of analysis we are looking for. 45 For one, it is 
the kind of analysis that is (a) general enough that it might apply to all things that we 
judge to be good, and further, (b) it explains why it is the case that the same feature can 
make one thing good, while at the same time making some other thing bad. The standards 
that we judge silk by will surely mention that we expect silk to be soft. For a piece of silk 
to meet this standard, and thus be deemed ‘good,’ it must be soft. Thus, softness is a good 
making property for silk. The standard we evaluate sandpaper by, on the other hand, will 
not include a condition that sandpaper be soft. In fact, it will require that sandpaper be 
rough. So softness is not a good making property for sandpaper. 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
45 As stated, this proposal is not fully developed. What sets the standards? If it is the kind that sets 
the standards, the view will be kind-relational, and thus, quite like the view of Geach (1956), 
Thomson (2009), and Foot (2001). If it is interests that people take in those kinds that sets the 
standards, the view will be interest-relational and then, more akin to the views advanced by Ziff 
(1960), and Mackie (1977). Finally, if it were ends that set the standards, the resulting view 
would be similar to the accounts offered by Finlay (2014) and myself. 
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What I have shown is that there is at least one plausible contender for a general 
feature that all good things have in common, in virtue of which it is appropriate to call all 
those things ‘good.’ This is what we should expect if the word ‘good’ is not ambiguous.  
b) Premise (3) – That ‘good’ is univocal 
 
 A word is lexically ambiguous when that word has two (or more) distinct 
meanings.46 The word ‘bat,’ for instance, in some instances refers to a flying mammal, 
while in other instances it refers to a piece of sporting equipment.47 ‘Bat’ is thus 
ambiguous. Premise three, on the other hand, states that the word ‘good’ has only one 
meaning.  Let me say a few things about how I understand this claim.   
Since ‘bat’ has at least two meanings, a sentence containing the word ‘bat’ can 
have multiple meanings as well. Consider the sentence:  ‘That is a bat.’ Because ‘bat’ is 
ambiguous, this sentence could express either of two judgments: it could express the 
judgment that the thing that is being pointed at is a flying mammal, or it could express the 
judgment that it is a piece of sporting equipment. Not so for ‘good,’ says the third 
premise. The sentence: ‘This is good soup’ just expresses the judgment that ascribes to 
the soup the attribute of goodness (whatever that attribute turns out to be). There is no 
other judgment that might be expressed by the sentence ‘This is good soup.’ 
 What evidence is there that ‘good’ is univocal? The first—and least technical—bit 
of evidence that ‘good’ is univocal is that on reflection the word does not seem to have 
two or more distinct meanings. It might be strange of me to say this, especially given how 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
46 Most of my discussion of ambiguity is informed by Adam Sennet’s Stanford Encyclopedia of 
Philosophy entry:  “Ambiguity” (2011). 
47 To keep things simple, I am ignoring the various other meanings of the word ‘bat’.  For 
instance, I am bracketing the uses of this word that describe the action of swinging a bat.!
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frequently I am drawing the distinction between moral and non-moral goodness. Doesn’t 
this distinction suggest that ‘good’ does have (at least) two meanings?  
While it is tempting to think of non-moral and moral goodness as two distinct 
things, we should not confuse the generality of the word ‘good’ for ambiguity. Consider 
obviously ambiguous words like ‘bat,’ ‘crane,’ or ‘bank.’ For these terms, it seems to be 
a contingent and coincidental fact about English that we use them to talk about two (or 
more) different types of entity.48 There is no connection between the flying mammals and 
the baseball equipment that would be lost if we started calling one of them by a different 
name. Thus, there is good reason to think that these words are ambiguous. Now consider, 
instead, a general term like ‘ship’. I say that ‘ship’ is a general term because the analysis 
of the concept that it expresses applies to a variety of different types of entities. We call 
many vessels that travel by water ‘ships’—as well as some vessels that travel through the 
air or through space. We apply the same term, ‘ship’ to these distinct types of entities 
because they share in common certain features such that they all meet the necessary and 
sufficient conditions for being a ship. Spaceships and seafaring ships are thus two distinct 
categories of ship. If we stopped calling one of them ‘ship’, it would not change the fact 
that (a) the thing we are talking about is a ship, and that (b) it shares this feature in 
common with some other types of entity. Because we do call both seafaring and space-
faring vessels ‘ships,’ our language expresses that we are aware of the facts (a) and (b).  
Were we to only call one type of ship a ‘ship’, our language would no longer express that 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
48 Perhaps ‘crane’ is a bad example.  One might think that the piece of construction equipment 
called a crane was given that name due to its resemblance to the bird.  If we stopped calling either 
a crane, we would lose this connection.  However, we could have equally named the construction 
equipment a ‘giraffe,’ if all we wanted to express was that the machine resembles an animal with 
an elongated neck.   
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spaceships and seafaring ships are all related to one another insofar as they are both 
categories of the more general type: ship. Our language would be impoverished.   
My intuition is that moral and non-moral goodness are two categories of 
goodness, and not two distinct notions contingently picked out by the same English word.  
There is something in common between things that are non-morally good and those 
things that are morally good, in virtue of which they are all properly categorized as good.  
To test my intuition, we could ask if anything would be lost if we started using two very 
different terms for non-moral and moral goodness.  It seems to me that we would lose 
something. Consider, for instance, the debate between philosophers like L.W. Sumner 
who believe that moral goodness should be identified with goodness for, or well-being,49 
and philosophers like Michael Zimmerman who believe that moral goodness should be 
identified with intrinsic goodness. If we did not use the same word ‘goodness’ for these 
three notions—goodness for, intrinsic goodness, and moral goodness—this debate might 
sound quite bizarre. The possible version of English that has three very different terms 
for these three notions of value is less expressive, and thus impoverished when compared 
to the actual version of English where those three notions share a term. 
In addition to imagining possible versions of English and asking whether or not 
those variations would continue to express certain relations between things, we can also 
look to actual non-English languages and see if they mirror our uses of words.  If in other 
languages the speakers use a single word to talk about moral and non-moral goodness, 
this is evidence that the notion of goodness is in fact a general notion (and not 
ambiguous).  If, on the other hand, it is merely a coincidence that we use the word ‘good’ 
to refer to two distinct notions—then other languages will likely use two distinct words to !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
49 Sumner (1996) 
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refer to those notions.50 The cross-linguistic data, however, show that speakers of other 
languages use one word to talk about both notions.51  
There are also a number of linguistic tests we can run on a word to see if it is 
ambiguous. These tests, unfortunately, are not all that informative. They sometimes 
confuse generality and/or context sensitivity with ambiguity. Since I believe that ‘good’ 
is both general and context sensitive—it comes as no surprise to me that it sometimes 
fails these tests.  
A term is context sensitive if the content that the term contributes is variable “due 
purely to changes in the context of utterance without a change in the convention of word 
usage.”52 As we saw in the last chapter, the word ‘tall’ is context sensitive. When we are 
talking about kindergartners, a child that stands 5 feet would be tall. In the context of 
professional basketball players, a person that stands 7 feet would be tall. We should not 
conclude that the word ‘tall’ sometimes means standing 5 feet, sometimes standing 7 feet, 
and sometimes standing several hundred feet tall (when we are discussing redwood trees, 
for instance). If that were the case, ‘tall’ would be massively multiply ambiguous.  
Instead, we should understand ‘tall’ as requiring some information from the context—in 
this case, what group it is relative to which the thing in question counts as tall—to 
determine its content. 
As noted above, we might think that to say of something that it is good is to say 
that the thing in question meets some standard. Which standard we are judging the thing !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
50 We would, of course, need to look at languages whose word for good is not either derived from 
the English word ‘good,’ or from the same word that the English word is derived from.  It would 
not be so surprising if words in other languages that share an etymology with ‘good,’ also share 
some features of how that word is used. 
51 Robert Shanklin discusses the data in Chapter One of his dissertation, On Good and ‘Good’ 
(2011) 
52 Sennet, (2011).!
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relative to might be contributed by context. Is it the silk standard that requires the thing 
be soft? Or is it the sandpaper standard that requires roughness?  Again, we could think 
that ‘good’ sometimes means soft, other times rough, and still other times any number of 
other attributes. In that case, ‘good’ would be multiply ambiguous. I think this is a 
mistaken way to think about the meaning of the word ‘good’. ‘Good,’ like ‘tall,’ seems to 
have only one meaning, but that meaning is partially determined by context. 
Again, I think the common tests that linguists use to determine if a word is 
ambiguous or not occasionally give us false positives for ambiguity when the term we 
test is either general or context sensitive in the way that I believe ‘good’ is. But let’s look 
at a couple of these tests anyway.   
The Contradiction Test: A sentence that looks as if it would be contradictory (if 
there is only one meaning of the tested term), will not sound contradictory if that term is 
ambiguous. So, for instance, ‘That is a giraffe, but it isn’t a giraffe’ should sound like a 
contradiction to us because ‘giraffe’ is univocal.  On the other hand, we should be able to 
imagine contexts where ‘That is a bat, but it isn’t a bat’ would sound perfectly fine and 
non-contradictory since the word ‘bat’ is ambiguous.53 How does ‘good’ fair in the 
contradiction test? Consider the sentence: ‘The soup is good, but it is not good’.  This 
sounds contradictory to me, though, I can also hear an interpretation where it does not 
sound contradictory. The non-contradictory interpretation would have us switching which 
standard it is relative to which we are judging the soup to be good from the first half to 
the second half of the sentence. Suppose, for instance, we are dining at a restaurant that !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
53 You will likely notice that this test is very close in structure to Moore’s Open Question 
Argument. It should not surprise you, then, that my hypothesis about what occurs when you run 
this test on ‘good’ will sound very similar to the response to Open Question Test that I discussed 
above. 
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you believe to be subpar—you find most of the food on the menu to be terrible.  
However, you find this particular soup to be less bad than everything else on the menu.  
So, you might say:  “This soup is good (relative to the rest of the slop on the menu here), 
but it is not good (relative what I could get at another restaurant)”.  A similar thing would 
occur if we said of the 5 foot tall kindergartner, ‘He is tall, but he is not tall.’ In that 
example, we might be saying that he is tall (for a kindergartner) but not tall (for an adult 
male). That switch in standard makes the sentence not sound contradictory.  But we 
should not conclude that ‘tall’ is thus ambiguous. It is just context sensitive, and the 
Contradiction Test can give us false positives with context sensitive terms.  For these 
reasons the Contradiction Test is inconclusive on ‘good.’ 
Conjunction Reduction:  In this test, we start with two sentences using allegedly 
different meanings of the term, and combine them via conjunction. If the resulting 
conjunction sounds absurd, then that is evidence that the term is ambiguous. So for 
instance: “The feathers are light” and “The colors are light” combine to give us “The 
feathers and the colors are light”. That sentence sounds odd—so we have evidence that 
‘light’ is ambiguous.54 How does ‘good’ fair on this test? Let us consider the sentences:  
‘The soup is good’ and ‘Giving to charity is good’. The combined sentence ‘The soup 
and giving to charity are good’ does indeed sound strange. Should we conclude that 
‘good’ is thus ambiguous? Again, I think here we are confusing generality with 
ambiguity. What makes the sentence sound odd is the switch from two different 
categories of goodness. In the first conjunct, we are ascribing non-moral goodness to the 
soup. In the second, we are ascribing moral goodness to charity. As I argued above, I do 
not think we should conclude that moral and non-moral goodness are two distinct types !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
54 This is Sennet’s example (2011). 
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of thing, but merely two categories of goodness. The Conjunction Test does not seem to 
distinguish generality from ambiguity, and does not answer whether ‘good’ is ambiguous. 
In summary, I think the standard linguistic tests are inconclusive when it comes to 
determining whether ‘good’ is ambiguous or not. The best evidence we have that ‘good’ 
is univocal is that our language would be less expressive if we used completely different 
terms for all the various types of goodness. ‘Good’ is general and context sensitive—but 
not ambiguous.   
c. Premise (1) – That non-moral goodness is end-relational 
 
So what then, we might ask, do good kites, silk, sandpaper, murder weapons, 
hammers, and parking spaces have in common? Earlier, I suggested that a good first 
guess might be that to say that X is good is to say that X meets some standard of what is 
expected from things of its kind. There would be different standards for what it is to be a 
good kite, or a good murder weapon etc. However, we might wish for a more 
illuminating answer. In particular, we might still ask: what is it that determines these 
standards? 
To begin answering that question, it is worth noticing that depending on the set of 
standards we use, the very same object can be good relative to one set, but bad relative to 
another.55 For instance, on one set of standards, a particular hammer will be good, but 
that same hammer will be bad relative to another set of standards. 56 The hammer that is 
good for nailing boards together to make a birdhouse would not be good for driving 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
 
55 Ziff notes that the same object (a dead body) can be good when described as a cadaver, but that 
it would be strange to say of it that it is good when we describe it as a corpse (1960) p.211. He 
does not explicitly note that a thing could thus be good relative to one set of standards and bad 
relative to another—but the seeds of this thought are there. 
56 Georg Henrik von Wright uses the example of a hammer (1963) p.8. 
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railroad ties into the ground. A sledgehammer would be good for driving in railroad ties, 
but bad for putting together a birdhouse. In these cases, the standards are set by what 
goal one is trying to accomplish. To be fair, there are two other contending types of 
answer to what determines the standard. First, there is the view that it is the kind that a 
thing belongs to that determines the standard (so in this case, we have two kinds: 
sledgehammer and hammer, and they each have different standards). Second, there is the 
view that it is human interests that determine the standard. I reject both these kinds of 
views in Chapter Four. For now, I hope that it is enough that at least one plausible answer 
is that standards are set by goals. If one wants to build a birdhouse, one needs to precisely 
drive small nails through thin boards of wood. A good hammer—relative to the goal of 
building a birdhouse—then, is one that would adequately accomplish this task.   
Hammers (but not sledgehammers) are typically used for driving nails through 
wood. Consequently, it is tempting to conclude from the above example that a good X is 
an X that adequately achieves some goal that X’s are typically used for. The standards for 
judging the goodness of an X would be set by what it takes to achieve that goal. This 
analysis is unsatisfactory for a few reasons. First, we can evaluate things relative to goals 
that they are not typically used for. Suppose that an artist is constructing a sculpture that 
will resemble the skeleton of a Tyrannosaurus Rex, though it will be made entirely of 
modern tools painted white. She needs a small, ‘T’ shaped tool to stand in as one of the 
bones. A hammer might adequately achieve this goal: representing a certain 
Tyrannosaurus Rex bone in the artist’s sculpture. That hammer is good relative to this 
goal, even though it is a strange goal that people do not usually use hammers for. It 
would be good for this goal, even if certain flaws in the handle, for instance, make it a 
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bad hammer relative to the goal of hammering in nails. Noting this does not force us to 
reject an end-relative account of goodness. It merely suggests that we should drop the 
talk of goals that X’s are typically used for. Instead, we should note that because 
hammers are typically used for hammering, it is in general safe to assume that a person 
that says, ‘This is a good hammer’ is evaluating that hammer relative to the goal of 
hammering.57 Were the artist to say ‘This is a good hammer,’ she might have to give her 
audience some contextual clues to eliminate the assumption she is evaluating that 
hammer relative to the goal of hammering. She should let us know that she is judging its 
goodness relative to the goal of representing a dinosaur bone in a sculpture, or we will 
likely misunderstand the claim she is making. 
 A deeper objection to a goal-based account of goodness is that for many things we 
judge to be good it seems incorrect to think of our judgments as being about those things 
achieving goals. What goals could I be evaluating a tiger by when I say ‘That is a good 
tiger?’58 Or, more troubling:  What would the end-relational account say of the judgment 
that ‘Sarah is a good person’? 
 First, it is worth stressing that we do not need to claim that tigers and people have 
essential functions that they serve, much as a hammer has the function of driving nails.  
Many criticized Aristotle for making such a claim, and I think their criticisms were apt.  
Above, I argued that for some objects, it is safe to assume that a judgment that that thing 
is good is to be understood as a judgment about that thing’s achieving a goal for which it 
is typically used. Hammers are typically used for driving nails, so we can generally !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
57 That is, it is a conventional implicature that a person is evaluating the hammer as a device for 
driving nails, unless this implicature is defeated by context.  
58 This is Philippa Foot’s example from Natural Goodness, (2001), p.49.  Paul Ziff expresses 
doubts about the grammaticality of such sentences in Semantic Analysis (1960).  He thinks that 
the sentence, ‘That is a good Gila Monster’ sounds ungrammatical Ibid, p.212.   
!! 51!
conclude that ‘good hammer’ refers to a hammer that adequately achieves that goal. 
However, I also noted that we could produce different judgments about the goodness of 
the hammer by referencing other goals. So the end-relative account of goodness I prefer 
is compatible with things lacking any essential function. All it says is goodness is relative 
to some goal or another. 
 So what goal is it that we are evaluating a tiger relative to when we say ‘That is a 
good tiger’? One suggestion might be the goal of being a representative member of its 
species.59 Consider a zookeeper who is looking to add a tiger to his zoo. She might want 
to acquire an albino tiger as such a tiger is rare and will draw crowds. Or, she might want 
a tiger that looks and acts like most tigers in the wild; she might want a representative 
tiger.  That is one possible interpretation of ‘That is a good tiger’. We might, 
alternatively, think that we are evaluating how well that tiger meets the goal of thriving in 
the wild. Philippa Foot seems to have this in mind. On her view, a good tiger is one that 
is well-adapted to survive in its environment, and perhaps to contribute to the propagation 
of its species.60 Often, in the natural world, these two interpretations will return the same 
results. A representative tiger is also a fit-to-survive tiger. Some animals are less lucky. 
The Giant Panda, for instance, is generally a finicky eater and mater. In times of plenty, 
pandas flourish, and their species thrives. But, mostly due to human invasion of their 
habitat, representative pandas currently are having trouble finding food they like, and will !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
59 Ziff suggests a similar answer in Semantic Analysis. Having already claimed that ‘That is a 
good Gila Monster’ sounds ungrammatical (Ibid, p.212), he goes on to say that ‘That would be a 
good Gila Monster to make a pet of…’ sounds fine p.236. Mackie explicitly states that there are 
uses where ‘good’ seems to mean ‘paradigmatic’ (1977) p.58. Thomson’s account of goodness 
properties begins with the property of “being a model, exemplar, paradigm, or good specimen of 
a K” (2008) p.19. 
60 She writes that the natural goodness of “plants and non-human animals… [has] to do, directly 
or indirectly, with self-maintenance, as by defence and the obtaining of nourishment, or with the 
reproduction of the individual, as by the building of nests” (2001) p.31. 
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rarely mate successfully. In this case, representative pandas are not well-adapted pandas. 
I will discuss this example in more detail in Chapter Four, when I turn to evaluating the 
plausibility of other relational accounts of goodness. For now, it is enough to show that 
what we mean when we judge that an animal (such as a tiger or a panda) is good is going 
to vary from case to case. I do not think I have here identified every goal relative to 
which we might judge a tiger good (I suspect, for instance, when an animal trainer picks a 
tiger to train to perform in circuses, she is not going to be interested in a tiger that is well-
adapted to survival in the wild). I have instead, pointed to a couple of plausible 
interpretations of what someone might mean when they say of a tiger that it is good. 
 I have a similar answer to what goal it is relative to which we judge people to be 
good. Consider the sentence, spoken of Bert, that he is a good man. This sentence might 
express the judgment that Bert is a morally upstanding person. That is, he adequately 
achieves the goal (whatever it is) of being moral. Or, suppose that I am discussing Bert’s 
merit as a possible romantic partner. In that context, ‘Bert is a good man’ might mean 
that he adequately achieves the goal (whatever it is) of being a fitting romantic partner. 
Again, there are many different goals relative to which we might judge someone to be a 
good man, woman, or person. All the end-relational account of goodness must say is that 
for any claim of the form, ‘X is a good person,’ there is some goal that sets the standards 
relative to which we make that claim. 
In summary, when we judge that something is good, we seem to be judging it 
relative to some standard, and that standard seems to be set by the goal we are trying to 
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accomplish with the thing we are judging to be good.61 To judge that X is good, then, is 
to ascribe to X the attribute of adequately accomplishing a goal, G.62 
 
III. Objections  
According to my view, goodness is a relation that things can stand in to ends. This 
is true both of non-moral and of moral goodness. In contrast, according to many other 
accounts, moral goodness is a different type of attribute than non-moral goodness. At first 
glance, there is something intuitive about the position that moral goodness is a different 
type of attribute from non-moral goodness. After all, why would we distinguish moral 
goodness from other kinds of goodness if they weren’t different? As I hope to show in the 
subsequent chapters, my view can accommodate our intuition that moral goodness is 
different from non-moral goodness (in some respects), without needing to claim that they 
are two different attributes. 
In this chapter, I argued that the best analysis of non-moral goodness, roughly, is 
that goodness is a relation that holds between things and goals.63 I also argued that unless 
the word ‘good’ is ambiguous, then we ought to believe that all good things share some 
common feature(s) in virtue of which it is correct to call them ‘good’.  I suggested that 
this common feature of all good things is that they stand in the relevant relations to goals. 
Thus, the end-relational analysis I provided for non-moral goodness extends to all types 
of goodness—including moral goodness. All goodness is relational. 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
61 Some philosophers believe that it is kinds or interests that set the standards. I discuss the virtues 
and vices of these theories of goodness in Chapter Four. 
62 In Chapter Five, I will spell this analysis out in more detail. 
63 Again, I will give this analysis further precision in Chapter Five.  For now, nothing rides on the 
details of the analysis. 
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Many philosophers reject my conclusion. To do so, they must reject at least one of 
my premises. That is, in order for a philosopher to claim that not all goodness is 
relational, she must either (a) claim that non-moral goodness is not relational, (b) deny 
the Thesis of Commonality, or (c) find some other feature that is in common amongst 
non-moral and moral goodness such that the Thesis of Commonality is satisfied.  I have 
already given a few reasons to think that the first two of these options are unattractive, 
though I will flesh out my objections further in this chapter.  One possibility that I have 
as of yet not discussed is that our goodness judgments do not ascribe any property at all, 
but merely express our attitudes. This is a view that has had many supporters, especially 
when it comes to moral goodness. I will argue, however, that it does not give us a very 
plausible account of non-moral goodness.   
I will then focus my attention on one plausible attempt to pursue the third 
strategy, one offered by Michael J. Zimmerman. I will argue that it is wrongheaded. Of 
course, this does not show that any such attempt at pursuing the (c) strategy for defending 
the claim that moral goodness is not relational will be equally wrongheaded.  At the very 
least, I see my argument as offering a challenge to my opponents; if we are to believe that 
moral goodness is not relational, you, my opponent, owe us a plausible account of 
goodness that is also compatible with the Thesis of Commonality.  I will give some 
reasons to doubt any such account is forthcoming. 
a) Objection:  Non-moral goodness is not end-relational 
Suppose that someone wanted to support the claim that moral goodness is not 
relational by way of (a). There are two ways of doing so. First, she could claim that all 
goodness is monadic. According to this view, even non-moral goodness is monadic. So, 
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when a hammer is good, it is good because it has the monadic property of goodness. 
Second, she could argue that what is really essential to goodness is its relation to the acts 
of recommending, commending, or prescribing. We do not ascribe goodness to X unless 
we express, in the relevant way, some pro-attitudes towards X. I think all of these 
answers, however, give us quite implausible accounts of non-moral goodness.  
i) Non-moral goodness is monadic 
Let me start with the first suggestion: that all goodness is monadic. I can see two 
ways of developing this view. The first is to claim that a thing’s goodness supervenes on, 
but is distinct from its other attributes. The second is to claim that a thing’s goodness 
does not supervene on its other attributes—it is just one additional property that good 
things have regardless of what other attributes they have. I believe that the latter view is, 
quite simply, untenable. The most plausible version of the former view appears to only 
really differ with my end-relational account in one respect: it needs to posit an additional 
property that I do not need to posit. We thus ought favor my view to it. 
Suppose one were to insist that a thing’s goodness does not supervene on its other 
properties. The resulting view would not be elastic enough to accommodate the context 
sensitivity exhibited by our goodness judgments. Recall the hammer that was good as a 
bone in a sculpture, but bad at driving nails. Does this hammer have the property of 
goodness? It seems that it both does and it does not—which is clearly a contradiction.  
We thus have a reductio of the view that goodness is a non-supervening monadic 
property. 
Perhaps this view could be salvaged if we were to claim that there are a variety of 
types of goodness properties, and the hammer has one of them, and lacks another one.  
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Thus there is no contradiction. This ‘solution,’ however, creates more problems than it 
solves. Suppose we have a hammer that is both good for driving nails and as a component 
in a sculpture. We would thus have a hammer with the following attributes: goodness1, 
the ability to adequately drive nails, goodness2, being well suited to serve as a component 
in a sculpture, etc. What is bizarre about this scenario is that the hammer’s having 
goodness1 is not related in any relevant way to its ability to drive nails (or to its serving as 
a part of a sculpture for that matter). The same goes for the hammer’s having goodness2. 
These are four unrelated properties that the hammer just so happens to instantiate. We 
might wonder, then: How many goodness properties does this particular hammer have? 
What constraints are there on how many goodness properties the hammers can have? 
Why do we call all these separate monadic properties ‘goodness properties’? Perhaps the 
strangest consequence of this view is how the goodness of this hammer relates to how I 
ought to respond to it. Suppose I want to make a birdhouse, and I learn that this hammer 
adequately drives nails. Do I also need to know that it is good before I buy it? It seems as 
if the goodness of the hammer is irrelevant to whether or not I should buy it, use it, favor 
it, etc. It would be mere coincidence if this hammer was both good and could adequately 
drive nails. Intuitively, however, I should buy, use, or favor good hammers (well, at least 
when I am interested in driving nails).  I conclude that the view that non-moral goodness 
is a non-supervening monadic property is wildly implausible. 
Several of the problems with the above view are fixed if we simply add the claim 
that goodness does supervene on the other features of good things. For instance, it might 
no longer be the case that there is no connection between a hammer’s ability to drive 
nails and its being good. If the hammer’s goodness is related in the appropriate way to its 
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ability to drive nails, then there would be an easy story to tell about why I should buy, 
use, favor, etc the hammer (given that I am looking to drive nails). However, I worry that 
this supervenience view is not really very different from an end-relational account of 
goodness, since the goodness of a thing will always supervene on the features that make 
it the case that the thing promotes some goal.   
As we noted above, for almost any feature, F, some things will be good because 
they have F, others things would cease to be good if they were to have F. Thus, either 
goodness does not supervene on F alone (and thus, F needs to be combined with some 
other feature(s) for goodness to supervene on it), or goodness does supervene on F alone, 
but the supervenience can be prevented by pairing F with some other feature(s) of X. 
Consider, for example, the property of softness. Soft sandpaper is bad; soft silk is good. 
Thus, either goodness does not supervene on softness alone, or it does supervene on 
softness alone, but that supervenience can be prevented due to the presence of other 
attributes in the thing in question. Either way, what other attributes the thing has other 
than softness will bear on whether or not it is good. 
Which other features of X bear on whether or not it is good? One possible answer 
is that the relevant feature is which kind X belongs to. Perhaps it is the case that if X has 
the attributes of being soft and being silk, then X is good.  If it has the attributes of being 
soft and being sandpaper, then it is not good. This answer is mostly right, but again, it 
does not allow that things might be good even if they are not good members of their kind. 
A piece of sandpaper that is well-used, and thus soft, might no longer be good as 
sandpaper, but if I were interested in a surface on which to jot down a quick note, it 
would be good. This suggests that the further feature other than softness, on which X’s 
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goodness supervenes, is whether or not X promotes a goal, G. I conclude that on a 
supervenience view, the relation of promoting a goal will always be present in the set of 
subvening attributes of an object. 
Since the above argument is neutral with respect to what feature ‘F’ stands for, it 
seems to suggests that for any attribute, X’s having that attribute is not sufficient for X’s 
being good. This would thus cut against my thesis that goodness is the relation of 
promoting an end. The argument above suggests that the goodness of X would depend 
not just on its promoting a particular goal, but also on the other attributes it has. This 
suggests that goodness cannot be identified with the promotion of goals. 
Yet the attribute of promoting goals is not an attribute like every other—if X 
promotes a goal, then there must be some other attributes of X in virtue of which it 
promotes that goal. For instance, if a piece of sandpaper would promote the goal of 
smoothing a piece of rough lumber—that means the sandpaper is rough, durable, etc. If a 
piece of silk had those features (being rough, durable, etc), it would also promote the goal 
of smoothing lumber. We can thus distinguish the relational property of promoting goal 
G, from all the further attributes that X has such that it has the relational property of 
promoting G. These further features make it the case that X promotes G. X’s goodness 
supervenes on its promoting G—and its promoting G supervenes on what other attributes 
the thing has. Softness promotes some goals but not others, so softness alone does not 
ground X’s goodness. It is the promoting of G that grounds X’s goodness.64  
I conclude that the most plausible supervenience view must agree with my end-
relational account of goodness on the following claims: (i) there is a relation of !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
64 Finlay also notes that X’s being able to promote a goal depends on what other features X has. 
He calls these additional features of the ‘good-making properties’ (2014) p.47.  
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promoting a goal, (ii) all good things stand in this relation to some goal, and (iii) the 
goodness of those things depends on their standing in that relation to a goal, as well as the 
presence of other features. Our accounts only differ in how we understand the relations 
among the goodness of X, the relation of promoting some goal, and the further features of 
X that contribute to X’s goodness. My view says that if X has features such that it stands 
in the relation of promoting a goal, then X is good relative to that goal. Standing in that 
relation just is being good relative to that goal. The supervenience view says that if X has 
features such that it stands in the relation of promoting a goal, then X also has some 
further monadic property, goodness, that supervenes on those features and the relation of 
promoting a goal. My view does not require positing a further, monadic property of 
goodness. It thus posits fewer entities and should be favored to the supervenience view. 
In this section, I have been evaluating the plausibility of views that claim that 
non-moral goodness is a monadic property.  On the first such view, the property of 
goodness is not supervenient, and thus, is not related in any relevant ways to the other 
properties an object has. This means that it is possible for a hammer to have the ability to 
drive nails, and yet, still not be good. My interest in hammers, then, should not be 
directed by which ones are good, but by which ones adequately achieve the goals that I 
am interested in using hammers to accomplish. That is a counterintuitive result. The other 
view I considered says that non-moral goodness is a monadic property that supervenes on 
the other attributes that a thing has. I argued that the most plausible version of this view 
agrees with my view on many points, but that it needs to posit an additional property 
whose existence I deny. My view is thus simpler, and should be favored. Of course, if it 
turns out that we have other reasons for positing monadic goodness, then the fact that my 
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view is simpler than the supervenience view might no longer count against it. Yet so far 
we have not seen any reasons for positing monadic goodness. 
ii) Non-moral goodness is not essentially end-relational 
Let us move now to the other type of strategy someone might take if they wish to 
reject my end-relational analysis of non-moral goodness. Pursuing this strategy involves 
claiming that what is really essential to goodness is its relation to the acts of 
recommending, commending, or prescribing.  There are two ways one might pursue this 
style of theory.  First, one might simply deny that our uses of the word ‘good’ ever 
introduce a property at all. ‘Good’ does not ascribe a relation, nor does it ascribe a 
property. Instead, this objector might insist, our uses of ‘good’ express the speaker’s 
mental states. I am speaking, of course, of a view that is parallel to the family of views in 
meta-ethics referred to as ‘Non-Cognitivism.’ This view has struck many as a plausible 
account of our moral uses of ‘good,’ but I argue that it is an implausible view when 
applied to our non-moral uses of ‘good.’65  Second, my opponent might allow that in non-
moral uses ‘good’ does have some descriptive content (and that content might be about 
ends), but the essential feature of our use of the word ‘good’ is that we use it to 
recommend, commend, or prescribe.  In The Language of Morals, R.M. Hare advances a 
view of this sort.66 Against such views, I will argue that any connection between our 
judgments of goodness and prescriptions is not a necessary one. It is possible to judge 
something as good without commending it, thus we do not need to reference 
commendation in our account of the meaning of ‘good.’ !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
65 I agree with Finlay when he states that a non-cognitivist view of non-moral goodness would be 
‘implausible’ (2014) p.19.  In what follows, I hope to provide additional arguments in support of 
this claim. 
66 Hare (1952). 
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To start, let us look at what might be called a naïve ‘expressivist’ account of non-
moral goodness. This view can be quickly rejected. According to a naïve expressivist 
view, when we say that something is ‘good’ all we are doing is expressing a pro-attitude 
for that thing. We are not asserting anything that can be evaluated as true or false—we 
are not, for instance, asserting that the thing we are calling ‘good’ has a property, 
relation, or set of properties and/or relations.  Our judgments of the form, ‘X is good,’ are 
not descriptive of the world; they are purely evaluative. They serve the same function as 
pure expressions of approval such as, “Hooray X!”67 
This purely evaluative account of the meaning of ‘good’ is something that sounds 
somewhat plausible when discussing moral goodness. Speaking for myself, it is certainly 
true that when I say that something is morally good, that I have positive evaluative 
attitudes (so-called, ‘pro-attitudes’) towards the thing in question.68 In telling you that 
charity is morally good, for instance, I express that I have the relevant pro-attitutudes 
towards charity. Is it plausible that that is all I am doing when I judge that charity is 
morally good?  Is it plausible that I do not intend to assert something true about the 
world?  I have my doubts, but several philosophers have found this plausible. Let us set 
that issue aside for now. What I want to stress is that when an expressivist account of 
goodness is applied to our non-moral uses of ‘good,’ however, this view is quite simply 
implausible. Consider what the expressivist would have to say about the following story: 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
67 See, for instance, A.J. Ayer (1936). Also, see Mark Schroeder’s recent book (2010) for a 
thorough and illuminating discussion of the various types of non-cognitivism. 
68 Is it possible to imagine someone who can make sincere moral judgments without the relevant 
pro-attitudes? That is, can there be so-called ‘amoralists’? Brink (1986). This questions have been 
hotly contested for years. I am not here taking a side on this issue—I am merely expressing that it 
seems true of me that when I make sincere moral judgments that I have the relevant attitudes. 
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Hardware Store. You have decided to build a birdhouse for your backyard.  You 
have drawn up a plan, and amassed the appropriate materials (wood, nails, etc).  
However, it occurs to you that you cannot begin the project since you lack a crucial tool:  
a hammer.  To remedy the situation, you head to the local hardware store:  Jolene’s 
Hardware. Jolene has been running the business for years, is extremely knowledgable, 
and adores do-it-yourself projects. Upon entering the store you find yourself face to face, 
however, not with Jolene, but with her teenage son Junior. Lucky for you, though, Junior 
has worked in the store with his mother for years, and has learned the trade well. He is 
now truly an expert on do-it-yourself projects. Upon hearing about the nature of your 
project, Junior takes you to the same section of the store that Jolene would have, and 
hands you the same hammer Jolene would have, and declares (as Jolene would have):  
‘This is a good hammer.’    
However, Junior does not have the same passion for hardware as his mother.  In 
fact, he hates hardware, and sees do-it-yourself jobs as a waste of time. He would rather 
spend his time and energy studying philosophy. Junior is a naturally cheerful fellow, and 
nothing about the manner in which he utters the sentence indicates to you his utter 
disdain for everything having to do with hardware. I stipulate then that when Junior utters 
the sentence ‘This is a good hammer’ he does not express his approval of that hammer, 
and/or of hammering, and/or of do-it-yourself projects. He has no pro-attitudes for that 
hammer, and thus, does not express any pro-attitudes. Yet, by my lights, he judges it to 
be good. The expressivist would have to say that Junior’s judgment was insincere—but 
this just does not seem right. Even if we accept that in calling a hammer ‘good’ Junior 
would typically be expressing a pro-attitude about that hammer (more on this claim later), 
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it is hard to imagine that that is all he is doing. It is hard to imagine that the further 
descriptive claim (that hammer will adequately drive nails in the construction of your 
birdhouse) is not an essential part of the judgment that the hammer is good.  
R.M. Hare was well aware that our judgments of non-moral goodness contain 
descriptive content—but he denied that that was all there was to them. He argued that we 
could not define ‘good’ by way of descriptive content alone. He pointed out that the 
primary function of our judgments of goodness is to commend. He thus rejected any 
account of goodness that did not make reference to the role it plays in commending. 
Junior commends the hammer that he hands you in Hardware Store. He tells you that it is 
choice worthy—he suggests that you should choose it. A similar thing, says Hare, 
happens whenever we judge that something is good. He writes: 
The meaning of ‘good motor-car’ is something that might be known by 
someone who did not know the criteria of its application; he would know, 
if someone said that a motor-car was a good one, that he was commending 
it; and to know that, would be to know the meaning of the expression. 
(R.M. Hare, The Language of Morals, 1952, p.117. Emphasis my own). 
 
So, according to Hare, we can imagine that you, as the uninformed customer, might not 
know the ‘criteria of application,’ for the term ‘good’ when applied to hammers. That is, 
you do not know which features are the goodness-making features of a hammer.  
However, when Junior hands you a hammer and says, ‘This hammer is good,’ you 
understand what Junior is saying. You understand since the primary meaning of ‘good’ is 
evaluative. To say of X that it is good is to commend X.   
I believe that Hare is mistaken about the primary meaning of ‘good’ having to do 
with commendation, though it is not hard to see why one would be tempted to claim that 
judgments of goodness necessarily involve some kind of commendation, approval, or 
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other sorts of pro-attitudes. Suppose that Tim says of a certain kite that it is a good kite. 
Now Tim would have to be a very strange person indeed if he was offering up this 
judgment, unprompted, and yet, lacked pro-attitudes towards kites and/or kite flying. 
First, to judge a good kite from a bad one, Tim would need to have some knowledge 
about kite flying. It would take time and energy to learn what it is that makes the 
difference between good and bad kites. Consequently, people rarely come by such 
knowledge unless they have an interest in flying kites. When a person has knowledge in a 
subject area, this is often a sign that the person has (or had) interest in that subject area. 
Second, for Tim to offer his judgment without prompting suggests, at the very least, that 
he is interested in talking about kites. It would be very strange for a person that is truly 
disinterested in kites and kite flying to be nonetheless interested in talking about them. 
Finally, it would certainly be strange if Tim told us that although he judges this kite as 
good, he is in no way recommending to us that we should use that kite, or go buy a kite 
that is similar to it. Why would he even talk about the kite being good unless he wanted 
us to respond in certain ways to kites like it? It is for these reasons that we generally 
assume that a person who makes a judgment about the goodness of X has some pro-
attitudes towards X. And generally speaking, this assumption is safe—it would be a rare 
occurrence for one to judge that X is good and to talk about X’s goodness, if she did not 
have pro-attitudes towards, and want to commend X. Regardless, I contend that it is 
possible to judge the goodness of X without having pro-attitudes and without 
commending X.  
For example, suppose my friend Jared is writing a murder mystery novel.  For his 
novel to be a success, he needs the murderer to kill his victims in an unusual but effective 
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manner. Jared is suffering from a bit of writer’s block and having trouble thinking of any 
creative methods of murder, so he asks his friends to help him brainstorm about good 
murder weapons and good methods for killing. I might, for his sake, start thinking about 
these topics, and come to make some judgments about what would be a good murder 
weapon. I might come to think: “Suppose the murderer was a scientist working on 
creating and programming airborne nano-bots.  He could program an swarm of nano-bots 
to invade the victims’ bodies through their mouth or nose, find their way into their 
victims’ bloodstreams, scrape the cholesterol from their victims’ arteries, and collect it 
into a clot in the victims’ brains causing them to suffer strokes. That would be a good 
way to kill someone.”  I can form this judgment, I believe, without thinking that murder 
is a good thing, or without commending murder by nano-bot swarms. In fact, I could 
even deplore murder, and believe that no one should ever murder! I need not even have 
pro-attitudes towards murder mystery novels or the sorts of events depicted in such 
novels. As described, I have pro-attitudes towards helping my friend Jared write his 
novel, but those attitudes only serve to explain why I was engaged in thinking about 
murder weapons to begin with. Granted, I am commending the scenario as a good thing 
to write in his book. However, it seems to me that the reason that I commend the scenario 
is that I honestly judge that murder by nano-bot swarms would be a good way to kill 
someone. I see no reason why we should interpret me as either having pro-attitudes, or as 
commending, murder by nano-bots.  
Hare would likely respond to this example by suggesting that if I do not have the 
relevant pro-attitudes or intend to commend murder by nano-bots, then my use of ‘good’ 
is not sincere.  He would say that my use of ‘good’ is an example of what he called, the 
!! 66!
‘inverted commas’ sense of ‘good.69 When we use the inverted commas sense of good, 
we signal that our use of ‘good’ is not entirely sincere. As Hare explains: “We are, in this 
use, not making a value-judgement ourselves, but alluding to the value-judgments of 
other people.”70 We intend to express that X has the attributes that others say meet the 
standards for goodness for things like X, but in so doing, we do not intend to express our 
agreement with those standards. The inverted commas use of ‘good’ is often an ironic or 
sarcastic use of ‘good’ that includes a negative evaluative judgment. Since I do not seem 
to share the positive evaluative judgment when I claim that it would be good to murder 
someone with nano-bots, Hare might claim that this is not a true judgment of goodness, 
but merely an inverted comma use of the word ‘good.’ 
To use ‘good’ in the inverted commas sense, I need to be aware of the 
conventional standards of goodness by which others would judge things like X. How 
might I come to have knowledge of the conventional standards by which people would 
judge the goodness of murder weapons, for instance? I see two avenues. First, there is a 
history of murder full of people who were interested in murdering, and I am familiar with 
this history. I have seen what features people have looked for in murder weapons, and 
thus, knows what people who are interested in murdering will judge to be good.  But 
what if there were no such history? Could one dispassionately judge something to be 
good without there being a history to draw on?  Consider, for instance, what we would 
say about the following case:  A group of friends are hanging out at the bar, and are 
involved in a heated discussion about what strategy is best for surviving a zombie 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!69!Ibid.,!p.124!
70 Ibid. 
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outbreak.71 Laura, a common friend of the discussants, shows up to the bar and wishes to 
join the conversation. Laura is not interested in zombies, movies about zombies, etc and 
would normally find such a conversation boring. However, she enjoys puzzles, and sees 
the set-up of the conversation as a kind of puzzle:  How would one plan to survive in a 
world populated with zombies? She thus joins in on the conversation and declares: “A 
samurai sword would be a good weapon for that scenario.”  
  There is no history of fighting hordes of zombies, as zombies are fictional 
creatures. There is thus, no convention about what would be good to fight zombies with 
that Laura appeals to in making her judgment. Laura’s judgment that a samurai sword 
would be good for fighting zombies does not rely on or presuppose her knowing any 
conventional standard of goodness for zombie fighting. One might insist that there is a 
history of zombie fighting, though it is a fictional history portrayed in movies and 
books—and that Laura could be drawing on this history in making her judgment. Let me 
stipulate then that she is not. Imagine she has never seen a zombie movie. She simply 
hears her friends describe how zombies attack, and what their weaknesses are, and she 
concludes that a samurai sword would be a good weapon for fighting them. If you doubt 
this is possible, think back to the very first movie or book featuring zombies. Before the 
author(s) of that fiction created zombies, there was no history to draw on. The author(s) 
had to imagine ways the heroes of the stories would escape and or fight off this new kind 
of creature. They made judgments about what would weapons would be good and bad for 
fighting zombies. They made these judgments, not by appealing to a history of what 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
71 This is a rare use of ‘zombie’ in philosophical writing. My interest here is reanimated, or 
walking dead, humans—and not, so-called ‘philosophical zombies’. 
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people chose—but by imagining an end (defeating zombies in a fight) and then figuring 
out what weapons would advance that end.  
This has been a long-winded way of suggesting that even when one judges an X 
to be good by appealing to a history full of people choosing X, the explanation for those 
peoples’ choices is ultimately grounded in the fact that X advanced some relevant goal. 
So we really do not need to reference the people or their choices in explaining why X is 
good, or why I currently judge X to be good.  We can simply appeal to the goal and my 
judgment that X advances that goal. That is what Laura is doing in the zombie-killing 
conversation, that is what I am doing in the nano-bot murder conversation. 
There is one last move for the proponent of a commending account of goodness to 
make. She might insist that since I do not endorse the relevant standards, when I judge 
that a swarm of nano-bots would be a good way to murder someone, I am not sincerely 
and literally using ‘good’. The nano-bot example is my own invention, so I could of 
course just stipulate that I was in fact being sincere in the example. I doubt my opponent 
would allow me this stipulation; she would insist that it is impossible for me to judge that 
X is good without the relevant evaluative attitudes. As a reply, let me try an example that 
comes from my own, actual experience. That way, I can speak to how sincerely the 
judgment was uttered.  
To begin, I need to admit to watching a lot of bad television shows and movies. 
One of my favorite bad movies, The Room, is truly a paradigm example of how not to 
make a movie. The writing, acting, directing, set-design, casting, music, story, and pacing 
are all just terrible.72 It is a really, really bad movie. I have, nonetheless, uttered the !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
72 I suspect that a lot of this can be explained by the fact that one man, Tommy Wiseau, wrote, 
directed, produced, and starred in the film. 
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following judgment quite sincerely: “I know that The Room is not a good movie, but you 
should really watch it.” If this were an inverted commas use of ‘good,’ the first clause 
would allude to standards of goodness that I do not endorse. But I can assure you that I 
do in fact endorse the standards of goodness for movies by which The Room is truly 
judged a very bad movie. Now presumably, if a sincere use of ‘good’ expresses pro-
attitudes, then the first clause of this sentence (when spoken sincerely) expresses a lack of 
pro-attitudes. It should consequently sound contradictory (or at the very least, 
incongruous) for me to go on in the next clause and commend the film to you (since, on 
the view we are considering, sincere commendation requires the relevant pro-attitudes). 
This sentence is thus very puzzling on a commending account of goodness. However, 
intuitively, it is not a puzzling sentence at all. 
The sentence is not puzzling if we think that what Hare calls “the evaluative 
meaning of ‘good’” is not essential.73 For instance, if we believe that ‘good’ ascribes end-
relational goodness, we can make sense of this sentence quite easily. The first claim—
that The Room is a bad movie—is sincerely uttered because I believe that there are a 
variety of goals that set the standards for what a good movie should be like, and The 
Room meets few, if any, of those goals. I can endorse those standards, without having a 
corresponding negative attitude about The Room. I can like things that I know to be bad. 
Thus, it is mistaken to think that the correct definition of ‘good,’ in non-moral uses, is 
essentially about expressing pro-attitudes. 
b) Objection: Thesis of Commonality is false 
Suppose instead, that my opponent wished to defend the thesis that moral 
goodness is monadic by way of (b), that is, by rejecting the Thesis of Commonality. !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
73 Hare (1952) p.121 
!! 70!
Without the Thesis of Commonality, there is no problem with saying that non-moral 
goodness (like the goodness of hammers) is relational, while moral goodness is monadic. 
At first glance, this sounds like an open and attractive way to argue; yet rejecting the 
Thesis of Commonality comes at a great cost.   
To see this cost, consider a silly example.  Suppose I were to pick an arbitrary 
monadic property (say, the property of redness for instance) and an arbitrary relational 
property (say, being the brother of Brianna).  I could decide to use the same adjective, 
‘red’ to refer to both of these things. Now for the most part, my use of ‘red’ would 
coincide with the regular use of that term in English. I would agree that apples, fire 
trucks, and roses are red. However, while other English speakers would claim that ‘red’ 
picks out a monadic property, I would disagree. When asked to defend my view, I would 
point out that ‘red’ sometimes refers to the relational property of being the brother of 
Brianna. My detractors could argue:  “Look, Brian. You clearly have the concept of 
redness and the concept of being the brother of Brianna. For some reason, you have 
picked out these two distinct attributes with the same predicate, but you could just as well 
have used two predicates (and things would have been much less confusing)”.  “Yes, 
yes,” I might reply, “but there is also, it strikes me, a further property that is the 
disjunction of either the property of redness or the relational property of being the brother 
of Brianna. I have been calling that disjunctive property ‘red’, but I could very well just 
call it ‘Blarb’ to avoid confusion.”  “Do what you like. You can arbitrarily gerrymander 
disjunctive properties however you see fit, but just know that the rest of us aren’t 
interested in the property you are calling ‘Blarb’, we are interested in redness.”74 !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
74 Frank Jackson (2000) proposes that one could simply identify a moral property (like goodness) 
with the massively disjunctive property of being either G1 or G2 or G3… where those variables 
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 The accusation that the disjunctive property picked out by the predicate ‘Blarb’ is 
the result of arbitrary gerrymandering is apt, if not only because I set up the example that 
way (remember, I arbitrarily selected a property and relation for the example). As I 
understand it, the philosopher that pursues (b) is also introducing a disjunctive property.  
She is calling ‘good’ anything that has either the monadic property of moral goodness or 
(at least) one of the relational properties of non-moral goodness. We should ask, then, 
whether this disjunctive property is also the result of an arbitrary gerrymandering. If it is, 
I see no reason to continue using a single predicate, ‘good’ to pick out the various 
properties and relations that have been gerrymandered together. We should be just as 
comfortable picking out new predicates for non-moral goodness, moral goodness, and for 
the disjunction of moral and non-moral goodness, as we are for redness, being the brother 
of Smith, and the disjunction of redness and being the brother of Brianna.  
If it strikes you, as it does me, that these two cases are distinct—that it makes 
sense to use a variety of predicates in the redness/brother of Brianna case, but not in the 
goodness case—then you agree with me that the predicate ‘good’ does not pick out an 
arbitrarily gerrymandered disjunctive property. And if ‘good’ does not pick out an 
arbitrarily gerrymandered disjunctive property, there must be something in common 
among the things we call ‘good.’  That is, the Thesis of Commonality holds for goodness. 
c) Objection: The common feature of good things is not that they are relational 
 Thus (c) is the only remaining option for the philosopher who wishes to deny that 
goodness is relational. That is, such a philosopher must claim that though non-moral 
goodness is relational and moral goodness is monadic, there is still something that these !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
refer to the members of the set of all properties we would intuitively view as ‘goodness making’. 
This view is not illuminating; it tells us nothing of the nature of goodness. 
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attributes have in common such that it makes sense to call them both types of goodness. 
They thus agree with me that the Thesis of Commonality is true—they simply disagree 
with me about which feature of good things it is that they all share in common. One such 
proposal, offered by Michael J. Zimmerman, is that what unites all good things is the 
appropriateness of favoring them.75  
I am confident in describing Zimmerman as a pursuer of strategy (c). He argues 
that moral goodness is monadic. But he also says, after considering the claim that moral 
goodness is just one of many ways of being good:  “But what, then, might be said to unite 
the ways of being good, making them ways of being good…?  My answer is:  the idea of 
valuableness (that is, the worthiness of being valued).”76  I take it that the question—what 
unites the ways of being good?—is asking for some way to satisfy the Thesis of 
Commonality. If ‘good’ just means ‘worthy of being valued,’ then it is certainly possible 
that ‘good’ sometimes picks out a monadic property, and other times a relational 
property. 
 According to Zimmerman, to say that it is appropriate to favor something is to say 
that certain favoring attitudes are fitting, or even required.77 That is, it is appropriate or 
fitting to have certain favoring attitudes if there are reasons that you ought to have those 
attitudes. In the roughest terms, then, Zimmerman explains goodness in terms of ought-
ness. Good things are those things that you ought to favor. 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
75 Wherever possible, I will do my best to present Zimmerman’s analysis as accurately as I can 
without getting too bogged down in the somewhat excruciating details.  Zimmerman takes almost 
an entire book to clarify what his analysis amounts to.   
76 Zimmerman, p.27 
77 According to Zimmerman’s final analysis of moral goodness, we are morally required to favor 
it to a certain degree.  Ibid, p.122 
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 This view is attractive for several reasons. First, it seems correct to say of most 
good things that we ought to favor them. On Zimmerman’s account of goodness, this 
connection is no coincidence. What it means for something to be good is for it to be the 
case that we ought to favor it. Second, thinking of goodness in this way gives us a very 
natural way to distinguish between moral and non-moral goodness. Suppose a hammer is 
a good hammer. According to Zimmerman, this means I have reasons to favor the 
hammer. Of course, if I am not interesting in hammering, then these reasons do not have 
to factor into my practical deliberation. The reasons that count towards favoring non-
moral goods will be hypothetical—their normative force depends, in some important way, 
on the agent’s desires. But, says Zimmerman, we have moral reasons to favor things that 
are morally good. Presumably, part of what makes a reason a moral reason is that its 
normative force is independent from the agent’s desires. That is, we have categorical 
reasons to favor things that are morally good. Again, by distinguishing these two types of 
reason, we can distinguish moral goodness from non-moral goodness while still insisting 
that what makes them both types of goodness is that it we ought to favor them. 
 Despite these virtues of the view, Zimmerman’s account of goodness strikes me 
as seriously mistaken. While his account of goodness explains the tight connection 
between the goodness of things and the appropriateness of valuing those things, it gets 
the explanation backwards. In the style of the Euthyphro Dilemma, we can ask:  Ought 
we favor good things because they are good, or are they good because we ought favor 
them? It is hard to do more here than appeal to intuitions. If I tell my friend he ought to 
see it, and he asks me why, a sensible and natural response is ‘You ought to see it 
because it is good’. If, on the other hand, I tell my friend that a movie is good, and he 
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asks me why, it is not a very natural response to say ‘It is good because you ought to see 
it.’ Intuitively then, it is a thing’s goodness that explains why we should favor it (or 
perhaps, the fact that something is good merely signals that there are other features of the 
thing that explain why we ought to favor it).78 In either case, that a thing is good justifies 
our favoring it.  
Zimmerman predicts and replies to this objection, by way of clever observation 
about how the term ‘because’ operates. As I am interpreting things, the fact that 
something is good explains or justifies its being the case that I ought to favor it. I ought to 
favor X because it is good. On this view, the goodness of X is prior to what I ought to do, 
so we cannot analyze goodness in terms of what we ought to favor. However, says 
Zimmerman, the explanatory / justificatory use of ‘because’ is not the only such use of 
the term. Consider the following example. We know that every point of a circle is 
equidistant from a fixed, central point. If we were asked why this is the case, we would 
reply: “Every point on a circle is equidistant from a fixed point because that is what it is 
to be a circle.” Let us call this the constitutive use of ‘because’. Zimmerman asks:  
“Might it not be that it is this sense of ‘because’ that makes ‘It is appropriate to favor S 
because it is good’ sound ‘natural’? If so, the suggested analysis is not threatened after 
all”.79 
  Now of course, it might be the case that we use ‘because’ in its constitutive use 
when we say that a person ought to favor good things because they are good. Zimmerman 
himself goes on to express doubt that this is in fact how we use ‘because’ in these cases.  
I know of no sure way to settle the question; the best I offer is brute appeal to my sense of !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
78 I am here describing T.M. Scanlon’s ‘buck-passing’ account of value (1998) pp.96-8. 
79 Zimmerman, (2001) p.115 
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how I use the term. When I say that we ought to favor good things because they are good, 
it seems to me that I am using ‘because’ in the explanatory / justificatory way. Similarly, 
when a friend asks why I think she to ought to go see a movie, and I reply: “Because it is 
good” I seem to be justifying my answer (albeit, in a not very descriptive manner) rather 
than repeating my recommendation in a different way. 
 I reject Zimmerman’s account of goodness because it gets backwards the 
explanation of how goodness relates to what we ought to do. This is, unfortunately, far 
from showing why any attempt at strategy (c) is bound to fail—although it is suggestive.  
Recall that to satisfy the Thesis of Commonality we need to point to some feature that all 
good things have in common in virtue of which it is appropriate to call them ‘good.’  Any 
such feature will have to be quite general and abstract, and at least be part of an analysis 
of what it is to be good. Zimmerman’s account is paradigmatic of a wide range of 
theories that suggest that goodness be analyzed in terms of reasons, fitting reactions, or 
what we ought to do. Such theories would succumb to the same objection—that the 
goodness of things explains why it is appropriate to respond to them in the specified 
ways. So while any such theory is compatible with moral goodness being monadic, and 
also with there being something in common between moral goodness and non-moral 
goodness, such theories are objectionable. 
 For what it is worth, my end-relational account of goodness also accounts for the 
intuition that goodness is closely related to what we ought to do. After all, on my view, if 
X is good, then X adequately promotes a goal G. Now if a person were to want to achieve 
G, it seems to follow that she would have reasons to favor X. So if I tell you that X is 
good, I tell you that if you were interested in achieving G, you ought to favor X. Notice 
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that this would be a form of commendation—but it is merely hypothetical commendation. 
I could always believe that no one is interested in achieving G—or stronger still, that no 
one should be interested in achieving G. I can, nonetheless, judge which things would be 
good relative to G. Suppose, for instance, that you want to build a solid piece of furniture. 
You ought to build it out of hardwoods (not softwoods), because hardwoods are good to 
use in building sturdy pieces of furniture. I tell you that maple is a good wood for 
building furniture. It seems that I have signaled to you that there is reason for you to use 
maple in your project, and I have thus commended maple. So on my view, goodness is 
still closely related to both commendation and to what we ought to do.  Better yet, 
however, my view also explains why the goodness of things explains why we ought to 
favor them.  
 
IV. A noteworthy virtue of my end-relational analysis 
 
If the arguments of this chapter are sound, then goodness is a relation that holds 
between things and ends. Though I do not wish to make much of the point, it is worth 
noting that one of the theoretical virtues of an account of goodness wherein all goodness 
falls under one unifed analysis is that the resulting account of goodness is highly 
parsimonious.  
I have two reasons for not making much of the advantage that my account enjoys 
due to parsimony.  First, I wish to prevent a certain misunderstanding of my argument.  
The motivation behind my appeal to the Thesis of Commonality is not parsimony; the 
motivation behind my appealing to the Thesis of Commonality is the accommodation of a 
common sense intuition. This is as it should be, since common sense intuitions are a good 
place to begin philosophical theorizing while parsimony is not. If parsimony were a 
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starting point for philosophical theorizing, things would be too easy; parsimony comes 
very cheaply. I could construct a theory, for instance, wherein I claim that all our 
evaluative terms, ‘ought,’ ‘good,’ ‘beautiful,’ ‘just,’ ‘right,’ etc. pick out one and the 
same property. This would certainly be a parsimonious theory; but no such theory is 
acceptable to our common sense intuitions. Intuitively, there is a difference between 
calling something ‘just’ and calling it ‘beautiful.’ We can reject such a simplistic theory 
forthrightly. Perhaps some argument could be given that would convince us that such a 
theory is correct despite conflicting with our common sense intuitions, but a mere appeal 
to parsimony will not do.   
This leads me to my second reason for not putting much emphasis on the 
parsimony of my account: as the above discussion suggests, parsimony is a fairly weak 
virtue. Parsimony can tip the scales when we are deciding between two or more 
competing theories that strike us as equally plausible.80 What parsimony does not do, 
however, is make a weaker, less plausible theory trump a stronger, more plausible 
theory.81 This discussion of the virtue of parsimony is my way of acknowledging the 
work I have ahead of me. I have shown that my account of goodness is fairly 
parsimonious, and accommodates some of our commonsense intuitions. At best, I have 
shown that my account of goodness cannot be dismissed outright. To show that we ought 
to adopt my account of goodness, however, I need to show that it is more plausible—or at 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
80 As it did above when I discussed the view that non-moral goodness is a monadic property that 
supervenes on the other attributes of good things. 81!This might be putting the point too strongly.  Suppose we are evaluating theories T1 and T2.  
Perhaps TI is only slightly less plausible, but much more parsimonious, than T2.  In this situation, 
I am willing to concede that it is at least possible that we ought to favor T1 to T2.  The point I am 
trying to make, however, is that the two (or more) competing theories need to be very nearly 
equally plausible before parsimony matters.!
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least nearly as plausible—as less parsimonious theories.  Arguing for this point is the 
primary task of the remaining chapters. 
 
V. Conclusion 
 
I have here argued that all goodness is relational, and we thus ought to reject the 
orthodox view that moral goodness is a monadic property. Were we to adhere to the 
orthodox view, we would be faced with several unattractive alternatives. Two of those 
alternatives: (a) rejecting the end-relational analysis of non-moral goodness, and (b) 
giving up the Thesis of Commonality, are implausible. It is tempting to try the third 
alternative, (c) giving an account of goodness that accommodates the Thesis of 
Commonality, while still insisting that at least moral goodness is monadic. My suspicion 
is that the most plausible accounts of goodness that can be utilized for strategy (c) will 
analyze goodness in terms of what we ought to do, what we ought to favor, or what 
would be appropriate to respond or the like. But such approaches require abandoning the 
claim that the goodness of things justifies or explains why we ought to do things. Thus, I 
conclude, there is no plausible account on which moral goodness is a monadic property. 
Upon reflection, it actually seems a bit odd that philosophers would take sides on 
whether goodness is monadic or not unless something else rides on how we answer this 
question. Geach and some of his followers believe that certain meta-ethical and 
normative positions can be rejected if goodness is not a monadic property; I agree (I will 
discuss some of these theoretical consequences of my view in a Chapter Five).  
Consequently, one motivation for taking a side on the nature of goodness is an interest in 
arguing against, or defending, some of these meta-ethical and normative positions. Most 
philosophers, I suspect, defend the claim that moral goodness is monadic due to their 
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belief in how that claim connects with the claim that some things are intrinsically good. I 
believe it is really this second claim, about intrinsic goodness, that is of most interest to 
moral philosophers. I turn now to discussing why that claim is false. 
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Chapter Three – Why we do not need intrinsic goodness 
 
 
 
I. Introduction 
 
In the last chapter I argued that goodness is end-relational. That is, a thing is good 
just in case and because it stands in the relevant relation to a goal. Briefly, my argument 
began with the premise that the best account of non-moral goodness reveals that it is end-
relational. The second premise was what I called the ‘Thesis of Commonality’—that is, 
that moral goodness and non-moral goodness share something in common in virtue of 
which it is true that they are both types of goodness. My suggestion was that because our 
best analysis of non-moral goodness reveals that it is end-relational, then the Thesis of 
Commonality recommends that we should likewise conclude that moral goodness is end-
relational.  
I believe that absent good reasons to reject it, we ought to accept the Thesis of 
Commonality. In this chapter, I will entertain one line of reasoning that, if successful, 
would justify abandoning the Thesis of Commonality. More specifically, I concede that if 
affirming the Thesis of Commonality leads us to a theory of goodness that is too 
revisionary—one that conflicts with too many of our commonsense intuitions and 
expectations about what a theory of goodness does or should do—then perhaps we ought 
to reject the Thesis of Commonality. For instance, if the extension of an end-relational 
account of goodness into the moral realm has too many counterintuitive consequences, 
perhaps we should conclude that although non-moral goodness is end-relational, moral 
goodness is not. This is to say that for my master argument from the last chapter to 
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succeed, I need to show that adopting an end-relational theory of moral goodness would 
not do too much damage to our ordinary understanding of morality.   
At this point, I must confess that the end-relational theory of goodness that I 
prefer does have one consequence that will strike many as quite revisionary: according to 
my view, nothing is intrinsically good. For many, this consequence itself constitutes a 
reductio ad absurdum of my end-relational theory of goodness. In this chapter, however, I 
will show that even though my view entails that nothing is intrinsically good, the view is 
not too revisionary. My argument involves examining what roles intrinsic goodness plays 
in our theoretical and practical lives, and then showing that an end-relational theory can 
fill those roles without positing intrinsic goodness; we do not need intrinsic goodness. 
 
II. Preliminaries 
Before looking at any arguments, it is best to be absolutely clear about (a) how I 
understand the notion of intrinsic goodness, and (b) why my view entails that nothing is 
intrinsically good. Let me start with (a). I intend to be discussing the same notion of 
intrinsic goodness that has been discussed for centuries by moral philosophers. 
Traditionally, moral philosophers have used the label ‘intrinsic goodness’ when talking 
about the value a thing has when it is ‘good in itself,’ ‘good for its own sake,’ or ‘just 
plain good.’ For instance, John Stuart Mill says that happiness is the only thing that is 
valuable for its own sake.82 Immanuel Kant says that the only thing that is good in itself is 
a good will.83 Aristotle says that eudemonia is the “chief good” that “we choose always 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
82 Mill, John Stuart. Utilitarianism, From On Liberty and Other Essays, Edited by John Gray, 
(1991) Oxford University Press, p.137 
83 Kant, Immanuel.  Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals, 4:393 
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for itself and never for the sake of something else”.84 I take all of them to be making 
substantive claims about what things are intrinsically good.  
Christine Korsgaard notes that labeling this kind of goodness ‘intrinsic goodness’ 
is misleading. 85The label suggests that things are good for their own sake due only to 
their intrinsic properties. However, some philosophers have argued—quite 
compellingly—that there are things that are worthy of being valued for their own sakes at 
least in part due to their non-intrinsic properties.86 For instance, Picasso’s Guernica is 
good for its own sake—but at least part of the reason this painting is valuable is due to 
who painted it, its cultural and historical significance, and the event it depicts.87 Those 
are relational properties of the painting. If this is correct, then the intrinsic value of the 
painting is at least partially determined by its non-intrinsic properties. For this reason, 
Korsgaard suggests that we refer to goodness for its own sake with a new label: ‘final 
goodness.’88 I am friendly to the suggestion, but am opting to stick with the longstanding 
tradition of referring to things that are good for their own sake as ‘intrinsic goods’.89   
Turning now to issue (b): Why does my view entail that nothing is intrinsically 
good?  As I understand it, for X to be intrinsically good is for X to be good for its own 
sake. But on my view, nothing is good for its own sake; things are good only because 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
84 Aristotle. Nicomachean Ethics, EN I.2.1097a27-1097b 
85 Korsgaard (1983) p.170 
86 See Shelley Kagan (1998) and W. Rabinowicz & T. RØnnow-Rasmussen (2000, 2003). 
87 Picasso’s Guernica depicts a truly despicable event of the Spanish Civil War. It depicts when, 
on April 26th 1937, German and Italian warplanes bombed the civilian population of the Spanish 
town of Guernica (at a busy outdoor market) at the request of then aspiring Spanish dictator 
Francisco Franco.  
88 Korsgaard (1983) p.170 
89 I am not alone in this decision. A recently published volume of essays titled Recent Work on 
Intrinsic Value, Edited by T. RØnnow-Rasmussen and Michael J. Zimmerman (2005), features 32 
essays, many of which discuss the notion of value that Korsgaard calls ‘final goodness,’ under the 
label ‘intrinsic value’.!
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they stand in the relevant relation to a goal. They are good for the sake of promoting 
those goals. Thus, on my view nothing is intrinsically good. 
Finally, let me introduce a bit of terminology for the ease of discussion. For the 
rest of this chapter, I will be using the term ‘nihilism’ to refer to the view that nothing is 
intrinsically good, and ‘realism’ to refer to the view that there is at least one thing that is 
intrinsically good. I will use the terms ‘nihilist’ and ‘realist’ to refer to the proponents of 
these views. I wish to stress, however, that these terms should only be understood quite 
narrowly. The nihilist whom I am considering in this chapter does not deny the existence 
of other kinds of goodness or value.90 She simply believes that there is nothing that is 
intrinsically good. Further, the realist that I am concerned need not be a ‘realist’ in the 
sense of affirming the existence of Platonic universals. She can accept any metaphysical 
view about the nature of properties that allows for it to be the case that at least one thing 
is intrinsically good. 
The realist view is the orthodox one in philosophy. As such, my end-relational 
view is revisionary. The question of this chapter, however, is whether my view is too 
revisionary. Does my view conflict with too many of our commonsense intuitions about 
moral goodness? To answer this question, I will start with an account of what roles or 
functions intrinsic goodness is believed to play in our practical lives. I will focus on two:  
(i) It explains why some of our judgments about the goodness of things are true, and (ii) it 
grounds basic practical reasons. Clearly, these are important aspects of our practical lives. 
Were it the case that we needed to posit intrinsic goodness in order to accomplish either 
(i) or (ii), I would concede to my opponent that this would constitute a fatal shortcoming !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
90 Unless, as I go on to argue in Section III, her nihilism about intrinsic goodness commits her to 
nihilism about some other kinds of goodness. 
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for nihilism. I will argue, however, that we do not need to posit intrinsic goodness to 
accomplish (i) or (ii). My end-relational theory is not so revisionary that it requires giving 
up on basic practical reasons or the truth of (most) of our judgments about goodness. 
 
III. Explaining the Truth of Goodness Judgments 
The first role that intrinsic goodness plays in our practical lives is explaining why 
some of our judgments about the goodness of things (henceforth, ‘goodness judgments’) 
are true.91 Let us begin by dividing our goodness judgments into two categories. Some of 
our goodness judgments purportedly ascribe intrinsic goodness to the things we are 
judging; other goodness judgments ascribe non-intrinsic goodness. The truth of our 
intrinsic goodness judgments requires realism about intrinsic goodness, so the nihilist 
must deny that these judgments are true. This might seem like a big bullet for the nihilist 
to bite. After all, as I just mentioned, the history of moral philosophy has seen many very 
smart people arguing over which intrinsic goodness judgments are true. I will argue that a 
nihilist can give a plausible explanation for why so many people mistakenly believed that 
there are intrinsic goodness judgments that are true. This explanation will also show that 
although nihilism requires denying that any intrinsic goodness judgments are true, 
nihilism is nonetheless, not implausibly revisionary in this respect. 
It is with regard to the truth of our non-intrinsic goodness judgments that the 
realist puts some real pressure on the nihilist. There is a promising line of argument—one 
that dates back perhaps to Aristotle, and is ubiquitous in ethics textbooks—that aims to !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
91 Recall that in the last chapter I argued against those non-cognitivist views of non-moral 
goodness that would deny that goodness judgments have truth-values. As such, I am assuming 
that at least some of our goodness judgments are true. Some non-cognitivists (Simon Blackburn 
(1993), for instance), can accept that some of our goodness judgments are true because they are 
deflationists about truth. Nothing I say here is incompatible with a deflationist view of truth.  
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show that we need there to be something that is intrinsically good in order to explain the 
truth of our non-intrinsic goodness judgments. I call this argument the ‘Argument from 
Need,’ or ‘AFN.’ Ambitiously, the realist might employ AFN in support of the Strong 
Realist Claim, the claim that the truth of all, or perhaps just most, of our non-intrinsic 
goodness judgments requires the existence of intrinsic goodness.  This would certainly be 
a big bullet for the nihilist to bite! If the Strong Realist Claim were true, then any form of 
nihilism would be much too revisionary to be a plausible account of goodness. I will 
show, however, that the Argument from Need is deeply flawed, and does not support the 
Strong Realist Claim. 
My objections leave open a less ambitious position to which the realist might 
retreat. She might still argue in favor of the Weak Realist Claim, the claim that the truth 
of some of our goodness judgments requires the existence of intrinsic goodness. 
Depending on the centrality of these judgments to our practical thinking, and our 
confidence that they are true, even this weaker realist claim has the potential to show that 
nihilism is too revisionary. I will argue that even this Weak Realist Claim is false.    
a) The truth of intrinsic goodness judgments 
The realist would say that the following sentences express paradigmatic examples 
of intrinsic goodness judgments: 
(A) Friendship is good. 
(B) Pleasure is good for its own sake. 
(C) A good will is good in itself. 
(D) Knowledge is intrinsically good. 
 
The realist insists that at least one of the above sentences (or one very much like them) is 
true. The realist might claim that the sentence is true in virtue of expressing a true 
judgment. The corresponding goodness judgment is true when the thing that is referred to 
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by the subject term of the sentence has the property of intrinsic goodness. Were there no 
such thing as intrinsic goodness, these judgments and sentences would not be true. These 
sentences and judgments are true, says the realist, thus there must be something that is 
intrinsically good.    
Given that the nihilist believes that no intrinsic goodness judgments are true, what 
should she say about sentences (A) – (D), and other sentences like them?  Some nihilists 
have suggested that these sentences are meaningless.92 They are meaningless because 
they ascribe intrinsic goodness to things, when there is no such property. Such a view is 
hard to square with the prevalence of intrinsic goodness judgments. As mentioned above, 
the history of moral philosophy is full of very smart people arguing over the truth of 
sentences like (A) – (D). Philosophers have, for centuries, debated which things are 
intrinsically good. William Frankena compiled a list of all the things that philosophers 
have judged to be intrinsically good, and the list is daunting. He cites: 
Life, consciousness, and activity; health and strength; pleasures and 
satisfactions of all or certain kinds; happiness, beatitude, contentment, 
etc.; truth; knowledge and true opinions of various kinds, understanding, 
wisdom; beauty, harmony, proportion in objects contemplated; aesthetic 
experience; morally good dispositions or virtues; mutual affection, love, 
friendship, cooperation; just distribution of goods and evils; harmony and 
proportion in one's own life; power and experiences of achievement; self-
expression; freedom; peace, security; adventure and novelty; and good 
reputation, honor, esteem, etc (William Frankena, Ethics, 1973, pp.87-8). 
 
And it is not just philosophers who trade in claims about which things are intrinsically 
good. As defenders of intrinsic goodness like to point out, millions of people have 
accepted the claim, appearing in the book of Genesis, that God looked at the world after 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
92 Judith Jarvis Thomson (2008) p.17 and Peter Geach (1956) p.41 defend this claim. 
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creating it, and “saw that it was good.”93 How could so many people not see that what 
they were saying was incoherent or meaningless? Are we to assume that they were not 
competent users of the concept of goodness? That is a hard view to accept. 
A more plausible thing for a nihilist to say about (A) – (D) (and other such 
sentences) is that all of them are technically false when we understand them as expressing 
judgments that ascribe intrinsic goodness. On the other hand, some of these sentences can 
be true when we understand them as expressing judgments that ascribe some form of 
non-intrinsic goodness. An end-relational theory of goodness, for instance, can explain 
the truth of these sentences quite nicely while at the same time explaining why so many 
people have mistakenly believed these sentences to be about intrinsic goodness.  What do 
I have in mind? 
The idea is that some sentences like (A) – (D) actually ascribe end-relational 
goodness to things even though the surface grammar of the sentence makes it appear as if 
they do not. Thus, when people take these sentences as expressing intrinsic goodness 
judgments, they are mistaken. The reason that the sentences do not mention ends or goals 
explicitly is because the relevant goal is taken as a given in the context, and 
conversational maxims prescribe against explicitly stating information that everyone 
takes as a given.94 When we go see a financial adviser, she need not continue to dot her 
recommendations with the qualifier: ‘If you wish to be financially stable…’ This goal is 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
93 Michael J. Zimmerman (2001) p.29, for instance, references the ‘pithy comment’ by Panayot 
Butchavarov: “Nevertheless, millions have thought they understood Genesis 1:31: ‘And God saw 
every thing he had made, and behold, it was very good.’” Butchavarov (1989) p.17. 
94 Finlay discusses this point with respect to moral judgments in general, that is, not merely with 
respect to goodness judgments (2008) p.353. 
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taken as a given, and thus does not need to be restated explicitly.95 I believe a similar 
thing occurs in true sentences that appear to ascribe intrinsic goodness to things.  
If I am correct, then the mistake that people make when they judge these 
sentences as if they are ascribing intrinsic goodness is the same kind of mistake people 
make when they think that sentences about the weight of objects ascribe an intrinsic 
property to objects. An object’s mass is intrinsic, but its weight is a measurement of that 
mass being subjected to some magnitude of gravitational force. Weight is a relational 
property. When you change the gravitational force, you change the object’s weight.  
However, because it is extremely rare that we are interested in gravitational contexts 
other than that on the Earth’s surface, it is often unnecessary to explicitly qualify our 
sentences about the weight of objects with ‘in an environment of 1 G of gravitational 
force’. So although the sentence, ‘My cat weighs 14 pounds’ does not appear to introduce 
a property that is relative to gravitational context, it does. Similarly, when a sentence of 
the form ‘Friendship is good’ is true, it introduces a property that is relative to a goal, 
even though it does not appear to. 
To demonstrate how this would work, let us look at an example.  For instance, 
let’s return to the example of the creation story in Genesis. As you recall, God creates the 
Earth, looks upon it, then pronounces: “It is good.”96 If we only focus on the surface 
structure of God’s utterance, it appears to be a judgment that ascribes intrinsic goodness 
to the Earth. However, I believe that the surface structure of that sentence disguises the 
fact that the judgment that God makes is one that ascribes end-relational goodness. And !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
95 Finlay uses the example of a rugby captain, speaking about which plays the team ought to run, 
qualifying each with ‘In order to win…’ (2008) p.353.  
96 To be more precise, God “sees that [the Earth] is good.”  For the ease of discussion, I will 
pretend that God went on to vocalize this judgment.  
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while I do not wish to presume too much about God’s motivations for creating the world, 
the following seems like a plausible story: God was interested in creating a habitable and 
pleasant place for human beings (and other animals) to live happy and fulfilling lives.  
Thus, when he looks upon the Earth and judges it to be good, he is judging it as satisfying 
this goal of creating a habitable world. He judges the Earth as end-relationally good 
relative to this goal. To further support this interpretation, we should note that the Earth 
would not be end-relationally good relative to just any goal. Imagine that God sets out to 
make a harsh, ugly, and inhospitable planet on which to imprison and punish the worst 
sinners. He then creates the Earth as we know it. Would he still look upon it and judge it 
to be good?  Or might he instead think:  “This would be a good world for humans beings 
to inhabit, but it is a lousy world to use to punish sinners”? I simply cannot imagine God 
judging the Earth to be good in this scenario. I have a similarly hard time imagining God 
creating the Earth with no purpose in mind at all, looking upon the planet, and then 
judging it to be good. But if God did have a purpose in mind for the Earth, his judgment 
very well could have been one that ascribes end-relational goodness.   
A similar story can be given for sentences (A) – (D). At first, it might be strange 
to think of friendship as end-relationally good—it just seems good on its own. The reason 
that ‘Friendship is good’ does not seem to us to ascribe end-relational goodness is due to 
the fact that the goal that friendship promotes is taken for a given. Friendship, it might be 
said, contributes to having a fulfilling and meaningful life.97 This goal is so pervasive we 
can generally assume that speakers and audiences alike share this goal in just about every 
context. It does not need to be made explicit. But observe what happens if we construct a !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
97 Finlay agrees that friendship is end-relationally good for living a fulfilling life, although he 
includes ‘happy’ where I include ‘meaningful’ (2014) p.34. 
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scenario where this goal is not contextually relevant. Suppose, for instance, we have 
captured a terrible warlord whom has brutalized and terrorized thousands of people. The 
international courts find him guilty of war crimes—but do not plan to execute him. They 
decide a more fitting punishment is that he lives out his life in a tiny cell in one of the 
many prisons where he and his followers once locked away political dissenters. One day, 
a few years into the warlord’s sentence, a guard intercepts a note that this warlord was 
passing to another prisoner in a nearby cell. The note is friendly, and reveals that the 
warlord and criminal have developed a friendship. The guard takes it to the warden, who 
grumbles, “A friendship!? Oh no, no, no! Friendship is a very bad thing!” and 
immediately begins plans to squash this friendship by moving the two prisoners further 
apart. Friendship generally promotes the goal of living a fulfilling and meaningful life. 
The warden does not want the warlord to have such a life. He wants the warlord to be 
punished and to suffer. Thus, in this context, friendship is a bad thing.98 I suspect that 
sentences the most obvious uses of (B) & (D) also ascribe the end-relational property of 
promoting a fulfilling and meaningful life. (C) has a particularly moral feel to it—and I 
will discuss how to accommodate moral goodness into an end-relational theory of 
goodness below. 
 In summary, the nihilist is committed to saying that any sentence that ascribes 
intrinsic goodness to things is not true. However, she need not say that any sentence that 
appears to ascribe intrinsic goodness is not true. She can claim that these sentences 
implicitly introduce a non-intrinsic notion of goodness, and thus, can be true. The nihilist 
can thus agree with the realist about which things are good and which are not. She merely !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!98!This example is reminiscent of Finlay’s discussion that although it might be good for a serial 
killer or child molester to experience pleasure, it might not be good that those villains experience 
pleasure (2014) pp. 27-28.!
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disagrees about the type of goodness that they have. Nihilism about intrinsic goodness is 
not as revisionary as it may at first seem.      
b) The truth of non-intrinsic goodness judgments 
Turning now to the topic of our non-intrinsic goodness judgments, the realist has 
a promising argument that suggests that even some of our non-intrinsic goodness 
judgments require the existence of intrinsic goodness if they are to be true. This argument 
should sound familiar—it is both ubiquitous in ethics textbooks, and has a long and 
venerable history. (Its first appearance may have been in Aristotle’s Nicomachean 
Ethics).99 Consider the following paradigmatic contemporary statement of the argument, 
provided by Shelly Kagan. He writes: 
Many objects are valued merely as means to other objects – they are 
valuable solely by virtue of the fact that they will produce (or help 
produce) those other objects.  Those things valued as a means in this way 
possess ‘instrumental’ value.  But what about the objects that the 
instrumentally valuable objects are means to?  In some cases, of course, 
objects may possess instrumental value by virtue of being means to 
objects that are themselves of no more than instrumental value (as means 
to still other objects).  But eventually – or so the thought goes – we must 
reach objects that are valuable as ‘ends’ or ‘for their own sake’  
(Shelly Kagan, “Rethinking Intrinsic Value,” 1998, pp.278-9)  
 
Following this line of argumentation, to show that there exists something that is 
intrinsically good the realist needs only to point to an example of something that is 
instrumentally good. If there exists something that is instrumentally good, then we need 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
99  Aristotle writes:  “If, then, there is some end of the things we do, which we desire for its own 
sake (everything else being desired for the sake of this), and if we do not choose everything for 
the sake of something else (for at that rate the process would go on to infinity, so that our desire 
would be empty and vain), clearly this must be the good and the chief good” (EN I.2.1094a18-
22). Because this argument is couched in psychological terms (about what we desire), and not in 
metaphysical terms (about what is good or valuable), it might only be a precursor of AFN, and 
not a statement of AFN itself. However, it is clearly the inspiration for contemporary statements 
of AFN. 
 
!! 92!
there to be something that is intrinsically good from which it derives its goodness. And 
clearly, if our judgments about the non-intrinsic goodness of things are to be true, then 
there must be something that is instrumentally good. More formally: 
Argument from Need 
(1) Assume that for some X, X is good.  
 
(2) Either X is good for its own sake, or it is good for the sake of some further thing, Y.   
 
(3) If X is good for its own sake, then it is intrinsically good.   
 
(Sub Conclusion 1): Thus, if X is good for its own sake, then there exists something that 
is intrinsically good (namely, X).   
 
(4) If, on the other hand, X is good for the sake of some Y (distinct from X), then it is 
instrumentally good.  
 
(5) And while Y might itself be merely instrumentally good towards some further good, 
Z, this chain of goods cannot go on like that forever.   
 
(6) At some point, a chain of instrumental goods must end with something that is 
intrinsically good, from which the instrumental goods on that chain derive their goodness.  
 
(Sub Conclusion 2): Thus, if X is good for the sake of something else, then there exists 
something that is intrinsically good.   
 
(Sub Conclusion 3): Thus, if X is either good for its own sake, or good for the sake of 
something else, then there must exist something that is intrinsically good.   
 
(Conclusion): Therefore, there exists something that is intrinsically good. 
 
 
Since the nihilist will agree that there is an X such that it is the case that X is 
good, she will assent to premise (1). Suppose, for instance, that she believes that 
medicine is good. The AFN would say that since medicine is not good for its own sake, it 
must be good for the sake of something else. That is, medicine is instrumentally good. 
And while it might be the case that medicine is a means to something else that is 
instrumentally good (for instance, remedying a particular illness), this chain of goods 
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cannot go on forever.  There must be something at the end of the chain that is good for its 
own sake (e.g. health, the realist might say) that explains the goodness of medicine.  
Thus, if the nihilist agrees that it is true that medicine is good, then she is committed to 
the existence of something else that is intrinsically good. 
The Argument from Need thus puts the nihilist in a very uncomfortable position.  
It purports to show that if X is either good for its own sake, or for the sake of something 
else, then there must be something that is intrinsically good. Given that we have said 
nothing to limit what X can be, this argument threatens to show any sentence of the form 
‘X is good’ is true only if there is something that is intrinsically good. That is, AFN 
appears to support the Strong Realist Claim: 
The truth of all, or perhaps just most, of our non-intrinsic goodness judgments requires 
the existence of intrinsic goodness 
 
If the Strong Realist Claim were true, this would be a powerful reason to abandon 
nihilism about intrinsic goodness.  If the AFN is sound, then a nihilist would have to 
accept a wide-reaching error theory—one that commits her to claiming that even the 
judgment expressed by the sentence ‘Medicine is good’ would be false. Lucky for the 
nihilist, the AFN is unsound and the Strong Realist Claim is false.  
c)  My Objection to the Argument from Need 
The Argument from Need has struck many as a plausible and promising argument 
in favor of the existence of intrinsic goodness.100 I believe that it is actually deeply 
flawed. The success of the Argument from Need hinges on how the realist understands 
‘instrumentally good.’ As I shall go onto explain, there is no single notion of instrumental 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
100 For instance: Beardsley (1965) p.66, Audi (1997) pp.250-1, Hurka (2010) p.5, and 
Zimmerman (2010). 
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goodness that makes both premises (4) and (6) true at the same time without begging the 
question against the nihilist. The AFN thus fails to show that we need intrinsic goodness. 
Let us begin with the standard definition of ‘instrumental goodness.’   
Definition 1 – Instrumental goodness – X is instrumentally good if and only if it is good 
for the sake of something else, and it ultimately derives that goodness from something 
that is intrinsically good. 
 
Clearly, if one is a nihilist, she will also be committed to denying that anything is 
instrumentally good in the sense given by Definition 1.  After all, according to this 
definition, it is a necessary condition of a thing’s being instrumentally good that it derives 
its goodness from something that is intrinsically good.101 I argue that the inclusion of this 
necessary condition that requires that instrumentally good things be linked to intrinsically 
good things makes premise (4) of the AFN susceptible to counterexample. According to 
premise (4), if X is good for the sake of Y, then X is instrumentally good. However, if we 
accept Definition 1, end-relational goods are all counterexamples to premise (4). 
For instance, when we judge that a parking space is good, or a steak knife, or an 
umbrella—we are not judging them to be good for their own sakes.102 These are all 
examples of end-relational goods—they are all good for the sake of something else.  So 
they meet the first necessary condition of Definition 1.  But should we go on to conclude 
that they meet the second necessary condition, too? That is, should we conclude that good 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
101 Some might worry that the AFN’s focus on instrumental goodness excludes other types of 
derivative value (for instance, Michael J. Zimmerman describes a variety of ‘extrinsic’ values, 
such as inherent value, signatory value, and contributory value) (2001) pp.251-8.  If the 
definitions of these notions of goodness include the necessary condition that they derive their 
goodness from something intrinsically good, then my arguments in this section would equally 
apply to versions of the AFN that include these types of goodness in the place of ‘instrumental 
goodness’.  If these types of goodness do not necessarily derive their value from their relation to 
something that is intrinsically good, then they are types of goodness a nihilist can accept. 
102 Geach discusses the example of a ‘good steak knife’ (1956) p.37, while Thomson discusses 
good umbrellas (2008) p.35. 
!! 95!
parking spaces, knives, umbrellas, etc derive their goodness from their relation to 
something that is intrinsically good? Consider what this would commit us to.   
Presumably, when I judge a steak knife to be good, I judge that it will easily cut 
cooked meat into bite-sized morsels. In short, I judge that it adequately promotes the goal 
of cutting meat. But the goal of cutting meat into bite-sized morsels is not good for its 
own sake—it is good for aiding in the consumption of meat. The consumption of meat is 
also not good for its own sake. Now if we were forced to find something that is 
intrinsically good at the end of this chain of goods, the most plausible answer would be 
that consuming meat is instrumentally good towards one’s having a pleasurable meal, and 
that pleasure is intrinsically good. Now while I will admit that this is a possible answer—
it very well could be that in rare instances, people judge that steak knives are 
instrumentally good because of how they relate to pleasure—more often than not, 
however, people do not have such a grandiose or involved story behind their judgments 
about the goodness of steak knives. Their judgment that a steak knife is good is merely 
the judgment that it is, or would be, useful for achieving the end of cutting up meat; their 
judgment does not require any further judgment about the goodness of the goal of cutting 
up meat. A vegetarian who derives no pleasure from eating meat, and who believes that 
eating meat is a morally despicable goal, can still judge a steak knife to be good. 
In summary, when we judge that X is end-relationally good, we need not make 
any further judgment about the value of the goal, G, relative to which we judge X to be 
good. G does not need to be intrinsically good. In fact, G could be an odious, downright 
evil goal. We can agree that an undetectable swarm of nano-bots would be a good murder 
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weapon, without thinking that murder is a good or worthwhile goal.103 There is thus a 
whole class of goodness judgments that a nihilist may make without committing herself 
to the existence of intrinsic goodness. She can say that X is end-relationally good, 
without saying anything about the value of the goal relative to which it derives its 
goodness. Premise (4) is thus false if we interpret it in light of Definition 1. There are 
some things that are good for the sake of something else, but that are not instrumentally 
good.   
My objection to AFN thus shows that the Strong Realist Claim is false. The 
Strong Realist Claim says that unless there exists at least one thing that is intrinsically 
good, all (or many) of our goodness judgments would be false. However, many of our 
goodness judgments ascribe end-relational goodness to things. As noted above, even 
some sentences that do not seem to be about end-relational goodness might, in fact, 
ascribe end-relational goodness. We do not need there to be anything that is intrinsically 
good to explain why they are true. The judgments that parking spaces, knives, murder 
weapons, etc are good can be true without there being anything that is intrinsically good.  
Thus, the nihilist can still believe that many of her judgments about non-intrinsic 
goodness are true without having to posit something that is intrinsically good.  
 To avoid my counterexamples, the realist might suggest that AFN uses a weaker 
notion of ‘instrumental goodness’ than the one we have up until now been considering.  
She might offer us the following: 
Definition 2 – Instrumental Goodness – X is instrumentally good if and only if it is good 
for the sake of something else. !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
103 Given what he says about good thieves and good torture instruments, it is reasonable to 
assume that Richard Kraut denies this. He says:  “If we believe that no one should ever steal, 
because of the great harm theft always does, then we should say there are no good thieves” (2007) 
p.270. 
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According to Definition 2, end-relational goodness is a kind of instrumental goodness.  
So end-relationally good things are no longer counterexamples to premise (4). They are 
by this definition, ‘instrumentally good.’ However, something that is end-relationally 
good need not be related to intrinsic goodness in the way required by premise (6). There 
need not be any intrinsic good that we must appeal to in order to explain our judgment 
that a steak knife is good, for instance. Thus, under Definition 2, premise (4) is true, but 
premise (6) is false. Definition 2 is far too weak for the realist’s purposes. 
 Given the role that putative examples of instrumental goodness are supposed to 
play in the AFN, I think it is clear that Definition 1 best captures how the realist defines 
‘instrumental goodness.’ That is, it is part of the definition of ‘instrumental goodness’ 
that things that are instrumentally good are, ultimately, good for the sake of things that 
are intrinsically good. For the rest of the paper, I will be using ‘instrumental goodness’ in 
this way. It is thus, worth mentioning that on this definition, a nihilist about intrinsic 
goodness is also a nihilist about instrumental goodness. Since my end-relational account 
of goodness commits me to saying there is no intrinsic goodness, it thereby also commits 
me to saying there is no instrumental goodness (in the sense captured by Definition 1). 
I have shown that AFN does not support the Strong Realist Claim.  However, it 
might still support a more modest claim.  All that my arguments have shown so far is that 
for some X’s, it can be true that X is good, and yet, we do not need to appeal to the 
intrinsic goodness of some other thing, Y, in order to explain the goodness of X.  The 
realist could accept this point, while arguing that the AFN might still support the Modest 
Realist Claim:   
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There is at least one true goodness judgment whose truth cannot be 
explained without appealing to intrinsic goodness. 
 
“So forget steak knives and umbrellas” the realist might say, “let’s return to the goodness 
of medicine. Surely medicine is instrumentally good, and thus, there must exist 
something else that is intrinsically good (perhaps health) from which medicine derives its 
goodness. That is, we need there to be something intrinsically good to explain why it is 
true that medicine is good.” 
 Unfortunately for the realist, this example fails to show that there must be 
something intrinsically good—and so would any other. After all, the nihilist can agree 
that medicine is good, but doing so does not commit her to the existence of something 
with intrinsic goodness.  The nihilist can claim that medicine is merely end-relationally 
good towards promoting the goal of curing a person of illness. And as you recall, when 
we say of something that it is end-relationally good, we do not need to make any further 
claim about the goodness of the goal that it promotes. Consequently, the nihilist does not 
need to say that the goal of curing people is a good goal, in order to explain the goodness 
of medicine. It is open for the nihilist to respond to any of the realist’s alleged examples 
of instrumental goodness, that they are just instances of end-relational goodness. 
The realist will want to insist that medicine is not merely end-relationally good, 
but that it is also instrumentally good (in the sense captured by Definition 1) because it 
derives its goodness from the intrinsic goodness of the goal of curing people of illness.  
However, this insistence is mere question begging; whether or not anything is 
intrinsically good is the very issue at hand! So long as it remains open to the nihilist to 
claim that any alleged instance of instrumental goodness is merely end-relationally good, 
the AFN fails.  
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IV.  Objection:  It is not possible that all goodness is end-relational 
 The realist might accept everything I have argued to this point. She might concede 
that any sentence that appears to ascribe intrinsic or instrumental goodness can be 
interpreted as ascribing end-relational goodness instead. Thus, any alleged example of 
intrinsic or instrumental goodness that she points to, the nihilist can simply insist that it is 
merely end-relationally good. But even if it is possible in this way to give each goodness 
judgment an end-relational reading, it might still be implausible to give all goodness 
judgments end-relational readings; it is not plausible that all goodness is end-relational.   
Robert Audi, in his book, Moral Knowledge and Ethical Character, expresses 
doubts about the plausibility of the view that all goodness is end-relational.104 When 
discussing chains of goods, or as he calls them “valuation chains,” Audi notes that they 
can take four possible structures: (a) They can end in something intrinsically good, (b) 
they can go on forever,  (c) they can be circular, or (d) they can end in something that is 
not intrinsically good.105 Chains with this last structure he dubs “terminatingly good.” My 
proposal is that no chains terminate in something intrinsically good, but that all valuation 
chains are, in fact, terminatingly good. And while Audi does not deny that some chains 
will be terminatingly good, he argues that it is implausible that all chains are. He writes: 
It would be widely agreed, however, that if X is terminatingly good (hence 
merely instrumentally good)106 then it grounds no basic practical !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
104 Audi (1997) 
105 Those familiar with a similar debate in epistemology over justification will also be familiar 
with this menu of options.  
106 Audi is here using the weaker definition of ‘instrumental goodness’ that I gave as Definition 2 
above.  He says: “Consider the existence of instrumental goods—something virtually anyone will 
grant, since it simply implies that some things are efficient in bringing about others” (1997), 
p.250. So on this view, end-relational goodness is a form of instrumental goodness. Again, I am 
using the term ‘instrumental goodness’ in the stronger sense I gave above in Definition 1.  
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reasons… On arriving at the termination, one could not say anything 
positive about the goodness of X as the terminal element, since X is by 
hypothesis, not good in any sense (Audi, Moral Knowledge and Ethical 
Character, 1997, p.250). 
 
Audi points to the second role that intrinsic goodness is said to play in our 
practical lives. It grounds basic reasons. Without intrinsic goodness, we would 
have no basic practical reasons, so we need to posit intrinsic goodness. 
While I do not make anything of it, it is worth noting that even if X is the 
terminal element on a terminatingly good valuation chain it does not follow that X 
is “not good in any sense.”  X would not be good for the sake of some further 
thing on that particular valuation chain, but X would likely belong to other 
valuation chains, and it might still be good for the sake of something on one of 
those other chains. This is merely a quibble with Audi’s phrasing. I take it that the 
more important claim he is making is that the terminal element on a terminatingly 
good valuation chain is not good in any relevant sense, and thus, does not ground 
basic practical reasons. If this claim is correct, then it is a consequence of my end-
relational account of goodness that we have no basic practical reasons. This bullet 
is far too big for me to bite; a theory of goodness that did not allow for basic 
practical reasons would be wildly implausible! Fortunately for me, Audi has 
overstated his case here.    
Audi’s argument only succeeds if we assume that intrinsic goodness is the 
only ground for basic practical reasons. But this assumption is false. Suppose that 
X is beautiful, or just, or right. Wouldn’t the beauty of X, or the justice of X, or 
the rightness of X ground practical reasons? T.M. Scanlon thinks so. He claims !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
According to that definition, terminatingly good valuation chains do not contain instrumentally 
good things—only those chains that end with something intrinsically good do. 
!! 101!
that even though justice (etc) is good, it is not the goodness of the justice of X that 
explains why we ought to favor X. In fact, it would be odd, Scanlon argues, to list 
both the justice of X and the goodness of the justice of X as reasons to favor X.107 
According to Scanlon, it is the justice of X that gives us reasons to favor it, while 
the goodness of X merely ‘passes the buck.’108 That is, saying that X is good just 
is saying that X has other properties that recommend it (such as beauty, justice, 
etc).   As such, if a just state of affairs were the terminal element of a 
terminatingly good chain, then the justice of that state of affairs would ground 
basic practical reasons, and explain why we ought to favor the end-relationally 
good things that make up that valuation chain.  Audi is thus wrong to claim that 
no terminatingly good chain can ground practical reasons. 
There are two weaknesses of this response. First, it relies on our accepting 
Scanlon’s ‘buck-passing’ account of value—a view that some philosophers 
remain unconvinced by. Second, the realist does not need to follow Audi in 
making the exceptionally strong claim that no terminatingly good chain grounds 
practical reasons. In order to show that we need there to be intrinsic goodness, she 
need only claim that there are some basic practical reasons that are grounded in 
intrinsic goodness. If the realist can identify certain basic practical reasons that we 
cannot account for by only using valuation chains that do not end with an intrinsic 
good, that would show that there must be at least one valuation chain that ends in 
something that is intrinsically good. Let us call this the Modest Realist Claim 
about Reasons. If this Modest Claim about Reasons were true there would be an !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
107 Scanlon (1998) p. 97 
108 Ibid, pp. 96-8 
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aspect of our practical lives that we cannot explain without appealing to the 
existence of something that is intrinsically good. In the next section, I will 
consider a promising argument that could be used to support the claim that an 
end-relational theory of goodness cannot account for all basic practical reasons.  
 
V. Support for the Modest Realist Claim about Reasons 
Consider the following example that I will call ‘Scrooge.’  Imagine a man 
named Scrooge who is remarkably reminiscent of the famous character of the 
same name from Charles Dickens’s classic, A Christmas Carol. He is a bitter, 
grouchy misanthrope whose only motivation in life is the acquisition of money.  
Suppose that Scrooge makes his money by charging excessive interest on ‘payday 
loans’ he makes to extremely poor people who are in desperate need of (and have 
no other means of acquiring) cash. Scrooge feels no mercy for the poor, and takes 
no greater pleasure than collecting what is owed to him. In fact, his business is so 
important to him that he rarely thinks about anything else. He has no friends, 
family, or loved ones to speak of. This does not bother Scrooge, though, as 
interpersonal relationships like those would only get in the way of his making 
more money. 
I suspect that none of us would claim that Scrooge is living an admirable life.  In 
fact, most of us would likely judge his life to be downright deplorable. If asked, we 
would likely point to two very serious practical mistakes that we believe Scrooge to be 
making. First, his attitudes and behaviors (what we might call his ‘responses’) towards 
money indicate that he values money much more than it deserves to be valued. His 
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responses to money are not fitting.  Second, his attitudes and behaviors towards people 
and towards interpersonal relationships indicate that he values them much less than they 
deserve to be valued.  His responses to people and interpersonal relationships are not 
fitting.   
 The realist would here point out that if we were to assume that there is both 
intrinsic and instrumental goodness, we could give a very simple and natural explanation 
of Scrooge’s mistakes. The realist’s explanation might look something like the following:  
Money is something that is merely instrumentally good. As such, there is a set of 
attitudes and behaviors relative to it that are appropriate or fitting. For instance, we might 
think that money should only be valued as much as, and never more than, the intrinsically 
good end or ends that it promotes. Thus, when a person like Scrooge dedicates all his 
time and energy into acquiring money, this indicates that he values money much more 
than the ends from which it derives its goodness. He has basic practical reasons not to do 
this; it is a serious practical mistake. Further, we might also think that things that are 
instrumentally good should only be valued hypothetically—that is, we should only value 
them on the condition that they actually promote an intrinsically good end. We should 
cease pursuing them when their acquisition will no longer promote the end or ends from 
which they derive their goodness. At some point, once Scrooge has accumulated a 
significant amount of wealth, acquiring more money will not significantly promote any of 
the ends relative to which an interest in money is justified. At that point, it would be a 
mistake for Scrooge to continue to spend time and energy acquiring money.  Let us 
stipulate that Scrooge, however, is unwilling to adjust his responses to money. He would 
continue spending his time and energy collecting debts even when he can obtain no 
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further significant benefits from having the additional money. He has reason not do this; 
this too is a serious practical mistake. 
On the other hand, claims the realist, people and the interpersonal relationships 
one can have with them have intrinsic value. We might think that things with intrinsic 
value deserve a central place in our practical lives. We ought to value them 
categorically—that is, we ought to pursue them regardless of what other ends we have, 
and we ought not be willing to cease valuing people or their friendship for the sake of 
other ends (unless these other ends are at least equally valuable). They should be valued 
for their own sake. Scrooge’s response to people and interpersonal relationships 
demonstrates that he values them merely hypothetically (if he even values them at all). 
This too, is a serious practical mistake. 
The realist thus has a very plausible and natural explanation for the kinds of 
practical mistakes that we encountered in Scrooge. Money is merely instrumentally good, 
and thus, it is unfitting of Scrooge to value it for its own sake. Friendship is intrinsically 
good, and thus, it is unfitting for Scrooge to fail to value it (or to value it only for the sake 
of something else). Presumably, the realist believes that the nihilist’s ontology is too 
sparse to account for these practical mistakes. If it is fitting to value some things for the 
sake of other things, and some things for their own sakes, don’t we need there to be (at 
least) two types of goodness: instrumental and intrinsic?   
 
VI. A Plausible Reply 
I believe that the nihilist can give a plausible explanation for the practical 
mistakes exhibited in Scrooge—one that need not posit any other kind of goodness other 
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than end-relational goodness.109 My claim is that an end-relational theory of goodness 
can fully account for the practical mistakes that the realist believes forces us to posit both 
instrumental and intrinsic goodness.  If I am correct, then the nihilist’s theory is simpler 
than the realist’s, and has all the explanatory power as well. We thus ought to favor the 
nihilist’s view. 
Initially, it seems unlikely that a theory that only posits one type of goodness 
could explain why there are (at least) two different sets of responses that are fitting to 
have towards good things.  It seems natural to think there will be a distinct type of 
goodness corresponding to each set of responses. However, I suggest that to explain the 
mistakes that Scrooge makes we do not need to distinguish two types of goodness—but 
we need to distinguish two types of goals. By distinguishing between (a) foundational 
goals that we as agents cannot help but take an interest in, and those (b) subsidiary goals 
that we can choose to take an interest in or not, the end-relational theorist can explain the 
fittingness of the two types of responses characterized in Scrooge.  Briefly, the account I 
will be defending is that those things that directly promote the achievement of the first set 
of goals deserve a central place in our practical lives, and it is only fitting that we value 
them categorically.  As I define it, X directly promotes a goal, G, if and only if X is the 
penultimate thing on a chain of end-relational goods that terminates with G. Those things 
that do not directly promote the achievement of foundational goals, or, that are only good 
(either directly or not) relative to our subsidiary goals, on the other hand, do not deserve 
such lofty treatment. It is fitting to value them hypothetically. 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
109 Many actual nihilists, like Thomson and Kraut, are not end-relational theorists. In Chapter 
Four, I argue that their views can be subsumed under an end-relational theory of goodness like 
the ones that Stephen Finlay and I defend. 
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Unfortunately, I do not have space here to develop the view in much detail.  I 
believe that the following sketch will adequately support my claim that an end-relational 
theory of goodness can explain the relevant practical mistakes seen in Scrooge.  First, let 
us begin by identifying a plausible candidate for a foundational goal that we as agents 
cannot help but care about.110 Consider the goal of living a fulfilling and meaningful life.  
I will admit that this notion is a bit murky, so let me elaborate on it some. By 
‘meaningful’ I do not mean ‘good’ or ‘valuable.’ Were I to mean that, my nihilistic 
account would be a realist account in disguise. Instead, what I have in mind here when I 
say ‘meaningful’ is the kind of thing that gives one’s life a purpose—a life plan, so to 
speak. A person who dedicates her life to helping others would be living a meaningful 
life, but so would be the person who is merely working to make ends meet. This notion of 
meaningfulness is thus, very normatively thin. My claim is reminiscent of David 
Velleman’s claim that an agent needs her actions to make sense to her—if she cannot say 
why she is acting as she is she will cease the activity until it is meaningful to her.111  
Similarly, if a person were to believe that her life was meaningless or without purpose, 
she would be distraught and would look for some purpose around which she can orient 
her life.  
So suppose (and I think it is quite plausible) that the goal of living a full and 
meaningful life is one of these fundamental goals that we cannot help but care about.112  
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
110 It seems quite possible to me that there could be a plurality of these types of goals, however, it 
does remain a possibility as well that there is really just one basic and fundamental goal. While I 
suspect that there is a plurality, nothing that I say here will require taking a stance either way. 
111 David Velleman (2007) pp.15-46 
112 Harry Frankfurt claims there are things we cannot help but care about in “The Importance of 
What We Care About” (2007) pp.80-94. There, he seems to be focused on things that the 
individual cannot help but care about, and it is thus not clear if he believes that there are any 
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It is quite plausible that, in general, friendship directly promotes the goal of having a full 
and meaningful life—thus, friendship is end-relationally good relative to this goal.  
Insofar as we care about having such a life, we ought to care about friendship as well.  
When I say that friendship ‘in general’ directly promotes this goal, what I mean is that 
nearly all life plans that people might adopt are such that having friends would contribute 
to the advancement of that plan. However, imagine a person who is single-mindedly 
dedicated to a form of art—say, writing literature or painting. She is a talented artist, and 
the work she produces is excellent (and appreciated by many). Let us call her 
‘Dickinson.’ When asked about her process, Dickinson mentions that she intentionally 
cultivates a lonely life in order to channel her intense feelings of sadness and isolation 
into her art. Let us stipulate that if Dickinson were not so lonely, her art would suffer, and 
she would also be less motivated to work. I believe that Dickinson’s life plan is one that 
would not be promoted by friendship. Life might be more enjoyable or pleasant for her if 
she were to have friends, but it would come at the cost of what gives her life meaning.  
To be clear, I do not wish to make the strong claim that she would be making a mistake if 
she were to develop some friendly relationships; I do not believe that she ought not 
cultivate friendships. I am, however, making the claim that she is not necessarily making 
a mistake by not developing those relationships.  
I contend that life plans like that of Dickinson are quite rare, so it is still correct to 
say that, in general, friendship directly promotes the goal of living a full and meaningful 
life. Most lives will be made more full or meaningful with the addition of some loving 
relationships. So what should we say about Scrooge? Scrooge thinks that his life plan will !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
things that people, in general, cannot help but care about. I am making this point as a reasonable, 
and friendly, extension of his view. 
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not be advanced by the addition of friends. He is singularly interested in his business, and 
he believes that friends will detract from that. And to a certain extent, he is correct.  
Maintaining close relationships would require some of his time and energy that he might 
otherwise dedicate to his business. Further, such relationships might sensitize him to the 
sufferings of other people—lessening his enjoyment of collecting debt from the poor. In 
this way, he is like Dickinson. His life plan is characterized by his singular drive to work, 
and developing friendships will lessen the quality and quantity of work he will be able to 
produce. He would insist that having friends would come at the cost of some meaning in 
his life: so why do we believe Scrooge is making a mistake by not having friends, when 
we do not believe Dickinson is113? 
The answer is simple. Dickinson is correct when she concludes that having 
friends would frustrate her having a full and meaningful life; Scrooge is not. Notice that 
Scrooge’s life plan is ultimately shaped by two desires. First is the desire for money for 
its own sake. I will discuss this desire in some detail below. Second, however, is the 
desire for pleasure. He works so much because he enjoys collecting debts—it is fun to 
him. Given that part of his motivation for being so dedicated to his work is that it is a 
means of enjoying pleasure, we can recommend to Scrooge that he would better meet this 
goal by diversifying the types of pleasure he pursues. Having loving relationships, 
hobbies, travelling, etc are all other ways of adding the enjoyment of pleasure into one’s 
life—and Scrooge is mistaken if he believes that these things won’t advance his life 
plan.114 Dickinson, on the other hand, is not motivated to create her art because it serves !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
113 Assuming, that is, that you share my judgment about her case: that Dickinson is not making a 
mistake by failing to cultivate friendships. 
114 Because we are recommending that Scrooge pursue friendship to advance his goal of enjoying 
pleasure, which in turn, advances his goal of having a meaningful life—we are not recommending 
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as a means of enjoyment for her. Unlike Scrooge, she knows that having friends would 
contribute to her pleasure; that is precisely why she avoids it! Her life’s meaning comes 
from producing art for its own sake. She is thus not mistaken when she believes that 
having friends would come at the cost of meaning in her life. Scrooge is mistaken insofar 
as part of the reason he collects debts is for the sake of pleasure. There are better means 
of achieving that goal, and consequently, he would better achieve the goal of having a 
full and meaningful life if he were to pursue other types of pleasures. But what should we 
say about Scrooge’s pursuit of money for its own sake? 
Money is, in general, good for promoting the goal of living a full and meaningful 
life. In general, people need certain goods and services to live such a life, and money is 
good for obtaining those goods. But notice that money does not directly promote our 
basic goals. Of course money can be used to obtain things that directly promote our basic 
goals, and thus, in those cases we have reason to value and pursue the acquisition of 
money. However, were we able to receive those goods without first obtaining money, 
then money would cease to be end-relationally valuable towards our basic goals. Having 
a shelter to sleep in might be necessary for having a full and meaningful life, but having 
the money to buy a shelter is not. If we can get what we need to live a full and 
meaningful life without money, then it would be a mistake to continue to value and 
pursue the acquisition of money. We should value and pursue money only as much as, 
and to the extent that, it promotes our goals. It should only be valued hypothetically.  
Scrooge is thus mistaken for valuing money for its own sake. This error is all the worse, 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
friendship as something that directly promotes Scrooge’s goal of having a meaningful life.  This 
does not change the fact that, in general, having friends does directly promote having a 
meaningful life.    
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in cases like Scrooge’s, when it leads to disvaluing the things that do promote our basic 
goals. 
Returning to the language introduced by Audi, what I am suggesting is that all 
valuation chains terminate in goals. Some of these goals are basic and we cannot help but 
care about them. Others are not. Recall the discussion of the steak knife. In that example, 
we noted that the goal of cutting steak into bite-sized morsels was not an intrinsically 
good goal, nor was it a means to some intrinsically good goal. Putting it that way assumes 
realism. Now, however, we can recast that observation in terms that a nihilist can accept.  
We can say that the goal of cutting up meat is not a fundamental goal that we cannot help 
but care about, nor does it directly promote a goal we cannot help but care about. For 
those who do care about cutting up meat, the goodness of a knife relative to that goal 
would give that person reasons to care about or favor the knife. For those of us who do 
not care about cutting up meat, the goodness of a steak knife gives us no reasons to care 
about or favor the knife. On the other hand, there are some fundamental goals that we all 
cannot help but care about. Living a full and meaningful life might be such a goal. When 
some X is good relative to one of these fundamental goals, we all have reasons to care 
about or favor X (but only as much as, and to the extent that, it promotes that goal). 
Notice I do not say that we have reasons to favor the fundamental goal that 
terminates the valuation chain. I say that we have reasons to favor the penultimate thing 
that is good relative to that goal. Since we all care about those fundamental goals, we 
consequently all have reasons to pursue them. In this sense, it isn’t literally true that we 
ought to favor anything categorically. As defined above, if we ought to favor some X 
categorically, then we ought to pursue X regardless of what ends we have. Strictly 
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speaking, on the story I just gave, we do not literally value friendship (or anything for 
that matter) categorically then. The reason we ought to pursue friendship is that it 
promotes a goal that we cannot help but care about. We can take it as a given that people 
share that goal, and will continue to share that goal, so those things that directly promote 
it are special.  So even though it is not literally true that friendship ought to be valued 
categorically—there remains some truth behind the distinction between categorical and 
hypothetical goods. Some goods are such that they promote a goal that people might take 
an interest in. We only have hypothetical reasons to pursue those things; that is, if we 
were to take interest in the goals, then we would have reasons to pursue the things that 
promote those goals. Other goods are such that they promote fundamental goals that 
people do care about (and cannot help but care about). We still only have hypothetical 
reasons to pursue those things if we had interest in the goals they promote. The fact of the 
matter is, however, that we do care about those goals, and always will. Consequently, our 
reasons for pursuing these goods are far more steady (because we cannot stop caring 
about the goals) and deeper (since the goals are foundational) than the hypothetical 
reasons we have to pursue the goods that promote those subsidiary goals we might or 
might not take interest in. That is to say, we can preserve something very much like the 
categorical/hypothetical reason distinction without positing two kinds of goodness. 
In summary, we do have reasons to favor and respond to things that are end-
relationally good when those things promote fundamental ends that we cannot help but 
care about. Audi was thus wrong to claim that there are basic reasons only if there are 
intrinsic goods. Further, when something directly promotes a fundamental end that we 
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cannot help but care about, we have deep, steady, basic reasons to favor that thing115. It 
should be a central part of our practical lives, and it would be a mistake to fail to favor it.  
When something (a) indirectly promotes an end, or (b) directly promotes ends that are not 
fundamental, or that we can help caring about, then we ought to care about it a different 
manner. For instance, it is a mistake to structure our practical lives around obtaining such 
a thing. These two types of practical mistakes are the ones that the realist claims that we 
could not explain without appeal to intrinsic and instrumental goodness. By showing that 
we can explain these mistakes, while still being a nihilist about intrinsic goodness, I have 
shown that we do not need intrinsic goodness. 
 
VII.  End-Relational Moral Goodness 
 At the outset of this chapter, I promised that I would show that an end-relational 
account of goodness, including moral goodness, would not be too revisionary. Above, I 
argued that given any purported list of intrinsic goods that a realist points to, the nihilist 
can agree that those things are good in a privileged way that makes it a practical mistake 
to not favor or behave towards them in some relevant way. While the end-relational 
theory of goodness commits us to the claim that nothing is good for its own sake, this 
turns out to be not too revisionary of a commitment.   
 As noted above, many moral philosophers have either equated intrinsic goodness 
with moral goodness, or reduced moral goodness to intrinsic goodness. Consider the 
Classical Utilitarian who says that happiness is the only thing that is intrinsically good. 
The Classical Utilitarian then tells us that it is morally required that we maximize !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
115 Again, we do not literally have categorical reasons—but we can nonetheless preserve 
something like the hypothetical/categorical distinction with respect to reasons.!
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intrinsic goodness. According to Classical Utilitarianism, intrinsic goodness is the only 
kind of goodness that is morally relevant. Or consider the Kantian who believes that 
rational agency is the only thing that is intrinsically good, and then tells us we are 
morally required to respect rational agents. I could list other moral theories with this 
structure, but the general schema is this: (a) Identify some thing or things that are 
intrinsically good, (b) declare that some set of responses to that thing or things that is 
morally required.  If my end-relational theory of goodness is correct, then all moral 
theories that can be characterized by this schema are mistaken. Since nothing is 
intrinsically good, we can never satisfy the first condition (a), and thus, no moral theories 
of this type are true. Given that there are many deontological, consequentialist, and virtue 
theories that follow this schema, the end-relational theory of goodness seems to entail 
that a vast variety of moral theories are false. That is a pretty revisionary consequence of 
the view. 
 An end-relational theorist, however, can defend moral theories that are nearly 
identical to the ones mentioned above. She simply needs to construct the correlating 
theories according to a different schema—one that does not posit intrinsic goodness.  
The starting point for an end-relational theorist is to identify at least one goal that 
is a moral goal. I can see two strategies here. First, one could try to identify some 
fundamental goal or goals that morality itself is meant to promote.  For instance, one 
might insist that morality is required for a society of people with different interests to 
cooperate and live together in harmony. This is a plausible claim made by moral 
philosophers independent of the discussion of nihilism/realism of intrinsic goodness.  
David Copp, for instance, defends this claim in support of his Society-Centered Theory 
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of moral justification.116 Insofar as morality is necessary for social harmony and 
cooperation, and insofar as most of us are pursuing life plans that require our living in 
proximity to—and cooperating harmoniously with—other people, we could say that 
morality directly promotes the fundamental goal of living a meaningful life. This view 
would thus explain the appropriateness of our giving moral goals a privileged position in 
our practical lives. We cannot help but care about having a meaningful life, and since 
morality directly promotes that goal, we have reasons to favor it categorically. Some, 
however, might find this interpretation of morality as ‘too instrumental.’ They might 
insist that the goal of treating others equally, for instance, is not merely good because it 
promotes a harmonious society and thus, meaningful lives. They might think that the goal 
of treating others equally needs no further goal to justify it. Philosophers who reject this 
first end-relational account of morality might instead favor the view that there is a set of 
goals that is the set of moral goals, and it is just a matter of brute fact which goals belong 
to that set.117  
Having pursued one of the above strategies, the end-relational theorist now has a 
list of one or more goals that are the moral goals. She can now begin to identify which 
things help promote those goals, and are thus, morally good. Let us apply this end-
relational schema to our earlier example of Classical Utilitarianism. The end-relational 
utilitarian can either say that it is a brute fact that maximizing happiness is the 
fundamental moral goal, or that maximizing happiness directly promotes some further 
fundamental goal such as living a meaningful life. She can then make all the same !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
116 Though, he does not strictly speaking think a moral code is required. He believes that societies 
with a moral code would be better able to meet their needs Copp (1995) pp.195-6 
117 Moral theorists of this sort are free to claim that the set of moral goals contains just one goal, 
or several goals.   
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prescriptions that the realist Classical Utilitarian makes about which actions or rules 
maximize happiness. For instance, she might insist that the morally right thing to do is to 
switch the runaway trolley from its current path, thus killing one person to save five 
others.118 Both the end-relational and realist Classical Utilitarians will say that the 
outcome of having one dead instead of five is one that is morally better than having five 
dead instead of one. They will both say that it is better because it maximizes utility. They 
will simply disagree about what makes it true that the maximization of utility is good. 
The most revisionary aspect of an end-relational theory of moral goodness, then, 
is not the resulting moral theory. An end-relational theorist can defend a moral theory 
that looks nearly identical to, and agrees with her favored realist moral theory on all 
claims (except those that ascribe intrinsic goodness). The most revisionary aspect of an 
end-relational theory of goodness is what it says about the relation between the right and 
the good. The classical schema I introduced above involved first identifying what is 
intrinsically good, and then defining moral rightness in terms of its relation to the good.  
This is a very common procedure in the history of moral theorizing. However, this 
schema is closed off to the end-relational theorist. She needs to instead start by 
identifying what the moral goals are—that is, which goals are morally required, 
prohibited, etc—and then defining what is good in relation to those goals. Thus 
understood, an end-relational moral theory would not define moral rightness in terms of 
the good; it instead defines moral goodness in terms of the right. Defining the good in 
terms of the right is a less common, though not unheard of, way of relating the right and 
the good. 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
118 Foot (1967) introduced the ‘Trolley Car Example’. 
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In summary, though an end-relational theorist believes that nothing is intrinsically 
good, and thus, any moral theory that posits intrinsic goodness is mistaken, she can still 
defend moral theories that are nearly identical to those defended by the realist about 
intrinsic goodness.119 Her argument for her preferred moral theory will have to start with 
claims about which goals are the moral goals instead of with claims about which things 
are intrinsically good, but this is hardly a reason for rejecting end-relational theories of 
goodness! I conclude that the end-relational analysis of non-moral goodness does not 
have any implausible consequences when applied to moral goods. We thus have no good 
reason to reject the Commonality Thesis, or the extension of the end-relational analysis to 
moral goodness.120  
 
VIII.  Objections  
The view I just provided was just a sketch. As such, it will likely invite several 
misinterpretations. Such misinterpretations often give rise to plausible-sounding, but 
ultimately misguided objections. I shall now respond to some of these objections, in the 
hope of clarifying the view I just presented. 
According to the view I just sketched, basic reasons for acting are grounded in 
what we care about. But there are people out there who care about a lot of terrible, 
deplorable things. So, an objector might claim, according to my view those people have 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
119 Finlay believes that his end-relational theory of goodness is compatible with the existence of 
intrinsic goodness (2014) pp.197-206. 
120 In Chapter Five, I will evaluate to what extent an end-relational moral theory can 
accommodate other intuitive constraints on what we expect from a moral theory. The goal of this 
section was just to show that an end-relational theory is not too revisionary with respect to what 
kinds of moral theory it can defend.  
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reasons to do those terrible things. Surely people do not have reasons to do such terrible 
things, thus, my view is mistaken.  
This putative reductio of my view fails, however, since it is not a consequence of 
my view that terrible people have basic reasons to do terrible things. My claim was that 
for all things that we have basic reasons to do or to care about, the reason to do so would 
be grounded in things we cannot help but care about. I did not claim that for all things 
that we care about we have reasons to do those things. Such a view is far more 
revisionary than what I am after. I am trying to present a view that is extensionally no 
different than the realist’s when it comes to what things deserve to be the center of our 
practical lives. The realist would say that having friends, enjoying harmless pleasures, 
appreciating beauty, etc. are all intrinsically good things, and deserve to be at the center 
of our practical lives. I agree that these things deserve to be at the center of our practical 
lives. I only disagree with the realist’s explanation of why these things deserve a 
privileged spot in our practical lives. The realist thinks that the universe is a better place 
the more pleasure that exists. I deny that. I simply say that enjoying (harmless) pleasures, 
in general, contributes to the goal of having a meaningful life, and we all ought to seek 
out such pleasure to the extent that it promotes our having meaningful lives.   
Similarly, the realist might object that my sketch of end-relational moral goodness 
makes our reasons to be moral depend on the motivations and goals of the agent. The 
resulting theory is thus, at its foundation, egoistic. It overlooks the reasons that are other-
regarding. However, we tend to think of morality as, at its foundation, an other-regarding 
enterprise. 
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This objection applies only to one of the two types of end-relational moral 
theories I described above. This objection does not apply to those end-relational theorists 
who claim that it is a matter of brute fact which goals fall into the set of moral goals. On 
that view, it is perfectly reasonable to expect that a number of the moral goals will be 
essentially other-regarding, and thus, we will have moral reasons to respond in certain 
ways to the things that promote these other-regarding goals. The other type of end-
relational moral theory, however, does suggest that moral reasons are derived from an 
agent’s more fundamental goals. The goal that I have been focused on is the goal of 
having a full and meaningful life. I have focused on this goal because it really seems to 
me to be a foundational goal—I can imagine many other goals that promote it, but no 
further, more fundamental goals that it promotes. However, I do want to leave open the 
possibility that there might be other equally fundamental or even more fundamental goals 
that we cannot help but care about. Some of these goals might be essentially other-
regarding. If so, then even this view of end-relational morality will have basic other-
regarding reasons. However, if there were no such goals, then this type of theory does 
commit one to saying that moral reasons are derived from an agent’s goal of living a 
meaningful life. Personally, I find this interpretation inoffensive. In fact, I find it easier to 
believe that my reasons for being moral depend upon my interest in having a meaningful 
life than the realist’s story that my reasons for being moral are grounded in an obligation 
to make the universe an impersonally better place. My suggestion is that if my objector is 
unhappy with the apparently egoistic grounding of moral reasons that one is committed to 
on this version of end-relational morality, then she ought to favor the other type, wherein 
it is a matter of brute fact which goals the moral goals are. 
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An opponent might deny that there are any goals that we all care about. While it 
is plausible that most of us care about living a full and meaningful life, it is dubious that 
this is true of all of us. For instance, a teenaged slacker might not care about anything 
more than idling away his time on a sofa in his mother’s basement. When pressed, he 
might admit that this is not a meaningful way to live, but also might insist that he has no 
interest in living a meaningful life. He would be a counterexample to the claim that we all 
care about having meaningful lives.   
But this objection is due to a misunderstanding of the scope of the claim that I am 
making. I do not mean to make a universal claim when I say we cannot help but care 
about these basic goals. I mean to make a general claim—the sort that cannot be falsified 
by pointing out that it is not true of literally everyone. As I am interpreting things, the 
claim that “We care about living a full and meaningful life” is akin to the claim that 
“Human beings have two lungs” insofar as both are true, even though not every human 
being has two lungs, nor does every human being care about these fundamental goals. 
That humans have two lungs is a biological truth about the kind of creatures we are; that 
we all care about living a meaningful life is a fact that might be grounded in the nature of 
personhood. People are concerned with living meaningful lives. This is true in general, so 
the slacker is no counterexample. 
Further, I am tempted to say that the slacker probably does actually care about 
living a meaningful life. Perhaps he cares about living a meaningful life, but does not 
believe any such life is open to him (I doubt that he could sustain such a pessimistic view 
for long—either he would find some meaning to attach to his life, or he would end his 
life). Or perhaps, deep down, being close to home and his family are things that are 
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important to him (he might not even be consciously aware that his living at home in the 
basement is his way of pursuing a life of meaning). If so, then living in the family 
basement is conducive to a meaningful life. Of course, we would recommend to the 
slacker that he do more with himself than idle his days away in the basement. This is 
because we believe that the slacker might be mistaken about what things give our lives 
meaning. People can be mistaken about this. Scrooge, for instance, thought that 
cultivating friendships would decrease his ability to have a meaningful life. I argued that 
he is mistaken—that his life plan would be promoted were he to develop some loving 
relationships. Similarly, the slacker might simply not be aware of, or fully appreciate, 
how gainful employment, hobbies, travel, etc. would promote his having a meaningful 
life. To be honest, I have little insight into the slacker’s psychology, so I will admit that it 
is possible that he, at least currently, does not care about living a meaningful life. Again, 
that would be a counterexample if I meant to ground basic reasons in goals that are 
shared by literally everyone—but that is not what I meant. 
The realist might further complain that I am sneaking in a notion of intrinsic 
goodness by way of my description of basic goals that we care about. Am I not just 
saying that some goals are just plain good?  
One way in which this accusation might be apt would be if I had said that we 
ought to care about these basic goals, or that we have reason to care about these basic 
goals. Some philosophers believe that intrinsic goodness is reducible to what we ought to 
do or favor, and thus, they would translate claims about what we ought to do or favor into 
claims about intrinsic goodness.121 Were I to say we ought to care about these 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
121 For instance: A.C. Ewing (1947) and Michael Zimmerman (2001). 
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fundamental goals, then I would be, by their lights, sneaking in a notion of intrinsic 
goodness. 
I have not relied on the claim that we ought to care about these fundamental goals.  
My thinking was that in a certain sense, we do not have a choice. We do care about them, 
and we cannot help but care about them. Because whether or not we care is not under our 
control, it is not something that we could have a reason for. Just as it does not make sense 
for me to ask if I ought to (or have reason to) be over 6 feet tall, or to have been born to 
my parents, it does not make sense for me to ask if I ought to (or have reason to) care 
about having a meaningful life. I cannot help but have these traits; and I cannot but help 
care about certain goals.  
Finally, the realist might argue that I am muddling up the issue, and getting things 
backwards. It is not the fact that we care about certain fundamental goals, as I suggest, 
that grounds our reasons for favoring those things that promote those goals.  It is the 
intrinsic goodness of those goals that grounds our practical reasons. It is true that we care 
about these goals, but we care about them because they are good.  
The objection notes that there are (at least) two contenders for what grounds our 
basic practical reasons: the fact that we care about certain fundamental goals, and the fact 
that these goals are good. The realist is correct in claiming that I have said very little to 
support the claim that it is the fact that we care about these goals, and not the goodness of 
those goals, that grounds reasons. But my goal has not been to argue that the realist’s 
view is incoherent or untenable! I have rather been offering the end-relational theory of 
goodness as an alternative to the orthodox view in order to show that we need not posit 
instrumental and intrinsic goodness to make sense of certain aspects of our practical lives. 
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And while it is does not settle the issue, I take it to be a significant point in favor of the 
end-relational theory that it is simpler without losing any explanatory power.   
 
IX. Conclusion 
In this chapter, I have been arguing that there is nothing implausible about 
extending the end-relational analysis of non-moral goodness to moral goodness. In other 
words, there are no good reasons for rejecting the Thesis of Commonality. I focused my 
discussion on one admittedly revisionary consequence of an end-relational theory of 
goodness—that on this view, nothing is good for its own sake, or ‘intrinsically good.’  I 
examined one line of reasoning that could lead us to conclude that nihilism about intrinsic 
goodness is an unacceptable consequence, namely: that there are certain roles that 
intrinsic goodness plays in our practical lives, and that if we do not posit intrinsic 
goodness, these roles cannot be filled. I looked at two such roles. First, that intrinsic 
goodness helps explain the truth of at least some of our goodness judgments. I suggested 
that a nihilist could agree that ‘X is good’ is true for any X that the realist points to. She 
can claim that any judgment that purports to ascribe intrinsic or instrumental goodness in 
fact ascribes end-relational goodness. Giving up intrinsic goodness does not commit us to 
radically altering which goodness judgments we believe are true. 
The second role that intrinsic goodness is said to play is the grounding of basic 
practical reasons—and especially the grounding of moral reasons. The realist claims that 
we have basic reasons to adopt certain responses to intrinsic goods, and we have 
derivative reasons to adopt a different set of responses to things that are merely 
instrumentally good. I suggested that the nihilist could preserve the view that some goods 
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deserve to be favored categorically, while others only deserve to be favored 
hypothetically, if she distinguishes different types of goals. There are fundamental goals 
that we cannot help but care about, and we have basic reasons to favor the things that 
directly promote these goals. The things that indirectly promote these goals, or that 
promote less fundamental goals, are ones that we have derivative reasons to favor.  
I conclude by stressing that if the nihilistic view that I have sketched in this 
chapter is plausible, then because it has the same explanatory power as the realist view 
with fewer ontological posits, it is the simpler view, and ought be preferred. Admittedly, 
the devil is in the details, and whether or not an end-relational theory of goodness is truly 
preferable will rest on how the view is spelled out. I will spell out my theory in Chapter 
Five. For now, I will only claim to have shown, more modestly, that the reasons in favor 
of realism are not persuasive. The realist is wrong; we do not need intrinsic goodness. 
 !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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Chapter Four – Other Relational Accounts of Goodness 
 
I. Introduction 
In the last chapter, I defended the Thesis of Commonality—one of the key 
premises of my master argument that all goodness is end-relational. Another key premise 
of that argument is that an end-relational account is the best account of non-moral 
goodness. In Chapter Two, my argument in support of this premise concentrated on 
demonstrating that an end-relational account of goodness gives us a very natural, and 
plausible way of understanding our everyday judgments about the goodness of parking 
spots, hammers, umbrellas, steak knives, etc. I further argued against some non-relational 
accounts of non-moral goodness. This of course, left open the possibility of someone 
defending a relational account of non-moral goodness that was not end-relational. In this 
chapter, I will discuss the other relational accounts of goodness that have been offered in 
the literature. If any of these other views were as plausible as the end-relational view that 
I offer, then there would be equal reason to substitute those views for my end-relational 
view into my master argument. That is to say, for all I have said so far, the master 
argument given in Chapter Two could still be used to show that all goodness is relational 
to something other than to ends. To show that my argument supports end-relational 
goodness, then, I need to show that these other relational theories are less plausible than 
an end-relational theory. 
To assess the plausibility of these competing views, I will evaluate these theories 
of goodness in two respects. First, how plausible are they as an account of our judgments 
about non-moral goodness? Second, and more importantly, could we plausibly substitute 
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one of these types of theories of goodness into my master argument? That is, could we 
give a plausible account of all goodness, even moral goodness, using one of these 
alternative relational views?122 To answer these questions, I will test how well each of 
these types of account fits with certain pre-philosophical intuitions we have about 
goodness. I conclude that these other relational theories of goodness all conflict in 
important way with our intuitions.  
And although I lean heavily on our intuitions about goodness, my thought is not 
that these intuitions are infallible; I simply believe that they track our commonsense 
concept of goodness and thus constitute significant constraints on what a successful or 
plausible account of goodness could be like. For this reason, when I show that these other 
theories of goodness conflict with some of our commonsense intuitions, I should not be 
interpreted as attempting to offer fatal counterexamples to those theories; I am not aiming 
to give ‘knock-down’ arguments against these other relational theories! The thesis of this 
chapter is that when you consider all the virtues and vices of each type of relational 
theory, an end-relational theory of goodness emerges as the most plausible. 
 
II. Kind-Relational Goodness 
a) The View and its Proponents 
Historically, the first type of relational view that was defended was a kind 
relational theory of goodness. According to a kind-relational theory of goodness, there is 
no such thing as goodness simpliciter, but only goodness relative to kinds. In discussing !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
122 In the course of defending the claim that his end-relational account of goodness is the best, 
Finlay also argues against interest-relational and kind-relational accounts of goodness. His 
arguments focusing on showing that sentences that appear to introduce interest or kind-relational 
goodness really introduce end-relational goodness (2014) p.32-4 & 36-8.  
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the plausibility of this view, I will be drawing from the writings of Peter Geach, Judith 
Jarvis Thomson, and Philippa Foot.  Before doing so, a word needs to be said about the 
extent to which each of these philosophers can appropriately be categorized as kind-
relational theorists. 
Of the three, Geach is the one who says the least by way of a positive account of 
goodness. In his seminal article, “Good and Evil,” Geach’s project is mostly a negative 
one.123 That is, he argues against certain views of goodness (namely, non-naturalist views, 
like those of G.E. Moore and W.D. Ross, and non-cognitivist views, like those of A.J. 
Ayer and R.M. Hare). As a result, he says very little about what he thinks goodness is.  
As such, it might be unfair of us to categorize Geach as a kind-relational theorist when he 
presents little more than a sketch of a relational view. On the other hand, the few positive 
claims Geach makes in that article provide the chief argument and motivation for 
thinking that goodness is kind-relational. So even if Geach would resist the claim that all 
goodness is relative to kinds, much of what he says is relevant to our project of 
evaluating the plausibility of a kind-relational theory.  
One might also be wary to categorize Foot as a kind-relational theorist. It is 
certainly true that in her book, Natural Goodness, Foot focuses on a particular type of 
goodness that is kind-relational: so-called ‘natural goodness.’  Briefly, natural goodness 
is the kind of goodness we attribute to a living creature when we claim that the creature is 
a good member of its species given the form of life for creatures of that species.  A 
species’ form of life is determined by how that species obtains nourishment, develops, 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
123 Geach (1956) 
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defends itself, and reproduces.124 So for instance, deer need to have keen eyesight, 
sensitive ears, and be swift if they are to evade predators. A deer that has these features is 
a good deer (at least, in respect to its ability to defend itself); a deer that is defective in 
one of these features lacks natural goodness (to some extent). So while natural goodness 
is obviously kind-relational, one might wonder if Foot would accept the claim that all 
goodness is. For instance, would Foot accept that the goodness of non-living things like 
toasters or steak knives is also relative to kinds? Foot’s answer is brief, but telling. When 
we evaluate non-living things in the natural world (such as soil or weather) or artifacts 
(such as toasters or steak knives), the goodness we ascribe to them is:  
What I should like to call secondary goodness. It is in this derivative way 
that we speak of the goodness of, for example, soil or weather, as such 
things are related to plants, to animals, or to us... By contrast, ‘natural’ 
goodness, as I define it, which is attributable only to living things… 
depends directly on the relation of an individual to the ‘life form’ of its 
species. On barren Mars there is no natural goodness, and even secondary 
goodness can be attributed to things on that planet only by relating them to 
our own lives, or to living things elsewhere. (Philippa Foot, Natural 
Goodness, 2001, pp.26-27).  
 
If I understand her correctly, Foot believes that good weather is derivatively good 
because it helps living creatures to pursue their form of life and achieve natural goodness. 
Steak knives are good, then, when they too contribute to humans achieving natural 
goodness. I will not discuss the plausibility of this claim in any detail. I will recall, 
however, my complaint from Chapter Three about a similar interpretation of the 
goodness of steak knives. There, I claimed that once we identify that a steak knife cuts 
meat well we could truthfully call it a good steak knife; we need not make any further 
claim about the goodness of the goal of cutting meat. Similarly, I see no reason why 
artifacts, etc must contribute to the natural goodness of some form of life or another in !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
124 Foot (2001) pp. 33-34 
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order to be good. This is, nevertheless, Foot’s claim. So, because secondary goodness is 
derivative of natural goodness, and natural goodness is kind-relational, we can 
confidently categorize Foot as a kind-relational theorist. 
On the other hand, it is probably inappropriate to label Judith Thomson as a kind-
relational theorist since she does not explicitly claim that all goodness is relative to kinds.  
In Normativity, she defends a theory of goodness that contains at least four different types 
of goodness properties. Three of these types of properties are fundamentally kind-
relational.  The fourth type is what she calls “being good-modified.” This is the type of 
goodness we attribute to something when we judge, for instance, that: 
(1) S is good at doing crosswords. 
(2) X is good for England. 
(3) S is good in Hamlet. 
(4) S is good with children.125 
 
Roughly, according to Thomson, any time the word ‘good’ is followed by a preposition, 
this use of ‘good’ refers to a distinct goodness property. Importantly for our purposes 
here, at least some of these types of goodness properties are not kind-relational.  
Thomson even leaves it open that her list of goodness properties is not exhaustive. She 
writes:  “The word ‘good’ shows up in other constructions, so we should allow that there 
are still other goodness properties.”126 Given that Thomson recognizes at least one type of 
goodness that is not relative to kinds, it is not strictly-speaking correct to call her a kind-
relational theorist.   
On the other hand, Thomson does not limit her discussion only to natural kinds—
she also discusses kinds that are quite complex or gerrymandered. For instance, one kind 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
125 Thomson (2008) p.27 
126 Ibid, p. 31!
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that she discusses is the kind: typewriter made in 1900.127 Accordingly, it is open to her 
to suggest that the above sentences (1) – (4) express propositions that introduce 
complicated kind-relational forms of goodness. “S is good at doing crosswords” might 
mean something like S is good relative to the kind: crossword-player. My suspicion is 
that the main reason that Thomson introduces this fourth type of goodness—being good-
modified—is that she is too preoccupied with the grammatical surface structure of 
sentences, when she should really be concerned with the propositions that those sentences 
express. The surface grammar of the sentence: ‘S is good at doing crossword puzzles’ is 
not explicitly about kind-relational goodness, but neither is the sentence ‘That toaster is 
good.’ However, ‘That toaster is good,’ and ‘That is a good toaster’ intuitively express 
the same proposition,128 and the latter sentence ascribes kind-relational goodness (if, in 
fact, any sentences do). Why not accept that even sentences that do not explicitly modify 
‘good’ with a kind term might nonetheless ascribe kind-relational goodness? I conclude 
that Thomson is too quick to dismiss this possibility, and that sentences like (1) – (4) can 
be reasonably interpreted as ascribing kind-relational goodness. Were she to accept this 
friendly amendment to her view (that is, that the things that are allegedly ‘good-modified’ 
are actually just good relative to complicated kinds), she would be a kind-relational 
theorist. 
 But let’s not worry too much whether or not we can alter Thomson’s stated view 
so that we can label her a kind-relational theorist. Since three of the four goodness 
properties she discusses are kind-relational, and since they do most of the work in her !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
127 Ibid, p.42 
128 In certain contexts, these two sentences might express different propositions.  Later, I will 
discuss in more detail context’s influence on the ways we should interpret sentences that express 
judgments of goodness. 
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theory, Thomson ends up developing a view that can largely be taken up by a kind-
relational theorist. And because her view is well developed and supported by arguments, 
in much of the discussion below I will be focusing on aspects of Thomson’s theory of 
goodness. To be clear, my doing so should not, however, be mistaken for the claim that 
Thomson accepts that all goodness is kind-relational.  That is not her view as she states it. 
b) Motivation for the View 
Almost every philosopher who advances any type of relational account of 
goodness appeals at some point to Geach’s distinction between logically attributive and 
predicative adjectives.129 As you will recall from Chapter One, Geach took the linguistic 
fact that ‘good’ operates as a logically attributive adjective as good reason to reject the 
claim that there is such a thing as goodness simpliciter. If ‘good’ were a predicative 
adjective, we would expect the proposition expressed by the sentence “Kyle is a good 
tennis player” to entail both that Kyle is a tennis player, and that Kyle is good. But it does 
not have this latter entailment, so ‘good’ must be an attributive adjective. We should 
understand this example sentence as evaluating Kyle’s goodness qua tennis player. That 
is, he is good relative to the kind tennis player. He is not, however, just plain good. 
This seems like a natural way of reading sentences like “Kyle is a good tennis 
player,” where the word ‘good’ is explicitly modified by a kind term, but how should we 
understand sentences that lack such a modification, such as “Friendship is good”?   
Geach suggests that even these sentences are to be understood as expressing propositions 
that contain a reference to a kind. He writes:   
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
129 While Geach is cited more frequently, W.D. Ross discussed this distinction when applied to 
‘good’ a few decades prior in The Right and the Good, (1930), pp.65-7 
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Even when ‘good’ or ‘bad’ stands by itself as a predicate, and is thus 
grammatically predicative, some substantive has to be understood; there is 
no such thing as being just good or bad, there is only being a good or bad 
so-and-so (Peter Geach, “Good and Evil,” 1956, p.34). 
 
Thus, according to Geach, all goodness is relative to kinds. Much in the same way you 
cannot be just plain tall, but only (for example) tall for a kindergartner or tall for a 
basketball player, you cannot be just plain good, but only (for example) a good tennis 
player or a good person.   
c) Virtues and Vices of the View 
 A kind-relational theory of goodness is attractive for two reasons. First, it gives a 
straightforward explanation of the inappropriateness of concluding that Kyle is good 
simpliciter, even if it is true that Kyle is a good tennis player. That is, it explains why 
‘good’ operates as an attributive predicate. Again, the explanation is simply that all 
goodness is relative to kinds, so even if one and the same person, Kyle, is good as a 
tennis player, this does not ensure that he is good relative to any of the other kinds he 
belongs to. This explanation is not only straightforward, but it is also prima facie quite 
plausible.   
Second, when paired with the Thesis of Commonality, a kind-relational theory of 
goodness yields a natural and elegant account of all goodness—including moral goodness 
(Thomson, for instance, develops an account of moral goodness that is, at its foundation, 
kind-relational).130 Notice that the kind-relationalist is uniquely poised to explain two 
notions that are often treated as fundamental or central to moral theorizing: the notions of 
a good life, and of a good person. The ‘good’ in both of these notions appears to be kind-
relational. A moral theory rooted in an account of what it is to have a good life, or to be a !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
130 Thomson (2008) Chapter XII  
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good person, could very easily be a moral theory that is rooted in kind-relational 
goodness. If this is correct, and one could give an elegant account of kind-relational 
moral goodness, then one could easily replace my appeals to end-relational goodness 
with appeals to kind-relational goodness into my master argument from Chapter Two, 
and it would still go through.   
The view is, however, open to a number of objections. The first objection starts 
with the observation that it sounds odd to ascribe goodness to certain kinds of things.  
Granted, for some kinds, it is very natural to talk about good members of that kind.  We 
not only feel that it is appropriate to judge the goodness of steak knives, for instance, but 
we even have some idea what it means to say that a steak knife is good. For other kinds, 
however, it sounds very strange to talk about good members of that kind. Pebbles, 
swamps, Gila Monsters, and corpses do not seem like they belong to kinds that one can 
evaluate for goodness.131, 132 We are simply in the dark about what it would mean for there 
to be a good member of these kinds. For now, let us call our intuition that it sounds odd 
to talk of good members of certain kinds the Odd Sounding Judgment Intuition.  
Now suppose that a kind-relational theorist were to claim that for every kind there 
are members of that kind that are good. Were she to claim this, she would thus be 
committed to there being good pebbles qua pebbles, good swamps qua swamps, etc. This 
would stretch our ordinary concept of goodness beyond the extension we believe it to 
have. Intuitively, there are no good pebbles qua pebbles. The objection to a kind-
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131 These are some of Paul Ziff’s examples (1960) pp. 210-1. 
132 Foot would object to the inclusion of Gila Monsters on the list of things to which it sounds 
strange to attribute goodness. According to Foot, Gila Monsters (and indeed, all living creatures 
with a form of life) can have natural goodness (2001) p.26. I discuss this claim in more detail 
below.!
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relational theory of this sort, then, is that it allows too many things to fall under the 
extension of goodness. Let us call this the Too Much Goodness Objection. 
 Of course, a kind-relational theorist need not be committed to the claim that there 
are good members of that kind for every possible kind. Both Geach and Thomson deny 
this explicitly. For instance, Geach claims that there are no good events qua event, nor 
things qua thing.133 Thomson agrees with these two claims and adds that neither are there 
good states of affairs, facts, or possible worlds.134 These are all kinds such that it does not 
make sense to speak of good members of that kind. In this way, a kind-relational theorist 
can deny that there are good pebbles qua pebbles. Thus, the view need not be susceptible 
to the Too Much Goodness Objection (at least not for this reason). 
 Once the kind-relational theorist admits that there are some K such that nothing is 
a good member of K, however, one might reasonably wonder how to identify which 
kinds have good members, and which do not. Is there any principled way to demarcate 
these two groups? Or, to return to the example above: Given that so many philosophers 
believe that we can meaningfully speak of good events, states of affairs, things, and 
possible worlds, what can Geach or Thomson say to convince them otherwise?   
 Here is what Geach says to support the claim that there are no good events qua 
events:   
We cannot sensibly speak of a good or bad event, a good or bad thing to 
happen. 'Event ', like 'thing ', is too empty a word to convey either a 
criterion of identity or a standard of goodness… Caesar's murder was a 
bad thing to happen to a living organism, a good fate for a man who 
wanted divine worship for himself, and again a good or bad act on the part 
of his murderers; to ask whether it was a good or bad event would be 
senseless (Peter Geach, “Good and Evil,” 1956, p.41). !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
133 Geach (1956) p.41 
134 Thomson (2008) pp.25-26 
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According to Geach, sentences of the form ‘X is a good thing’ or ‘Y is a good event’ are 
‘senseless’ since the words ‘thing’ and ‘event’ are too empty.  But how should we 
understand this notion of ‘emptiness’?  Given what Geach goes on to say in this passage, 
we can interpret his notion of emptiness as involving either (a) a lack of criteria of 
identity, (b) a lack of a standard of goodness, or (c) both. In regards to (a), Geach seems 
to have in mind that terms like ‘event’ and ‘thing’ are so broad or general that there are 
few to no restrictions on what properties that X must have to be properly categorized as a 
member of that kind. Any X can properly be categorized as a thing, no matter what 
properties it has. However, lacking identity criteria cannot be a necessary condition for a 
K failing to have good members. After all, terms like ‘pebble,’ ’corpse,’ or ‘swamp’ do 
have identity criteria—there are restrictions on what properties a thing must have to 
qualify as a pebble or a corpse, etc. But ‘That is a good pebble’ still elicits in us the Odd 
Sounding Judgment Intuition. The kind, pebble, has identity criteria, but does not have 
good members. Thus (a) is not necessary for a K to lack good members.  And if (a) is not 
necessary for lacking good members, (c) cannot be necessary either. 
We should thus focus our attention on (b): that certain K lack ‘standards of 
goodness.’ This condition is certainly more in line with the explanation that Thomson 
gives for why certain K lack standards of goodness. The distinction between kinds that 
have standards of goodness and those that do not is central to Thomson’s discussion of 
what she calls ‘goodness-fixing kinds’. Something is a goodness-fixing kind if “what 
being a K is itself sets the standards that a K has to meet if it is to be good qua K.”135  
Functional kinds like toaster or umbrella are obvious examples of goodness-fixing kinds.  !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
135 Thomson (2008) p.21 
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These kinds have essential functions—and to be a good member of that kind is to 
perform that function well. If you know what an umbrella is, then you know what 
standards it must meet to be a good umbrella. But it is not just functional kinds that are 
goodness-fixing, according to Thomson. She claims that the kinds: beefsteak tomato, 
tiger, and even human being, are goodness-fixing, even though they do not have essential 
functions.136    
Thomson argues that it is only when a thing belongs to a goodness-fixing kind 
that it can be good qua member of that kind. So for instance, the kind toaster is a 
goodness-fixing kind, so a particular toaster can be good qua toaster. But because there is 
nothing in what it is to be a possible world, event, thing, state of affairs, etc that sets the 
standards for what a good member of that kind would be, there is no such thing as a good 
possible world qua possible world. The same goes for the kinds: pebble, swamp, and 
corpse. There are no good pebbles qua pebble, and thus, we have the Odd Sounding 
Judgment Intuition about the judgment, ‘That’s a good pebble’.  
Suppose that we grant that some kinds are goodness-fixing kinds, and others are 
not (this does not seem like a huge concession—in fact, it seems true). I contend that 
even granting her this fact, Thomson has not yet answered the question with which we 
began this discussion. That is, Thomson has yet to tell us how we can distinguish those 
goodness-fixing kinds from non-goodness-fixing kinds. Her ‘answer’ is that only 
goodness-fixing kinds have standards of goodness that are set by what it is to be a 
member of that kind. Further, you can tell that a kind is such that it does not set the 
standards of goodness for that kind if you have the Odd Sounding Judgment Intuition 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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about judgments that attribute goodness to members of that kind. Why do those 
judgments give us that intuition? Because the relevant kind is not goodness-fixing. This 
‘explanation’ is thus circular and uninformative.   
Consider an analogous ‘explanation.’ Some substances dissolve in water, while 
others do not. We call the former set of substances ‘water-soluble’. Now if we were 
interested in if a certain substance, S, was water-soluble or not, there would be a way to 
answer that question: namely, we could drop S in water and see if it dissolves. But 
suppose we want to know why things like S dissolve in water. It would not be a very 
illuminating answer to our question that S dissolves in water because it is water-soluble.  
We are asking for a deeper answer than that. We want to know what makes it the case 
that things like salt are water-soluble, while things like copper are not. Similarly, 
Thomson tells us that toasters belong to a goodness-fixing kind because what it is to be a 
toaster sets the standards of goodness for toasters. But we might still inquire why toasters 
have this feature, and pebbles do not. Thomson does not give us an answer to this further 
question, and it is hard to imagine what answer she could give other than that it is simply 
a matter of brute fact which kinds are goodness-fixing and which are not.   
Notice that it is fairly easy to answer this question if we were to give up on being 
kind-relationalists. One answer that suggests itself, for instance, is that goodness-fixing 
kinds are the ones that have salient interests or ends associated with them. To be a good 
member of a goodness-fixing kind is just to promote that salient interest or end.  If a kind 
lacks a salient end (as the kinds pebble, corpse, and swamp do), then that kind is not 
goodness-fixing. As we saw, the paradigm examples of goodness-fixing kinds are 
functional kinds like toaster, umbrella, steak knife, etc. These kinds have essential 
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functions—and it is thus obvious that when we judge their goodness we are evaluating 
them for how well they satisfy those functions. Their essential functions are the salient 
interest or end we judge them by—and these ends or interests ground the standards by 
which we judge members of that kind.   
What should we say about beefsteak tomatoes, tigers, and human beings?  
Thomson claims these are goodness-fixing kinds, but that they clearly lack an essential 
function. The view I am suggesting does not require that a kind have an essential function 
for there to be good members of that kind; it requires that the kind must have a salient 
interest or end associated with it. So, for instance, presumably we would judge the 
goodness of beefsteak tomatoes relative to how well they would satisfy certain interests 
we have in cooking and eating. Admittedly, it is a little harder to find salient ends or 
interests that good tigers or good human beings promote. Of course, we can simply 
disagree with Thomson that these are goodness-fixing kinds. I for one, get the Odd 
Sounding Judgment Intuition with regards to the judgment ‘That’s a good tiger.’ To my 
ears, this sentence only sounds acceptable if we imagine that photographers or 
zookeepers are looking to capture a tiger that can serve as an exemplary model of its 
species. So perhaps the salient end that a good tiger serves is being a representative tiger.  
Notice that this interpretation could possibly subsume Foot’s notion of natural goodness.  
Foot claimed that a good tiger would be one that has all the features that help it flourish 
in the form of life of a tiger. Such a tiger would certainly be an exemplary model of its 
species. So, one might argue that Foot’s natural goodness is not, deep down, a type of 
kind-relational goodness; it is actually a type of end or interest-relational goodness, 
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where the salient end makes reference to a kind. 137 Again, we need not agree with 
Thomson or Foot that there are good tigers, qua tigers. But if we did agree with them, it is 
plausible that our judgment that a tiger is good could be saying of that tiger that it 
promotes the end of being representative of its species. 
It is highly unlikely, however, that when we judge that someone is a good human 
being, that we are judging her as representative of her species. We might, for instance, 
believe that most humans are petty, awful people, so a representative human being would 
also be petty and awful. Even if all people are awful, it makes sense to claim that a good 
human being would be someone who is not awful; a good human being would be the rare 
exception to the norm. We should thus not interpret ‘good human being’ as roughly 
meaning ‘representative human’. So what does it mean to be a good human being? It 
strikes me that ‘Kyle is a good human being,’ has a particularly moral sound to it. To 
avoid favoring one view of morality over another, we might simply say that the relevant 
end or interest that human beings promote, in virtue of which we judge them to be good, 
is the goal of being moral. This neutral way of referring to the salient end allows that we 
can cash out what it is to be moral in terms of having virtues, doing one’s duty, 
maximizing utility, engaging in fulfilling loving relationships, etc. I will return to this 
point in a moment.   
For now, it is worth summarizing the discussion so far. I began by raising a worry 
for kind-relational views: that they cannot give a deep explanation for why we have the 
Odd Sounding Judgment Intuition when we call members of some kinds of things good.   
Thomson gave the start of an answer by distinguishing between goodness-fixing kinds 
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and other kinds. Only goodness-fixing kinds, she claimed, have standards of evaluation 
built into what it means to be a member of that K, and thus, it is only relative to 
goodness-fixing kinds that something can be good qua K. For all other K, we will get the 
Oddness Sounding Judgment Intuition when we purport to attribute goodness qua K to 
members of that K. I argued that this answer does not really get to the heart of the issue, 
since it seems that the only way to determine if a kind has standards of evaluation built 
into what it means to be a member of that K is to see whether or not we have the Oddness 
Sounding Judgment Intuition when we judge that something is good qua K. The 
‘explanation’ for why we get the Oddness Sounding Judgment Intuition is, thus, circular.   
I proposed a natural, plausible alternative, where we distinguish goodness-fixing 
kinds from non-goodness fixing kinds by whether or not they have a salient end or 
interest associated with them. If they do, then the end or interest generates a set of 
standards of evaluation, and it will thus sound natural to speak of something as being 
good qua that kind. The problem for a kind-relational theorist, of course, is that this 
interpretation makes the goodness of members of goodness-fixing kinds a type of interest 
or end-relational goodness. It thus gives up on giving a unified, kind-relational theory of 
goodness. Someone who wished to substitute kind-relational goodness into my master 
argument could not accept this way of distinguishing goodness-fixing kinds. Worse yet 
for the kind-relational theorist: there does not appear to be any easy, yet truly kind-
relational answer to the puzzles surrounding the Oddness Sounding Judgment Intuition 
(other than simply claiming that some kinds are such that they have standards of 
evaluation built into them, and this is just a brute fact that admits of no further 
explanation). Again, this is not meant to be a devastating objection to kind-relational 
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theories of goodness.  After all, there might yet be an undiscovered way to resolve this 
puzzle that is open to the kind-relational theorist. Other things being equal, however, we 
ought to prefer a theory that does resolve this puzzle. Interest-relational and end-
relational theories both resolve this puzzle in a way that is both compelling and plausible.  
d. Kind-relational ethics? 
Before moving on to look at interest-relational theories of goodness, I wish to 
evaluate the plausibility of extending the kind-relational analysis to cover moral 
goodness. I suspect there are a variety of very ingenious and nuanced ways of 
constructing a moral theory that is compatible with a kind-relational view; I cannot 
possibly address them all. Instead, I will focus on what I take to be the most natural and 
fitting forms of moral theory for a kind-relationalist to defend (and also, not 
coincidentally, the forms of moral theory that actual kind-relationalists have defended).  I 
do so fully realizing that, of course, someone might come along and offer a more 
complex, gerrymandered kind-relational moral theory that sidesteps the criticisms of this 
section. Were someone to concoct such a view, it would not affect my overall argument. 
Again, I am only interested in defending the relative claim that a kind-relational account 
of goodness is, all things considered, less plausible than my preferred end-relational 
account. In the next chapter, I will show that my account lends itself quite naturally to a 
simple, and elegant account of morality. If the only way the kind-relationalist can avoid 
the criticisms I offer in this section is by providing a complicated, baroque moral theory, 
then all the more support for my claim that my view is more plausible. 
As I noted above, because kind-relational views say that goodness is relative to 
kinds, they stand in a privileged position to make use of the notions of a ‘good person’ or 
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a ‘good life.’ These two notions are often central to virtue theories of morality, so kind-
relational accounts of goodness lend themselves quite naturally to virtue theories of 
morality. Further, since kind-relationalists often deny that there is such thing as a good 
possible world, good state of affairs, or good thing (to happen), they generally must deny 
the plausibility of other types of moral theories. Both Thomson and Foot, for instance, 
argue against Utilitarianism on the grounds that it is incoherent.138 I will thus focus my 
discussion on the prospects for a kind-relational virtue theory. 
As a reminder, since we are only considering kind-relational views of goodness 
that might replace my end-relational theory of goodness in my master argument, there are 
even some forms of virtue theory that the kind-relationalist cannot defend—namely, 
those theories that require the positing of intrinsic goodness. A kind-relationalist can say, 
for instance, that certain traits are characteristic of a good human or person. She cannot, 
however, say that those traits, the possession of those traits, or people with those traits, 
are intrinsically good. For this reason, a kind-relationalist could not support the 
Perfectionist moral theory that Thomas Hurka defends. One of the constraints that Hurka 
places on his search for the “best or most defensible perfectionism,” is that a 
“perfectionist concept of [human] nature assigns intrinsic value to certain properties, and 
these must on their own seem morally worthy of developing.”139 Similarly, a kind-
relationalist can talk about what constitutes a good life, but she could not say that the 
good life is one that is intrinsically good—as Aristotle does. Aristotle says that 
eudemonia is the only thing that is good for its own sake, and the cultivation and exercise 
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!! 142!
of the virtues are constitutive of a life of eudemonia.140 So, while a kind-relationalist can 
agree with Aristotle that the cultivation and exercise of the virtues are constitutive of a 
good life, she cannot agree with his further claims about the intrinsic value of a good life. 
In short, there is a fairly narrow class of moral theories open to the kind-relationalist. 
Whether a kind-relationalist grounds her moral theory with an account of a good 
person, or with an account of a good life, she will be faced with two very difficult 
questions. First, why think that a good life/person has the particular features that you 
identify? Second, having settled the first question, why should we care about having a life 
like that, or being a person like that? Again, the easy answer here would be that the 
features of a good life/person are themselves intrinsically good, and thus, having a good 
life/being a good person is intrinsically good—but this answer is not open to the kind-
relationalist. I will argue that, in fact, the only plausible responses to these questions 
require giving up the thesis that all goodness is kind-relational. Thus, a kind-relationalist 
must either give up on offering a unified kind-relational account of goodness, or, she 
must admit that she cannot give an explanation of how we identify the virtues, or why we 
should care about virtues. Either alternative counts against the plausibility of extending 
the kind-relational theory of goodness to apply to moral goodness. 
Philippa Foot grounds her moral theory in the notion of a good human life. Just as 
a tiger has a ‘form of life’ that is natural to creatures of its species, and a tiger that is not 
well-suited for its form of life is a bad tiger, a similar thing can be said for humans. The 
details of the transition from talk of the natural goodness of tigers to the natural goodness 
of humans are a bit murky. Foot seems to have in mind here that the natural form of life 
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for a human is one that requires a lot of cooperation with other humans. We do not have 
any natural power to bind people into cooperating with us, so our pursuit of a naturally 
good life requires that we be able to trust that others will cooperate with us when they say 
they will. This for instance, explains why it is prima facie wrong to lie. If we lie, then we 
are not fully cooperating with other humans, and it is part of our natural form of life that 
we cooperate. The badness of lying, for instance, is thus explained in terms of the 
naturally good human life. A person who is disposed to lying is thus not a virtuous 
person.141   
That explains Foot’s answer to the first question: Why think that a good person 
has the particular characteristics that you identify? The more troubling question, for Foot, 
is the question: Why should I care about being a good person—so described? One 
particularly forceful way of pursuing this question is to draw attention to something that 
Philippa Foot overlooked. Foot defines the natural goodness of an animal in relation to 
how fitting it is to its form of life. She states “that it is the particular life form of a species 
of plant or animal that determines how an animal should be.”142 It seems to me, however, 
that there are two ways to fail to fit within a form of life. Foot focuses entirely on one: 
where a creature is weak or defective and thus not a good member of its kind. But there is 
clearly another way a creature can fail to fit the form of life for its species—by being 
different in ways that make that creature flourish.  
It is difficult to come up with examples of what I have in mind, partly because 
most creatures are well adapted to their habitats, and deviating from the natural way of 
life for that creature does result in that creature’s failing to flourish. However, it is !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
141 Foot (2001) pp.45-6 
142 Ibid, p.32!
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possible that for some species, the form of life of that species is not conducive to the 
flourishing of the individual creatures of that species (nor to the species itself). Recall my 
discussion of the Giant Panda from Chapter Two.  Giant Pandas eat only bamboo—a 
food source from which they barely receive the nutrition they need to get through the day. 
It is not possible to eat enough bamboo to build up a layer of fat that would sustain a 
panda if it wishes to hibernate through a cold winter. Bamboo does not flourish in the 
cold either. So the panda’s diet requires that the panda stay somewhere that is fairly 
warm. As humans encroach upon the panda’s natural habitat, it is being pushed into 
colder areas in which it is not well suited to survive. These pandas natural form of life—
the exclusive eating of bamboo—means they will be hungry and cold. Further, pandas 
rarely mate—and female pandas are actually only fertile for a very short time out of 
every year. When panda numbers diminish, it becomes rarer and rarer for pandas to meet. 
It thus becomes even more rare for mating to occur, and for it to occur at a time that can 
result in an offspring. For all of these reasons, the form of life of the panda is currently an 
important factor in why pandas are an endangered species. Clearly it would be good for 
the individual pandas if they were more flexible about what they eat. It would be better 
for the panda species if they wanted to mate more often, and if they were fertile for 
longer periods of time. Suppose then that there was a panda that liked to eat more diverse 
and nutritious foods, and who was fertile and willing to mate more frequently. This panda 
would not be a naturally good panda in Foot’s sense. However, it strikes me that this is 
indeed a good panda! A good panda is one that flourishes, even if that means living quite 
differently from its form of life.  
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 My diagnosis of the last example is that Foot’s natural goodness is really a form 
of end or interest-relational goodness. There is an end—the flourishing of the animal or 
species—and it is constituted, in part, by the procurement of food, mates, and the 
avoidance of predators. In nearly every case, species have evolved so that a naturally 
good member of that species is also good at accomplishing these tasks, but as the panda 
example shows, these two ways of being good can come apart. When they do come apart, 
I do not see why we should favor the creature that fits the form of life for creatures of its 
kind, instead of the creature that is better at obtaining food, wooing mates, and avoiding 
predators. 
 The worry, of course, is not about animals—but about people. An honest person is 
virtuous, according to Foot, because lying does not fit our natural form of life. She thus 
says that dishonesty is a defect in humans. I have suggested a way we might agree with 
her prior claim (that lying does not fit our natural form of life), but that nonetheless, it is 
wrong to call dishonesty a ‘defect’. Perhaps being dishonest can lead to a person’s 
flourishing more efficiently than being honest and adhering to the natural life of a human. 
Many politicians surely do well due to their dishonesty! My intuition is that there is no 
good reason to prefer pursuit of a natural life to pursuit of a life of flourishing (when the 
life of flourishing does not fit the natural form of life for members of that species). 
However, if we identify the virtues as those traits that promote flourishing, then we have 
abandoned a kind-relational moral theory, and instead, proposed an end or interest-
relational theory. 
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Judith Thomson’s moral theory equally struggles to answer the question of why 
we should care about having the traits she identifies as the virtues, without giving up on 
offering a purely kind-relational theory.  
According to Thomson, a feature, F, is a virtue in a kind, K, only if: 
(i) K is a goodness-fixing kind 
(ii) A K is as good a K as a K can be only if it has F 
(iii) It is possible for there to be a K that lacks F, and 
(iv) It is not nomologically impossible for there to be a K that has F. 
 
A virtue is a moral virtue in a K if the goodness that we are concerned with in condition 
(ii) is moral goodness.  That is, if F is a moral virtue, then (ii) reads: a K is as morally 
good a K as a K can be only if it has F.143 
Let us consider what Thomson would thus say about the moral virtue of honesty. 
First, according to Thomson, human being is a goodness-fixing kind, so condition (i) is 
met. Earlier, I suggested that there are reasons to be suspicious of this claim. Let us set 
those worries aside. Second, it looks as if it is possible for there to be humans that are not 
honest, and it is not nomologically impossible for a human to be honest (even the cynic 
will grant that!). So conditions (iii) and (iv) are met. Thus, whether honesty is a virtue 
hinges on whether or not it is true that a human is as morally good as a human can be 
only if that human is honest.   
The problem with this account is that for any particular human, that human will 
fall under many different kinds. Larry, for instance, is a person, a gangster, a golfer, a 
husband, a friend, a mammal, etc. What counts as a virtue relative to some of these kinds 
will not count as a virtue relative to others. Being empathetic and supportive of others is a 
virtue in a person, but not one in a gangster. Suppose that Larry is considering having a !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
143 Thomson (2008) p.73 
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surgery performed on his brain that will make him much less empathetic. We want to be 
able to say that he ought not have that surgery. However, Larry might note that the 
surgery will make him more virtuous, qua gangster, but less virtuous, qua person.  On 
what grounds could we insist that he ought to favor being virtuous qua person?  
Thomson predicts this worry, and offers the following solution. What we ought to 
do is avoid defect. When our having a trait would render us defective qua K1, and lacking 
that trait would render us defective qua K2 then what we ought to do is settled by 
appealing to whichever K is the more general, ‘super-kind’.  K1 is a super-kind of K2 if 
all members of K2 are necessarily members of K1.144 So in Larry’s case, since all 
gangsters are human,145 but not all humans are gangsters, gangster is the sub-kind, and 
human is the super-kind. Larry thus ought to avoid defect qua human, even if that means 
being a defective gangster.   
This reply is not successful; given some of the other moving parts of Thomson’s 
theory, it is easy to reconstruct the theoretical impasse. Her theory, after all, allowed for 
the introduction of complicated, even gerrymandered kinds. Let me introduce one such 
kind: Machiavellian-Politician-in-Training (or MPIT).146 I stipulate that (i) an MPIT is a 
goodness-fixing kind, (ii) it is a virtue in a MPIT that she be dishonest, and (iii) all 
persons are MPIT’s. Some might doubt that it is permissible for me to stipulate (iii),147 
but here is what I have in mind: To some extent, we all have the drive for power, and as 
we live our lives, we are all exposed to the fact that being ruthless and dishonest is a very !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
144 Ibid, p.212 
145 Of course, for it to be the case that all gangsters are necessarily human, we have to claim that 
it is impossible for there to be non-human gangsters. Consequently, it would be impossible for an 
alien like Jabba the Hut to exist. That is clearly false! We should thus understand Thomson as 
introducing a unique technical kind gangster* where only humans can be gangsters*.  
146 I am here rehearsing an objection given by David Copp (2010) pp.2-3.  
147 I have slightly amended Copp’s counterexample to make this stipulation more palatable.  
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efficient way to gain power. We are thus in training with respect to becoming 
Machiavellian politicians. Some of us are not as successful at cultivating our drive for 
power, or at learning how to do so most efficiently; some of us are so unsuccessful that 
we do not even aspire to become Machiavellian politicians! No matter, we are all 
nonetheless receiving the training. And since the standards for becoming a Machiavellian 
are impossibly high, even the most ruthless politicians are still in training (practice makes 
perfect, after all). Thus, all people are MPIT’s.  
The kind MPIT is not a super-kind relative to the kind person, but neither is the 
kind person a super-kind of MPIT. All people are MPITs, and all MPITs are people. By 
stipulation, an honest MPIT is a defective one. Suppose that yet again, Larry is 
considering brain surgery, this time that will make him less honest. This would make him 
a less virtuous person, but a more virtuous MPIT. On what grounds could we insist that 
he ought to favor being virtuous qua person? We are back at our theoretical impasse. 
Thomson might reply that while dishonesty is a virtue in a MPIT, it is not a moral 
virtue in a MPIT. Recall that to be a moral virtue, F must be such that a K cannot be as 
morally good a K as it can be unless it has F. Larry would not be as morally good a MPIT 
as he could be if he were dishonest, so honesty is a moral virtue both for a person, and for 
a MPIT. This reply, however, threatens to give up on the kind-relational commitments of 
this theory. Nothing about what it is to be a MPIT explains why it would be a moral 
virtue for a MPIT, to be honest. If we are inclined to agree that a morally virtuous MPIT 
is an honest MPIT, this says more about our estimation of honesty than it does about how 
we understand MPIT’s. The plausibility of Thomson’s moral theory would thus rest on 
our prior commitments to the goodness of honesty—and deep down, would not be 
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grounded in the nature of kinds. If on the other hand, we deny that honesty is a moral 
virtue in MPIT’s, we are left with the question: Why should Larry—or any of us for that 
matter—aim at being a morally virtuous person, instead of aiming at being a virtuous 
Machiavellian Politician In Training?  Thomson’s view either cannot answer this 
question, or in answering it, must give up on offering a purely kind-relational theory. 
e.) Final Assessment 
 I noted two obstacles for being a kind-relational theorist.  First, kind-relational 
views cannot explain why some goodness judgments give us the Odd Sounding Judgment 
Intuition. They leave it a mystery why some kinds are ‘goodness-fixing,’ while others are 
not. The most plausible ways to solve this mystery involve appealing to interests or goals.  
These answers amount to giving up on having a kind-relational view, since ultimately, it 
is the goals or interests, and not the kinds, that are doing the theoretical work. Second, I 
argued that a kind-relationalist would have difficulty developing a moral theory without 
abandoning her commitment to a kind-relational theory of goodness. More specifically, 
she would have trouble (i) justifying any substantive list of virtues, and (ii) motivating 
the claim that we ought to aim at developing those virtues. These considerations, while 
not fatal, do warrant our looking elsewhere for a more plausible account of goodness.  
 
III. Interest-Relational Goodness 
a) The View and its Proponents 
According to an interest-relational theory of goodness, a thing is good if and only 
if it promotes or is conducive to achieving some interest. Because the term ‘interest’ is 
ambiguous, there is more than one way to be an interest-relationalist. My discussion of 
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these views will focus on the writings of Paul Ziff, John Mackie, and Richard Kraut. But 
before going into any detail, let us disambiguate (at least some of) the notions that are 
expressed with the term ‘interest’.148 
On one understanding of ‘interest,’ it refers to a thing that a person in fact takes 
an interest in. This is the sense of the term used in the sentence:  “Woodworking is one of 
my interests.”  For lack of a better term, I will call this the subjective sense of ‘interest.’  
It is subjective because whether or not a sentence of the form “X is one of my interests” 
is true will be wholly determined by facts about the speaker’s attitudes. If we were to 
know all the speaker’s attitudes, we would also know all the interests she has. On another 
understanding of ‘interest,’ the term refers to a thing that is an advantage or benefit for a 
person. This is the sense of the term used in sentences like:  “It is in your child’s interest 
that she learn to play a musical instrument.” Whether this sentence is true or not does not 
turn on what the child likes; we might think that learning to play a musical instrument is 
in a child’s interest, even if the child hates everything about learning to play that 
instrument. I will call this the objective sense of ‘interest,’ because whether or not a 
sentence of the form “X is in my interest” is true will not be determined merely by facts 
about that speaker’s attitudes.149,150  
Because there are (at least) these two senses of ‘interest’—there are (at least) two 
corresponding interest-relational theories of goodness. The Subjective Interest Theory 
says that something is good if and only if it promotes something that a person is actually !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
148 Finlay coined the term ‘interest-relational’ in (2001)—however, the view he advanced under 
that label was actually an end-relational account of goodness. 
149 Several other philosophers make use of this distinction. See for instance:  Ziff (1960) pp.219-
20 , Mackie (1977) p.58, Railton (1986) pp.173-5, Finlay (2004) p.215. The labels ‘subjective’ 
and ‘objective’ come from Railton. 
 150 A person’s objective interest is often partially determined by her attitudes (for instance, in 
general, it is in a person’s objective interest to be able to pursue her subjective interests). 
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is interested in. The Objective Interest Theory says that something is good if and only if it 
promotes a person’s well-being. Mackie appears to be a proponent of the subjective 
interest theory; Kraut is a proponent of the objective interest theory. I will also consider a 
Hybrid Interest Theory—in the style of Peter Railton—that says that something is good if 
and only if it promotes something that a fully informed version of the agent would want 
the less informed agent to be interested in. Ultimately, I will argue that it is only the 
Objective Interest Theory that is a plausible alternative to an end-relational theory of 
goodness. 
It is a bit difficult to determine which banner we ought to place Ziff under. He 
clearly states that he takes goodness to be relative to interests.151 However, he also notes 
that ‘interest’ is multiply ambiguous. He writes: 
Something must be said about my use of the word ‘interest’. I mean to be 
using that word in an ordinary way. I shall assume you know what that is, 
that you are familiar with the word. Since the word has been used in 
extraordinary ways by philosophers it is, I suppose, necessary for me to 
disassociate myself from the tradition. I take it that interests, motives, 
wants, wishes, hopes, cravings, longings, likings, hankerings, and so on 
are all different (Paul Ziff, Semantic Analysis, 1960, p.219). 
 
He also says that by ‘interest’ he does not mean the same thing as ‘end’ either.152 I must 
confess that I am not sure what Ziff means by ‘interest’; both the subjective and the 
objective sense of interest that I discussed above seem to capture ‘ordinary ways’ in 
which we use the term. It is unclear which of these, if either, Ziff has in mind. However, I 
do not think it is vital that we resolve this issue here. What Ziff says about goodness can 
be equally used to motivate either the subjective or the objective interest-relational view.  
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
151 Ziff (1960) p. 215 
152 Ibid, p. 218!
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So let us simply bracket the question of which kind of theorist Ziff is, and focus only on 
what he says that can help us motivate the more plausible type of interest-relational view. 
b) The Motivation 
Ziff was extremely bothered by what I called the Odd Sounding Judgment 
Intuition. He noted that it sounded odd to speak of good pebbles, corpses, swamps, or 
Gila Monsters. On the other hand, there is nothing odd about speaking about good 
crystals, cadavers, pastures, or cats. This is very puzzling because, after all, the words 
‘cadaver’ and ‘corpse’ are two ways of picking out the same object—a dead body.  How 
could the way we describe something change whether or not that thing is good?   
He concluded that for something to be good is for it to promote or be conducive to 
an interest. Cadavers can be used for dissection. When we describe a dead body a 
‘cadaver,’ we indicate that we are thinking about the body in terms of how it can be used 
for the purpose of dissection. When we describe that same body as a ‘corpse,’ we do not 
indicate that we are thinking about the body in terms of any uses or interests at all.153 
An interest-theory can explain many phenomena that are quite puzzling on the 
kind-relationalist’s view. First, it can explain why some kinds are, in Thomson’s 
language, ‘goodness-fixing.’ When the kind term that we use to describe X makes salient 
an interest that we might promote with X, then that kind term names a goodness-fixing 
kind. It is the interest, not the kind, relative to which X is good. Further, this explains 
why so-called ‘functional kinds’ are the most obvious examples of goodness-fixing kinds. 
Functional kinds have essential functions, and those functions are the salient interest 
relative to which we judge their goodness. Second, an interest-relational view predicts 
that if the kind term that we use to describe X does not indicate some interest we might !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
153 Ziff (1960) p. 211 
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promote with X, then we will get the Odd Sounding Judgment Intuition. Since there is no 
salient interest that pebbles promote, it sounds odd to say ‘That is a good pebble.’  Yet, 
the interest-relational theory also predicts that we can discharge any oddness from how 
the judgment, ‘That is a good pebble’ sounds by first contextually indicating an interest 
that the pebble would serve. As even Thomson admits, if we stipulate that someone is 
looking for a pebble to fill a hole in the bottom of a flower pot, then there is nothing odd-
sounding if she says, upon discovery of a pebble, ‘Aha!  Now this is a good pebble!’ 154  
The most interesting prediction of the interest-relational theory is that even for 
goodness-fixing kinds, we should be able to contextually shift the standards relative to 
which we judge members of that kind. As it turns out, we can contextually shift the 
standards of evaluation for goodness-fixing kinds. Consider the kind: razor.155 I assume 
this is a goodness-fixing kind since it is a functional kind, and what it is to be a razor 
appears to set the standards of evaluation for the kind: a good razor should be sharp.  
However, suppose that your local theater group is staging a production of Sweeney Todd, 
the Demon Barber of Fleet Street, and it is your job to acquire all the necessary props for 
the play. One prop that you must acquire is the razor with which Sweeney Todd slits the 
throats of several of his barbershop’s customers. While shopping for the razor, someone 
might show you a very sharp razor, and you might truthfully exclaim: “No, no, no! That 
razor is no good!” Within normal contexts, a good razor is sharp, and the razor that was 
just shown to you would be good. Within the context of putting on the play, where 
presumably you do not want to put your actors at risk, a good razor is not sharp.  
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
154 Thomson (2008) p.22 
155 ‘Razor’ appear on von Wright’s list of examples of ‘instrumental goods’ (1963) p.8. 
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In Chapter One, I claimed that ‘good’ was a context-sensitive term like ‘tall.’ I 
suggested that both terms introduce standards of evaluation, and that these standards of 
evaluation were in some way supplied by context. The interest-relational view explains 
how we can use context to switch the standards of evaluation—we contextually indicate a 
new interest. What is really exciting about this is that the puzzle of goodness-fixing kinds 
and of the Odd Sounding Judgment Intuition both turn out to be consequences of the 
context sensitivity of the word ‘good.’ The interest-relational view thus has quite a lot of 
explanatory power! We certainly ought to prefer an interest-relational view to a kind-
relational one for this reason. 
c) Which Interest Theory? 
Having now shown that we ought to prefer an interest-relational theory to a kind-
relational one, we can now turn to the question:  Which interest theory is most plausible? 
As I hope to now show, the Subjective Interest Theory is untenable, and the Hybrid 
Interest view is really just an Objective Interest Theory in disguise. Consequently, the 
Objective Interest Theory is the only actually viable alternative to my end-relational 
theory. Objective theories, however, either conflict with our commonsense judgments 
about which things are good, or collapse into end-relational views. Either way, they are 
not more plausible than my end-relational theory of goodness.  
My argument against Subjective Interest Theories is brief. The Subjective view 
makes goodness too dependent on the contingent tastes of people. The following two 
scenarios seem possible to me, but cannot be accounted for on the Subjective view. First, 
everyone on Earth could lose interest in things that we would intuitively consider good. It 
is not hard to imagine a dystopian future where people have lost all interest in 
!! 155!
philosophy, literature, and art. According to the Subjective Interest Theory, then, 
philosophy, literature, and art would thus cease to be good things. That seems plainly 
false. Philosophy is a good thing, even if no one is in fact interested in it. Second, we can 
also imagine a future wherein everyone on Earth takes interest in something that is 
intuitively not good. Suppose that instead of pursuing philosophy, art, etc, people spend 
their time counting blades of grass.156 In that world, counting grass would be a good thing 
to do, according to the Subjective Interest Theory. But again, this seems clearly false.  
Intuitively, what is good and bad does not depend on the actual interests of people.   
The problem with the Subjective Theory is that it makes peoples’ attitudes 
sovereign—they cannot be mistaken about what is good because they determine what is 
good. Intuitively, however, they can be mistaken about what is good. To accommodate 
this intuition, we might decide to pursue a Hybrid Interest Theory. 
According to a Hybrid Interest Theory, a thing, X, is in a person, S’s interest (and 
thus good) if and only if a fully informed version of S would want the less informed 
version of herself to want X. This is, roughly, the definition for non-moral goodness 
offered by Peter Railton.157 The idea is this. A person can make mistakes about what is in 
her interests due to ignorance about (a) her situtation, (b) herself, and (c) the world. To 
borrow Railton’s example, suppose that Sandra is travelling and is not feeling great. She 
feels like drinking a glass of milk to settle her stomach. The Subjective Interest Theorist 
would say that her drinking the milk would be good, since doing so satisfies one of her 
interests. But suppose that what is making Sandra feel ill is dehydration. She does not 
know this, and she also does not know that drinking milk would aggravate her stomach !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
156 This is Rawls’ example (1971) pp.432-3. 
157 Railton, (1986) p.176 
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further. Were she to know these facts, says Railton, she would no longer want to act on 
her desire to drink milk. A fully informed version of Sandra would not want her 
uninformed self to want to drink milk. Drinking milk is thus, not in her interest, and on 
this view, thus not good.158 
I worry that this view is secretly an objective-interest theory in disguise. To 
motivate this suspicion, consider a slightly altered hybrid view. I call it the Anti-Nemesis 
View. According to the Anti-Nemesis View, X is in S’s interest, and thus good, if and 
only if, a fully informed nemesis of S would not want S to want X. I think that by 
contrasting Railton’s view with my Anti-Nemesis View we will notice a feature of 
Railton’s view that was not explicit, but that was doing a lot of work in his theory. In 
structure, our views are very similar. They both suggest that we can define goodness in 
relation to what a fully informed agent would choose for us. However, my view says we 
should avoid the things that the fully informed agent would choose for us, and Railton’s 
theory says we should favor the things that the fully informed agent would choose for us. 
Why this difference? Clearly, it is because our nemesis is not looking after our interest—
in fact, she wants to frustrate our interests. This reveals a background assumption of 
Railton’s view: that the fully informed version of yourself has your interest at heart. This 
raises a worry—how do we characterize the difference in preferences between Railton’s 
benevolent fully informed agent, and my malevolent fully informed nemesis? I just put it 
in terms of ‘interest’—but that would render the theory viciously circular (X is in your 
interest if and only if a fully informed person with your interest at heart would want you 
to want it).  
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
158 Ibid, pp.174-5 
!! 157!
We could, instead, say that my fully informed self wants what’s good for me, and 
my nemesis does not—but this requires that facts about what is good for me are 
independent and prior to what the informed agent chooses. It is unclear, then, what role is 
left for the informed agent to play in this theory. It appears that all she does is (a) use her 
full information to recognize what is good for me, and due to her motivation to promote 
my interests, (b) she wants that I would want those things that are good for me. We could 
eliminate the middleman and simply say that there is a list of things that are in my 
interests, and something is good if and only if it promotes one of those interests. This is 
precisely what the Objective Interest Theory of goodness says! 
I conclude that the Hybrid Theory is really an objective interest theory in disguise. 
I will now consider the virtues and vices of the Objective Interest Theory. 
d) Virtues and Vices of the View 
 The Objective Interest Theory states that if X is good, this is because it promotes 
a creature’s objective interests, or well-being. Consequently, this view very handily 
accounts for the connection between goodness and reasons. Nothing fanciful must be said 
to show that I have reasons to favor X when X promotes my well-being! And insofar as I 
am motivated to promote my own well-being, learning that X is good would motivate me 
to favor X.  This gives us a very simple account of the connection between goodness and 
motivation. I think these are the strongest of the interest-relational theory’s virtues. 
Another virtue of the interest-relational view is that it would be difficult to pin the 
Too Much Goodness Objection on it. The range of possible good things is actually quite 
restricted on the interest-relational view. One might wonder, however, if that range is too 
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restricted. Are there things that are good that are not related to a creature’s well-being? If 
so, the interest-relational theory might fall prey to the Too Little Goodness Objection. 
 For instance, there are a variety of skills that one might possess that would make 
that person good at thieving. Intuitively, a person with those skills would make a good 
thief. But, we might notice, thieving does not promote anyone’s well-being. So interest-
relational theories cannot say there are good thieves. Similar things can be said about 
good murder weapons, good torture implements, and good doomsday devices.159 None of 
these things contribute to creatures’ well-beings, so the interest-relational theory must say 
there are no good murder weapons, etc. But clearly an undetectable swarm of nano-bots 
that can cause a person to have a stroke would be a good murder weapon. If an interest-
relational theory denies that there are good murder weapons, thieves, etc, then it is 
susceptible to the Too Little Goodness Objection. 
When I raised this worry to Kraut in personal correspondence, he agreed that he 
was too quick to say that there cannot be such a thing as a good thief.160 He said: 
Did I say that there is no such thing as a good thief? If so, I wish I 
hadn’t. What I would like to say is this: There are times when theft is 
justified. A good thief needs to know when theft is justified, not merely 
how to accomplish an act of thievery. It may be that, by common 
standards, all it takes to be a good thief is to have the skills needed to 
accomplish acts of thievery. But I think our standards should be higher 
than that. A good thief would know when to thieve, and not merely how 
to. 
 
Kraut is here distinguishing between a morally good thief, and an efficient thief.  And 
while he says that our standards should be ‘higher’ than demanding that a good thief is 
merely an efficient thief, what he does not say is that the ‘common standards’ are !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
159 Finlay also uses the examples of doomsday devices to argue against interest-relational views 
(2014) p.31. Kraut also discusses the goodness of instruments of torture, though as you will see, 
not as a counterexample to interest-relational views (2007) p.270.  
160 Kraut (2007) p.270 
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insufficient. There can be a good thief that is just someone who thieves well. Similar 
things might be said about murder weapons, doomsday devices, etc.161 There can be good 
murder weapons if they are efficient at achieving the goal or function of murder weapons.  
We can distinguish this from the claim that it is morally good that there are murders or 
murder weapons. 
I find Kraut’s response unsatisfactory for two reasons. First, pursuing this answer 
comes at a great theoretical cost. The interest-relational theorist who adopts this view is 
no longer offering a unified account of goodness.162 Now she has goodness relative to 
interests, and goodness relative to functions, without any obvious answer what it is that 
these two types of goodness share such that it makes sense to call them both ‘good.’ She 
thus gives up the Thesis of Commonality. Second, and more worrying for the interest-
theorist, is that once we introduce a ‘functional’ sense of good (and stretch it to cover 
things like thieves), we now have the theoretical tools available to give a unified theory 
of goodness that is no longer an interest-relative theory of goodness. We might now 
adopt an end-relational theory of goodness that covers all the things that the interest 
theory did before. So, things that promote well-being (like health, art appreciation, 
friendship, etc) might be good because there is an end that is of flourishing, and they 
promote that end. That is to say, if we extend our notion of ‘functional goodness’ beyond 
the few problematic cases that it is meant to resolve –and I see no principled reason not 
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161 Kraut denies this. He claims that, “A torture instrument… can be a good one, only if torture 
can be justified in terms of the harm it avoids” (2007) p.270. Again, this sounds to me like it 
would be a morally good torture instrument, but that there are also end-relationally good torture 
instruments. 
162 Finlay (2014) pp.32-3 
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to—interest-relational goodness simply becomes a subset of ‘functional goodness.’  
Functional goodness is just end-relational goodness.163   
e) Final Assessment 
 Although it is hardly a decisive point against the interest-relational theorist, their 
inability to offer a unified theory of goodness that allows that there are good thieves, 
murder weapons, etc counts against the plausibility of the view. If a theory of goodness 
can explain all the cases that the interest theory does and can explain why there are good 
murder weapons, then, other things being equal, this theory would be more plausible than 
an interest-relational theory. I believe an end-relational theory is just such a theory. 
 
IV. End-Relational Goodness 
a) The View and its Proponents 
 According to an end-relational theory, something is good if and only if it 
promotes an end.  As stated in the previous chapters, I favor an end-relational account of 
goodness.  As such, my view is very similar to that of Stephen Finlay, who also defends 
an account of goodness where goodness is relative to ends. It is worth stressing that his 
view and mine disagree on some important points. For that reason, I dedicate the next 
chapter to spelling out the details of both our views, giving special emphasis to the points 
where they differ. My discussion here will be a fairly brief sketch of the motivation, 
virtues, and vices of end-relational views in general.   
b) The Motivation for the View !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
163 It should come as no surprise that Finlay and I agree on this point (2014) p.32. Anyone 
offering a unified view of goodness must claim that, deep down, judgments that appear to ascribe 
a different kind of goodness (relational or not) must really be ascribing that theorist’s preferred 
type of goodness.  
!! 161!
 End-relational views have all the explanatory power that interest-relational views 
have. Like interest-relational views, it has a simple way of answering the question that 
plagued kind-relational views, namely, why is it that certain kinds have good members, 
and others do not. The answer for the end-relationalist is that some kinds have salient 
ends associated with them, so good members of those kinds are ones that promote the 
salient end associated with the kind. A good hammer is one that is good at driving nails—
unless we make some other end contextually salient. There are no salient ends for 
swamps, pebbles, and corpses—so there are no good swamps, pebbles or corpses. Like 
the interest-relational view, this view predicts that ‘good’ will be context sensitive—we 
can switch the standards by which someone is evaluating X by contextually indicating 
different ends relative to which we should judge X. 
One issue that is thus central to developing an end-relational view is how we 
should define ‘ends.’  Finlay and I disagree upon this point. We both agree, however, that 
the notion of ends is broader than that of interests. Roughly, ends are things that people 
could be interested in.164 As such, an end-relational theory can explain all the cases that 
an interest-relational theory can, and more. So for instance, both an objective interest 
theory and an end-relational theory would preserve our judgment that Guernica is a good 
painting even if everyone stopped being interested in viewing or producing paintings. 
Unlike the objective interest-relational theory, however, an end-relational theory of 
goodness also preserves our judgment that there are good murder weapons, thieves, and 
doomsday devices—even though we all agree that it is wrong to murder, steal, or bring 
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about the end of the world. The main motivation for adopting an end-relational view, 
then, is that it is an extremely flexible theory that explains a wide range of cases. 
c) Virtues and Vices 
One potential objection to end-relational views is that they fall prey to the Too 
Much Goodness objection. The thought is this. If ends are simply things that people could 
be interested in, then ends are abundant and it will likely be possible to imagine an end 
relative to which even a plate of mud would be good.165 But plates of mud are not good, 
and it is a big bullet to bite if an end-relational view says that they are. That is, even if it 
is the case that we can think of an end relative to which a plate of mud is good, it is just 
not the case that a plate of mud is truly good.  There is a special type of goodness—and 
plates of mud are not good in this way. Let’s call this the Special Good Things Intuition. 
If my opponent means that a plate of mud is (a) not good for its own sake, or that 
it (b) does not give us any basic reasons for acting, then I would agree: a plate of mud is 
not good in those ways. My view would be absurd if it said that everything that is good 
gives us basic reasons for acting. A doomsday device might be good relative to the goal 
of destroying the world, but its goodness relative to that goal is no reason to build such a 
device! So, while there will be at least one goal relative to which a plate of mud is good, 
it is unlikely that this goal will be one that gives us reasons to act. Plates of mud (and 
doomsday devices) are just not good in that special way. 
Nevertheless, as I argued in the last chapter, my view can accommodate the fact 
that we will of course expect our theory of goodness to be able to distinguish the good 
things that we have reasons to adopt, pursue, and favor from those that we do not.  My 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
165 I pursue this objection in more detail in the next chapter. 
!! 163!
view handles this not by claiming that certain things are intrinsically good, but by saying 
that there is some special set of goals, and the things that are good relative to those goals 
deserve a privileged position in our practical lives. So, even though on my view all things 
are good, there is still room to preserve our intuition that there is are special good things.  
 
V. Conclusion 
The question I have been considering in this chapter is the following: What is the 
most plausible unified account of goodness? I argue that kind-relational views have 
problems explaining why we have the Odd Sounding Judgment Intuition when we try to 
attribute goodness to certain kinds. Kind-relational views will also have difficulty 
constructing truly kind-relational moral theories. It is natural to think that a kind-
relational moral theory will be constructed around the notion of a good person or a good 
life—which appear to be paradigm cases of kind-relational goods.  I argued, however, 
that to do the work of grounding a plausible moral theory, we need to interpret ‘good 
person’ or ‘good life’ in non-kind-relational ways.  
Interest-relational views have an answer to why we have the Odd Sounding 
Judgment Intuition when we attribute goodness to certain kinds, but ultimately, they are 
too narrow. The most plausible versions of interest-relational views of goodness are 
committed to saying that there are no good murder weapons or doomsday devices. End-
relational views, I conclude, are thus the most plausible accounts.  I hope to reinforce this 
conclusion in the next chapter, where I scrutinize two end-relational views. 
 
 
!! 164!
Chapter Five – My End-Relational Theory of Goodness 
 
 
 
 
I. Introduction 
 Having settled that an end-relational theory of goodness is the most plausible 
relational theory, the last task remaining for me to complete is to develop and defend my 
preferred end-relational account of goodness in greater detail. The most general statement 
of an end-relational account of goodness is that such a theory claims that when predicated 
of a thing, ‘good’ ascribes to that thing a particular relation that holds between it and an 
end.166  To further elaborate and clarify the view, an end-relational theorist needs to 
answer the following three questions: 
a) What kind of things can stand in the goodness relation with ends? 
b) What are ends? 
c) What is the nature of the goodness relation? 
In the process of answering these questions, I will be comparing my view with that of 
Stephen Finlay.167 I focus on his view because it is the most developed end-relational 
theory that can be found in the literature. Although our views share many similarities, as I 
read him, Finlay disagrees with me over how we ought to answer each of the above 
questions. As such, Finlay offers a substantially different end-relational theory of 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
166 For ease of discussion, I will simply call this “the goodness relation.”  
167 I had already developed much of my own view when I learned of Finlay’s then forthcoming 
book (2014) wherein he more fully develops an end-relational account of goodness. Lucky for 
me, he and I disagree about a few key aspects of how best to develop an end-relational theory. I 
am truly indebted to him, as his book served as a foil as I worked on the remaining details of my 
view. 
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goodness from the one that I prefer. In what follows, I will argue that where our theories 
disagree, it is my theory that is more plausible. 
 
II.  What things can be good? 
 The first aspect of my end-relational view of goodness that I wish to elucidate is 
what kind (or kinds) of things can stand in the goodness relation to ends. My inclination 
is to take seriously the vast variety of objects that feature in our goodness judgments. We 
judge all of the following as good: physical objects (e.g. knives, umbrellas, parking 
spaces, diamonds), people, other living things, places, actions, events, states of affairs, 
abstract entities such as properties or relations (e.g. beauty, justice, being loved), 
imaginary characters, possible worlds, etc. In short, there seems to be no restriction on 
what kind of things to which we can ascribe goodness. I thus see no reason for my theory 
of goodness to limit what types of things can stand in the goodness relation to ends. In 
short, I understand ‘things’ as broadly as possible when I say that ‘good’ ascribes to a 
thing a relation that holds between it and an end. 
 In fact, my account of goodness not only says that all kinds of things can be good, 
but says that all things are in fact good (in some way or another). This might seem 
counterintuitive, or worst still, it might invite the complaint that my account of goodness 
falls prey to the Too Much Goodness Objection discussed in the last chapter. Surely there 
are things that are not good! Some things, like plates of mud, do not seem to be good 
because they serve no known interests.168 Other things, like doomsday devices, do not 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
168 G.E.M. Anscombe introduced the example of a “saucer of mud” (1957) pp.70-1. 
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seem to be good in any way because they are contrary to all interests.169 But we need to 
remember that end-relational goodness comes cheaply. If we can point to an end that a 
thing promotes, then that thing is good in relation to that end. Because end-relational 
goodness comes cheaply, accepting that all things are good in some way does not require 
biting any bullets. In fact, there is a quick and clever argument that proves that goodness 
does come cheaply, and thus all things are good: If it were it true that something (a plate 
of mud or a doomsday device, for example) was not good in any way, it would be a good 
counterexample to the claim ‘All things are good in some way.’ So it would be good in a 
way. Thus, it is impossible for something to fail to be good in a way. That is, all things 
are good.170 
 I take it that when someone claims that a plate of mud or doomsday device is not 
really good, this is not because she denies that there are ends that those things promote.  
She could grant me that.171 Her concern might remain: that there are some things that we 
ought to favor or promote because they are good, and plates of mud and torture devices 
are not good in that way.172 The Too Much Goodness Objection, if it is to have teeth, 
must concern itself with the special subset of the set of good things.  It must say that it is 
objectionable if a theory of goodness is too permissive in regards to ascribing this special 
kind of goodness to things. My view does not commit me to the claim that everything is 
good in this special way. In fact, my view does not commit me to any definitive answer 
as to which things are good in this special way. At the end of Chapter Three, I sketched !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
169 Finlay also uses this example to make this point (2014) p.31. 
170 Stephen Finlay, Judith Thomson, and I have each independently arrived at a version of this 
argument. See Finlay (2001), p.73 and Thomson (2008), p.10. 
171 A person who knew enough about doomsday devices to say that they are not good in any way 
presumably understands what end doomsday devices serve. She just believes, correctly, that the 
destruction of all life on Earth is a horrible goal for one to pursue. 
172 Richard Kraut raised the concern in this way in personal correspondence.!
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one way my view might account for the fact that some ends are worthy of our promoting 
them, while others are not. That sketch provided a framework from which we could 
discuss the substantive question of what is good in that special way. It did not, however, 
commit me to any substantive answers to the question. This is to say that my view does 
not fall prey to the Too Much Goodness Objection. 
 Finlay disagrees with me about what the bearers of goodness are. He argues that 
the bearers of goodness are not things in the broadest sense of the term, but states of 
affairs.173 Finlay arrives at this conclusion because he is interested in finding a deep 
unifying syntax that is shared by all sentences that predicate goodness to something.174 
He notes that two of the most common types of sentences used to express goodness 
judgments, however, appear to be too different to share a unifying syntax: 
 (Type 1)   X is good. 
 (Type 2)   It is good that X. 
The problem for a unified syntax is that X appears to be the subject of sentences of Type 
1, but not of Type 2.175   
 To quickly summarize Finlay’s discussion, he argues that sentences of Type 1 are 
elliptical for “X is good for Sa to ϕ,” where ‘Sa’ refers to an agent, and ‘ϕ’ represents an 
action.176 This interpretation captures the intuitive idea that to say that X is good is to say 
that X is good for someone to do something with. Finlay proposes that the phrase ‘For Sa 
to ϕ’ is itself elliptical for a complete sentence.  It is elliptical because  ‘ϕ’ is an 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
173 Finlay, (2014) pp.26-8 
174 Ibid, p.22 
175 Ibid, p.26 
176 Ibid, p.26 
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incomplete predicate that requires a noun phrase to complete it.177  The noun phrase that 
completes the predicate, he argues, is X itself.178  For instance, on this picture, 
“Chocolate is good” is elliptical for “Chocolate is good for a person to eat 
[chocolate].”179 Eating is always the eating of something, but we do not normally say the 
word ‘chocolate’ twice because it is clear from context that the object of the action of 
eating is chocolate.  So in general, Type 1 sentences can be analyzed as having the 
following form:  
  G1:  X is good for Sa to ϕ X180  
 Finally, he notes that many English sentences include a ‘dummy subject’ like ‘it’ 
(e.g. “It is raining”), which simply serves as a placeholder to render the sentence 
grammatical. The presence of the dummy subject does not contribute to the meaning of 
the sentence. For this reason, some English sentences feature subject-movement—where 
the subject of the sentence moves away from the front of the sentence and is replaced by 
a dummy subject—with no change in the meaning of those sentences.181 For instance, the 
sentence “Bill ate a sandwich” can be expressed as “It is the case that Bill ate a 
sandwich” with no change of meaning. He thus proposes that we insert such a dummy 
subject into the analysis of Type 1 sentences give above, resulting in: 
  G2:  It is good for Sa to ϕ X182 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
177 Ibid, p.21 
178 Ibid, p.26!
179 One might notice that nothing about the target sentence, ‘Chocolate is good,’ indicates that we 
should substitute the word ‘eating’ in for ‘ϕ’.  However, later in the book, Finlay gives a 
pragmatic explanation of why we can assume ‘Chocolate is good,’ is about eating, that is, unless 
some other clues in the context make another action (smearing on one’s face, for instance) more 
salient.  !
180 Ibid, p.25 
181 Ibid, p.27 
182 Ibid, p.27 
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 This analysis, he claims, applies to sentences of Type 2 as well—thus giving us a 
unifying syntax for both types of sentence.183 But how well does it really handle 
sentences of Type 1? According to this analysis “Chocolate is good” has the same 
meaning as “It is good that one eats chocolate.” But that does not seem right. The target 
sentence, intuitively, ascribes goodness to chocolate. The proposed paraphrase, 
intuitively, ascribes goodness to an activity that people might do. The dummy subject 
appears to be altering the meaning of the sentence—indicating that the analysis does not 
adequately handle sentences of Type 1.   
 Finlay predicts this objection, and adds some more machinery to his analysis to 
handle it.184 I will discuss this machinery, and Finlay’s reply, when I give his final 
analysis in the next section.  What is important for the current discussion is that according 
to Finlay’s analysis, goodness is predicated not of X itself, but of the potential state of 
affairs of Sa’s ϕ-ing of X. According to Finlay, it is potential states of affairs, not things 
in general, that are the bearers of goodness. 
 I find it a bit surprising that Finlay claims that only states of affairs can be bearers 
of goodness, especially in light of the fact that he offers a version of the reductio 
argument I gave above to show that all things are good in some way. According to his 
view, it is not literally true that all things are good in way (because only states of affairs 
can be good). So it is odd that he offers a reductio argument to support the claim that all 
things are good in some way.  
 Perhaps because he recognizes this tension, Finlay addresses the putative 
goodness of things in an appendix. There, he argues that his view can “accommodat[e] !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
183 Ibid, p.27!
184 Ibid, p.27 
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the common intuition that the goodness of objects is often prior to and explanatory of the 
goodness of states of affairs.”185 His claim is, roughly, that that the goodness of a state of 
affairs, A, depends on how it relates to some relevant contrast class.186 Often, there will 
be some choice over which dimensions of comparison it is relative to which we are 
evaluating A. Suppose, for instance, that we judge that (1) it is good that Jones uses that 
hammer, to drive those nails, through that kind of lumber. If we express judgment (1) 
with the sentence, “That is a good hammer,” we signal that the relevant contrast class is 
the one where Jones is still interested in driving those nails through that kind of lumber, 
but uses a tool other than that hammer to do it.  Alternatively, we could express (1) with 
the sentence, “Those are good nails.” Our choosing to express (1) this way signals that 
we mean that it is good that Jones uses those nails, and not some other nails. In both these 
cases, it was the presence or the absence of an object that made the difference between 
the state of affairs that we are calling good and the contrast class. We can thus explain the 
difference between these states of affairs by appealing to features of the object—the so-
called ‘goodness-making’ features. Appealing to those properties of the hammer thus 
explains why it is good that Jones uses that hammer. This, says Finlay, accommodates 
our intuition that it is the hammer, and not Jone’s use of the hammer, that is good.187  
 I agree that Finlay’s discussion goes some way towards accommodating the 
intuition that objects can be bearers of goodness, but does it go far enough? We can 
actually use the original reductio argument from above to create a new argument against 
Finlay’s claim that only states of affairs can be good. Suppose, for the sake of a reductio, 
that it were the case that only states of affairs could be good. If that were so, then !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
185 Ibid, p.46 
186 More on this point in Section IV.!
187 Ibid, pp.46-7 
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ordinary objects like plates of mud could not be good. It follows that a plate of mud 
would be a good counterexample to the claim that ‘All things are good in some way.’ 
Thus the plate of mud is good in a way:  as a counterexample. The claim that only states 
of affairs can be good leads to a contradiction, and thus, should be rejected. 
 Finlay would likely reply that a plate of mud is not literally good, nor is it literally 
good as a counterexample. It is the state of affairs of my using a plate of mud as an 
example that we can evaluate as either good or not. But this reply blurs the distinction 
between the thing that is the counterexample, and the event of someone giving that 
counterexample. This distinction is important; there are times when you have a good 
counterexample, but it is not good for you to give that counterexample (for instance, in a 
quarrel with one’s significant other, even if one has a very effective counterexample to 
something her significant other said, often it will only aggravate the quarrel further if one 
gives that counterexample). A counterexample can be good, and so can the giving of a 
counterexample. On the assumption that only states of affairs are good, however, a plate 
of mud is literally not good in any way. It would thus be a good counterexample to the 
claim that ‘All things are good in some way,’ even if no one ever gives it as a 
counterexample. The contradiction remains, and thus, we ought to reject the claim that 
only states of affairs can be good. 188 
 This argument can be generalized. Suppose, for the sake of a reductio, that only 
some restricted class of things can be good. Pick a thing, X, that falls outside of that !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
188 There is a popular view that claims that states of affairs are the only bearers of intrinsic 
goodness. See, for instance, Chisholm (1986), Audi (1997), and Zimmerman (2001). I deny that 
anything is intrinsically good (Chapter Three). However, if we understand their claims as being 
about a special kind of end-relational goodness that we should take interest in and promote, then 
my view is compatible with theirs. I do not say anything about what kinds of things can be the 
bearers of that special kind of goodness. I allow that states of affairs can be good, so it remains 
possible on my view that only states of affairs have this special kind of goodness. 
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class. Thus, X is not the kind of thing that can be good, so it is not good in way. If X is 
not good, then it is a good counterexample to the claim that ‘All things are good in some 
way.’ If X is a good counterexample, then X is good in some way. We have a 
contradiction, so we need to reject our initial assumption. That is, it is not the case that 
only some restricted class of things can be good.  
 I conclude that it is a mistake to claim that there are any restrictions on the types 
of things that can be good.  Finlay’s account of end-relational goodness places 
restrictions on what things can be good; mine does not.  This is one reason to favor my 
view over his.   
 
III. What are ends? 
 It is with regard to how we define ends that Finlay’s and my accounts of goodness 
are most similar. Finlay uses ‘end’ as a “term of art for any proposition conceived as a 
potential outcome.”189  To put it more succinctly, ends are potential states of affairs. 
I too think that ends are potential states of affairs. However, as I understand him, an end 
can be any state of affairs. This is not so for ends as I understand them. To illustrate the 
way our views come apart, I need to talk first talk a bit about two different kinds of 
attitudes: desires and intentions.   
 Both desires and intentions have objects—that is, a desire is always a desire for 
something, but an intention is always the intention to do something. Thus, intentions are 
different than desires. How so? Where desires differ from intentions, I contend, is in their 
satisfaction conditions; a desire is easier to satisfy than an intention. Consider for 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
189 Finlay (2014), p.32 
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instance, that I have the desire that my friends Alex and Casey start dating, and I intend 
to bring it about that they start dating. My plan is to invite both to a dinner party, sit them 
next to one another, and steer the conversation towards topics I know they both share an 
interest in. Days before my party happens, though, Alex and Casey meet in the Science 
Fiction section of a used bookstore. They begin chatting about their favorite Sci-Fi 
authors, and eventually move to discussing things over coffee, and then dinner. After 
dinner, Alex gives Casey her phone number; they have started dating.  My impression of 
this story is that this is a scenario where my desire, that Alex and Casey start dating, has 
been satisfied. My intention, however, has not. I planned on having a hand in bringing 
these two friends together—but I played no role in it.190  
 It might be pointed out that the reason my intention is more difficult to satisfy is 
that my intention was that I bring it about that Casey and Alex start dating, while my 
desire was merely that they start dating. Had my intention been merely that they start 
dating, it would have been satisfied alongside my desire. This reply, however, threatens 
to erase any distinction between desires and intentions. Allow me to put it in another 
way: I have lots of desires, some of which are incompatible. For instance, I desire to 
finish this chapter, but I also desire to go out with friends. It is not possible that I do both 
(at least, not this evening), so I must choose which desire I will act on. Once I have 
chosen to finish this chapter that becomes my intention. It is my intention because I plan 
on acting in such a way as to bring about that the state of affairs that I desire obtains. I 
contend that intentions are always intentions to bring about that P, whereas a desire can !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
190 I am drawing extensively from Michael Bratman’s so-called ‘planning theory of intentions.’ 
According to Bratman, intentions are a distinct type of mental state that is used to direct future 
action. Having an intention to X involves having a plan (even a partial plan) for how one will go 
about doing X. This view is developed in (1987). 
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simply be for P. Thus, even if I say that “I intend that Casey and Alex start dating,” this 
should be understood as elliptical for, “I intend to bring about that Casey and Alex start 
dating.”  
 What should we say if instead we considered the case where I have both the 
intention and the desire to bring it about that Casey and Alex start dating? Again, the 
desire is easier to satisfy because the intention involves some plan of action. Returning to 
the example, suppose that both Casey and Alex went to the used bookstore due to my 
recommendation of the Sci-Fi section there.  It is mere coincidence that they go at the 
same time, meet, start to chat, and (eventually) begin dating. My desire to bring it about 
that they start dating has been satisfied. Again, my intention has not. I intended to bring it 
about that they start dating by way of a plan (that they come over for dinner, etc). 
Intentions necessarily involve plans for how to bring about the object of the intention—
desires do not.  
 I can now explain the difference between my account of ends and Finlay’s. On 
Finlay’s account, ends are states of affairs. Every end, in Finlay’s sense, can be the object 
of a desire. However, it is not the case that every end in Finlay’s sense can be the object 
of an intention. Some of the ends that he has in mind are simply outcomes—they are just 
that certain events occur.  The ending of the war in Iraq is an end on Finlay’s account.  
As I wish to define them, ends are only those states of affairs that can be the object of an 
intention. My view would thus say that the ending of the war in Iraq is not an ‘end’; I 
cannot intend that the war in Iraq ends. I can, however, intend to do my part in bringing it 
about that the war in Iraq ends. On my view, my bringing it about that the war ends is an 
end, but the war’s ending is not. Perhaps this is why I prefer the term ‘goal’ over the 
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word ‘end’ as a way to refer to the relevant notion. On my view, ends involve plans for 
action—and ‘goal’ seems to better capture that. Regardless, I will continue to ‘goals’ and 
‘ends’ interchangeably—what I mean by these terms is the possible object of an 
intention. 
 There is not much to say in this section about why we ought to think of ends as 
plans for action instead of mere outcomes. As we shall see, the way that I characterize 
ends does play an important role in explaining the nature of the goodness relation. For the 
most part, I believe that the reason to prefer my characterization of ends over Finlay’s is 
due to the way it supports my account of the nature of the goodness relation. There is, 
however, one minor point that I believe weighs in favor of my account of ends. 
 On Finlay’s view, since ends are just states of affairs, and since the bearers of 
goodness are states of affairs, it turns out that one and the same end can be good relative 
to itself. Goodness is sometimes a reflexive relation. My drinking a beer, for instance, is 
good relative to the goal of my drinking a beer. That is a strange consequence of Finlay’s 
characterization of ends. 
 Finlay argues that this consequence is not a bullet to bite. Quite to the contrary, 
the fact that e promotes e explains the locution, said of an end, that it is ‘good for its own 
sake.’ Of course, if that is what it means for something to be good for its own sake, we 
have the bizarre consequence that every e is good for its own sake!  Why then, would we 
ever talk about something’s being good for its own sake (if it is trivial that everything is 
good for its own sake)?191  Finlay’s answer, again, is pragmatics. To say that an end is 
good for its own sake can signal that that end is one that you desire for its own sake, and 
not for the sake of some further end. We also sometimes talk of an end being good for its !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
191 Finlay discusses this objection on Ibid, p.202 
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own sake to moralize—to convince others that they too ought aim at this end.192 For the 
most part, I find these pragmatic explanations compelling—but I cannot help but shake 
the feeling that there is something odd about the fact that on Finlay’s view, an end can be 
good relative to itself. 
 For what it is worth, my view does not have that consequence. As I understand 
ends, they are abstract plans. Intuitively, an abstract plan cannot promote the achievement 
of itself.  My having the plan, my acting on the plan, etc can bring about the achievement 
of the plan—but the plan itself cannot. So, on my view, nothing is good for the sake of 
itself in the way that Finlay discusses.   
 This is not to say that my view does not have its own trivial judgments about 
goodness. Say my goal is very simple—waving ‘Hello’ to a friend. The plan would 
consequently be simple as well: the best way to promote this goal is for me to simply 
wave hello to a friend. It sounds a bit silly to say that waving hello to your friend is good 
relative to the goal of waving hello to your friend, but we have to be clear about what this 
sentence really means. According to my view that sentence expresses the proposition: the 
activity of waving hello promotes (in the relevant respect) the achievement of the plan to 
wave to your friend. This is long-winded; but not so very absurd.  
 Again, the criticism of Finlay’s account of ends is mostly a quibble. Where our 
accounts of ends gain or lose plausibility, is in which answers they support to the 
question, ‘What is the nature of the goodness relation?’ I turn to that question now. 
 
 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
192 Ibid, pp.202-4!
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IV.  What is the nature of the goodness relation? 
 The greatest difference between my view and Finlay’s is how we characterize the 
goodness relation. I contend that his account of the goodness relation gets things wrong 
in certain scenarios. That is, his view commits him to (a) saying that some things are 
good relative to G, when intuitively, they are not good relative to G, and (b) saying that 
some things are not good relative to G, when intuitively, they are good relative to G. This 
is the primary reason I believe we ought to prefer my view to his. 
 That we disagree about the goodness relation should not be too surprising. There 
is a lot of room for disagreement on this issue, given that for any two relata there are 
many (innumerable?) relations that can hold between them. The end-relational theorist 
believes that one of these relations that can hold between two (or more) relata is the 
goodness relation, but which one? What is the nature of this relation? That is, what 
differentiates this relation from all the other relations up there in ‘Plato’s heaven’?  I will 
consider three plausible candidates. 
a) Achieving e 
 The first answer that might spring to one’s mind, given that we are talking about a 
way in which things relate to ends, is that the goodness relation is that of achieving some 
end. According to this view, to say that X is good is to say that X achieves some end e.193  
This certainly seems to get things right in a large number of cases: A good steak knife is 
one that achieves the end of cutting meat into bite-sized pieces. A good paperweight is 
one that achieves the end of keeping papers on one’s desk, even if a significant breeze 
blows over it. Examples abound. !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
193 In earlier versions of his theory, Finlay defended an achievement view of goodness. He called 
it a ‘satisfaction’ view. See Finlay (2001), p.74 & (2004), p.214. 
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 But for a variety of reasons, this relation is too strong to be the goodness relation.  
For one, there are many things that achieve ends, but are intuitively not good relative to 
those ends. I can cut a steak up with a chainsaw—but the result is not pretty. Similarly, I 
could, with enough time and patience, fell a redwood tree using only a butter knife.  
Intuitively, however, a butter knife is not good for cutting down redwood trees, nor is a 
chainsaw good for cutting steak.   
 Second, there are things that merely contribute to the achievement of ends that are 
not themselves sufficient for the achievement of those ends (partial causes, tools, 
background conditions, etc) that are nonetheless good relative to these ends. For instance, 
a mild, sunny day might be good relative to the end of our enjoying a bike ride—but it is 
certainly not sufficient. Without a bike our ride would not happen, no matter how 
pleasant the weather is!  
 Third, it also seems clear that many things are good, even if they never in fact 
achieve or help achieve e. The following story seems perfectly unobjectionable:   
Samurai:  A virtuous samurai was awarded, in recognition of his virtue, 
the finest sword in the world. It had all the virtues of a top-quality sword:  
it was extremely sharp, light, and could be swung swiftly with ease. The 
virtuous samurai, however, never engaged in battle, preferring instead to 
use well-reasoned arguments to convince his enemies of the errors of their 
evil ways. He was so successful that he never used the sword.   
 
Despite the fact that the sword is never used in battle, it remains true that the sword is 
good. But if goodness is the relational property of achieving e, this sword is not good. 
 Similarly, suppose there is a sword very much like the one described in Samurai, 
except with one minor flaw. There is a tiny, imperceptible imperfection on the blade that, 
if struck just right with a very hard material, would snap the blade in two. The odds of 
this happening are extremely unlikely. In an overwhelming number of cases, then, this 
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blade would achieve e. Isn’t this still a good sword? I believe that we should say that it is.  
If so, then we should also be willing to say that it is good, even if due to some 
outrageously bad luck someone were to strike the weak-spot in just the right way and 
split the sword in two. In that scenario, it would be a good sword that just so happens to 
fail to achieve e. But if goodness is the relational property of achieving e, this sword is 
not good.  
 Finally, goodness comes in degrees; achievement of e does not. We frequently 
compare the goodness of things, ranking one thing as better, worse, or equally good as 
another.194 The achievement view can make sense of two things being equally good: they 
both achieve e.  But what can this view say about the claim that X is better than Y?  
Either a thing achieves e or it does not. So if it were the case that X achieves e, and Y 
does not, then it would be the case that X is better than Y. After all, on the view we are 
considering, if X achieves e, it is good; if Y fails to achieve e then it is not good.  Being 
good is better than being not good. But what if both X and Y achieve e? They would thus 
both be good, but how could we ever explain why one is better? Intuitively, a chainsaw is 
better than a butter knife for felling trees, even if both achieve the goal. The achievement 
view does not have the moving parts to explain this. 
 For all these reasons, I contend that we should not identify the goodness relation 
with that of achieving goals. 
b) Promoting e 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
194 In “The Possibility of Parity”, Ruth Chang claims that there is a further relation, being on a par 
with, which is distinct from being equally good as (2002) p.661. Whether there is such a relation 
or not is neither here nor there for our purposes. An achievement view fails to explain how one 
thing can be better than another. That is surely reason enough to dismiss the achievement view 
without inquiring into how it handles the relation of being on a par with. 
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 According to Finlay, the goodness relation can be described as the relation of 
promoting.  He says:   
Being good for e is approximately being promotive of e… What does it 
mean to be good for or promote some end e?  An intuitive answer is that p 
is good for (or “promotes”) e if and only if p increases the probability that 
e.  (Stephen Finlay, Confusion of Tongues, 2014 p.38) 
 
Finlay admits that his account requires taking a stance on a philosophically vexing 
question: How best should we understand probability? I have no horse in that race, so I 
will not raise serious criticisms of his account for how it understands probability. I will, 
however, simply draw attention to this as a potential weakness of the view. If we can 
explain the nature of goodness without taking sides on other philosophically vexing 
issues, we probably ought do that. 
 According to Finlay, to promote e is to increase the probability that e. But 
increase it from what? We need a contrast class relative to which we determine whether 
the probability of e increases when p occurs. Finlay first suggests that the contrast classes 
be stated in terms of possible worlds. He suggests that if e obtains in a greater proportion 
of possible worlds where p occurs than it does in possible worlds where p does not occur, 
then p is good. If not, p is bad.195 Of course, there are some difficulties here due to 
familiar features of possible worlds. There are an infinite number of possible worlds 
where both p and e obtain, but also, an infinite number of possible worlds where not-p 
and e obtain. How then, could we speak meaningfully of e occurring in a greater 
proportion of p worlds than in not-p worlds? Finlay’s response is to switch to discussing 
possible world types.196 At first glance, this does not seem to resolve the issue. Aren’t 
there an infinite number of possible world types as well? For instance, there is a set of !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
195 Ibid, p.39 
196 Ibid, p.40!
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possible worlds wherein I win the lottery and win $10. Then there is another set where I 
win $11. There is another where I win $12, and so on. Presumably, what Finlay has in 
mind is that we should not distinguish types of possible worlds in such a fine-grained 
manner. If we categorize possible worlds in a fairly general way, there will not be an 
infinite number of possible world types. Consequently, we should be able to evaluate 
whether e obtains in a greater proportion of possible world types where p than where not-
p. 
 It is also worth noting that the contrast class should not include all the possible 
world types where not-p occurs. In asking if an additional sheet of paper, stacked onto a 
pile of papers, would make a good paperweight, I am not interested in worlds that have 
radically different physical laws than ours, or where the Earth’s gravitational force is 
1,000 times stronger. On those worlds, sheets of paper might make excellent 
paperweights. But that is irrelevant whether a sheet of paper would make a good 
paperweight in the actual world.  In order to restrict the not-p worlds to only the relevant 
ones, Finlay proposes that we only include not-p worlds that are consistent with some set 
of propositions, B, that is true of the actual world.197   
 Let’s look at one of Finlay’s examples.198 There is a baseball player, let’s call him 
Casey, and he is at the plate. We want to know if it would be good, relative to Casey’s 
team winning the game, if he drew a walk. So in this case, p is Casey’s drawing a walk, 
and e is Casey’s team winning the game. We now ask: Does p increase the probability of 
e? Again, to answer this, we need to put some constraints on the contrast class of not-p.  
For surely there are possible worlds where the team’s batting line-up is different, where !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
197 Ibid, pp.40-1 
198 Ibid, p.40!
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the rules of baseball are different, or even where the rules of physics are different. These 
worlds will not help us in determining if p is good. We also would exclude worlds where 
the baseball game that has been played prior to Casey’s turn at bat unfolded differently.  
Casey’s taking a walk might be a good strategic move, but not in all situations. This is 
just to say that we want the worlds that we are looking at to be very ‘close’ to the actual 
world. To this end, we come up with some set of propositions, B, that specify some of the 
constraints we just noted (the laws of physics are such-and-such, the game played out in 
the following manner, etc). We then look only at the world types that are consistent with 
B, and where not-p. In some of those worlds, Casey will strike out. In others, he might hit 
a line drive or even a homerun. These are the worlds that are relevant when we are 
determining whether or not p would increase the probability of e.  Having identified our 
contrast class, we can now draw a diagram like this one that follows:199 
 
Finlay explains that the shaded shape labeled ‘e’ represents the world types in which e 
obtains. One of the ovals in the large oval represents the worlds in which p obtains (the 
one labeled ‘p’), while the others represent “various possible ways of realizing not-p 
consistent with B”200 These ovals come in different sizes to represent that some types of 
worlds are more likely than others. It is more likely that Casey strikes out than that Casey !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
199 The following figure is a slightly adapted version of FIGURE 2.1 from Ibid, p.45. 
200 Ibid, p.45. 
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hits a home run. So perhaps the littlest oval (that is all grey) represents worlds where 
Casey hits a home run,201 and the largest inner oval that is only slightly shaded would 
represent worlds where Casey strikes out. To determine whether p is good, we simply 
compare the shaded proportion of the p oval with the shaded proportion of the other 
ovals. In this case, roughly 75% of the p-type worlds are worlds where e obtains, and 
roughly only about 25% of the not-p type worlds are worlds where e obtains.  So p 
increases the probability that e, and is thus, good. 
 One problem I have with this view is that to determining the sizes of those smaller 
ovals would push us right back into the problem of probability over worlds. How do we 
determine how much more likely world types are where Casey strikes out than world 
types where Casey hits a home run? Intuitively there is no problem here, but when you 
remember that there are an infinite number of B consistent worlds where Casey strikes 
out, and an infinite number of B consistent worlds where he hits a home run, it is hard to 
see how we can claim one type of world is more likely than the other.  
 Suppose that we grant Finlay that these difficulties regarding probability across 
possible worlds can be overcome. Even so, I think that he is mistaken to define ‘good’ in 
terms of increasing the probability of e.  As I will now show, this view gives us the 
wrong answer in certain cases. 
 To set up my counterexample, first consider a case that I will call Ball Bearing 
One. Suppose that a certain e requires the use of a ball bearing. That is, if I do not use a 
ball bearing, the probability that e obtains is 0. I am handed a ball bearing, B1, and 
unbeknownst to me, microscopic imperfections in the surface of B1 cause it to have a !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
201 For the oval to be completely shaded would mean that Casey’s team is guaranteed to win in 
that type of world. Thus, it must be the case that the game is tied and it is the bottom of the ninth 
or of a later inning. Otherwise, a homerun would not guarantee Casey’s team winning. 
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15% chance of failing to bring about e. Is B1 good relative to e?  Finlay’s answer is that 
B1’s goodness depends on whether using B1 increases the probability that e obtains. 
Whether or not using B1 increases the probability of e obtaining will depend on what the 
alternatives are to using B1, how likely those alternatives are, and in how many of those 
alternatives e obtains.  
 Since B1 has a 15% failing rate, we can expect that e will obtain in 85% of the p 
worlds (that is, the worlds where I use B1). Looking at that number in isolation, one 
might come to conclude that B1 is good.  It is very likely to get the job done—what more 
could you want?  However, Finlay would insist that B1’s goodness depends on what 
happens when I do not use B1. Thus, we do not yet have enough information to judge the 
goodness of B1; we cannot evaluate the goodness of B1 until we know if using it 
increases the probability of e. That is, we cannot know if B1 is good until we consider the 
contrast class. 
 So let’s add some details to the story. Suppose there is a bin with 9 other ball 
bearings in it that I could have chosen instead. Suppose further that all of them have the 
same surface imperfections as B1, and thus also have a 15% chance of failing.  In 
evaluating whether B1 is good or not, it seems that there are 10 relevant possible world 
types against which I must contrast the probability of e obtaining (the worlds where I use 
B2, the worlds where I use B3, … B10, and the worlds where I do not use any ball bearing 
at all).  Nine of these world types are equally likely, and e will obtain in 85% of the these 
not-p worlds. So far, p worlds are doing equally well as not-p worlds. Because my intent 
is to bring about e, because I know that doing so requires a ball bearing, and because I 
have several ball bearings on hand, the tenth type of not-p world—the one where I do not 
!! 185!
use any ball bearing at all—is extremely unlikely. However, that tenth type of possible 
world makes the difference. In those worlds, e never obtains. Thus, if e obtains in 85% of 
the not-p worlds where I use a ball bearing other than B1, and obtains in 0% of the 
possible worlds where I do not use a ball bearing at all, then e would obtain in just 
slightly less that 85% of the total not-p worlds. Recall that e obtained in exactly 85% of 
the p worlds.  Thus, B1 (barely) increases the probability that e will obtain, and is thus, 
good. That seems like the right result: B1 is a good ball bearing. 
 But what if we change things slightly? Let us call the new case, Ball Bearing 
Two. This scenario is similar to Ball Bearing One, except that this time, the ball bearings 
in the bin have from a 1% to 30% fail rate. The distribution of these ball bearings is 
uneven, but the average fail rate of the bin is 14%. As before, e obtains in 85% of the 
worlds where I use B1. Also as before, e obtains in 0% of the worlds where I do not use 
any ball bearing at all. This type of world, however, is extremely unlikely. For the other 
not-p worlds, where I use ball bearings B2-B10, the number of worlds where e obtains will 
vary. However, taken together, e obtains in 86% of those possible worlds.  The 
probability of e in the not-p worlds is now slightly greater (just under 86%) than the 
probability of e in the worlds where I do use B1 (85%).  Finlay would have us conclude 
from this that B1 is not good relative to e.  But that is surely counterintuitive! B1 only has 
a 15% fail rate! !
! Finlay’s view is a sophisticated example of a broader type of account of the truth 
conditions for goodness judgments that I will call a comparative account.  On this type of 
view, being good involves being better than some contrast class.  The most naïve view of 
this sort says that X is good if it is better than most (or perhaps, merely ‘enough’) of the 
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other members of a kind of which X is also a member. X is a good ball bearing, the view 
would say, if it is better than the average ball bearing (or perhaps, merely better than 
enough other ball bearings). 
 A proponent of this view could agree that in Ball Bearing Two, B1 is still a good 
ball bearing because there are some ball bearings that have a fail rate as high as 30%, and 
B1 is better than them. On the other hand, were I to have stipulated that all the ball 
bearings in the bin had a fail rate of 1 - 15% then it would no longer be true that B1 is a 
good ball bearing.  It would be worst than enough of the others, so Finlay’s account 
would be correct in claiming that it is a bad ball bearing. 
 But suppose that all the ball bearings in the bin are very fragile and have a 99% 
fail rate! B1, however, has a fail rate of 98%.  Since B1 is better than the average ball 
bearing, the naïve comparative account would have to say that B1 is good.  Finlay’s 
account would say that this ball bearing is good as well, since the probability that e 
obtains is better (albeit, only slightly so) when I use B1, than when I do not.  Even though 
we can agree that (i) B1 is better than all the other ball bearings, and that (ii) B1 raises the 
probability of e, intuitively, (iii) B1 is not good. B1 is extremely fragile and very likely to 
fail. The proper thing to say about this scenario is that this is a world where all the ball 
bearings are bad. A similar story can be given where all the ball bearings in the world are 
good, even if one ball bearing has a slightly higher fail rate than the rest (for instance, a 
world where all ball bearings have a 1% fail rate, except for B1, which has a 2% fail rate). 
 Comparative views go wrong because they confuse the relational property of 
being good relative to e with the relational property of being good for a K, (where ‘K’ 
stands for a kind).  I think it might make sense to say that when B1 has a 98% fail rate it 
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is good for a ball bearing (in the world where all the other ball bearings have a 99% fail 
rate). But if we want to accomplish an e that requires a non-failing ball bearing, then B1 is 
not good relative to this goal. In fact, it is very bad. The fact that being a good K and 
being good relative to e are two distinct relations should be familiar turf for anyone who 
has discussed politics with a disillusioned voter.202 Such voters will often say that they 
are voting for the ‘better of two evils.’  I take this expression to mean, roughly, that 
within the category of electable candidates there are only two options, and while one is a 
better candidate than the other, neither one is good. If such a complaint makes sense, then 
we must reject naïve comparative accounts of the truth conditions for goodness 
judgments. 
 In summary, my complaint is that comparative accounts, including Finlay’s, fail 
to capture the intuitive notion that we can judge X to be good, independently from a 
judgment about the goodness of other things (even other things of its kind).  We do not 
need to know how well other things can accomplish e to know if X is good relative to e.   
 It is worth stressing that this objection to Finlay’s view is potentially quite 
damaging. Above, my objections were more or less that my view was more intuitive or 
natural than Finlay’s in certain respects. But, as noted at the outset of the chapter, because 
Finlay’s end-relational account of goodness is just one aspect of his larger end-relational 
theory of normativity, he can allow that certain aspects of the theory be implausible or 
counterintuitive. He can allow this so long as these costs are made up for by other 
theoretical virtues of the entire theory (that it is simpler, for instance). This kind of 
response is not as compelling to my objection from this section. My objection here shows 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
202 Or who has been a disillusioned voter herself! 
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that Finlay’s theory gets things wrong in a number of cases. If X is really lousy, but 
slightly less lousy than the other options, Finlay has to say that X is good.  If Y is more 
than adequate at accomplishing e, but all the other options are sufficiently better, then 
Finlay has to say that Y is bad. Both these judgments are mistaken. Theoretical virtues 
like simplicity do not go far in outweighing the costs of accepting a theory that gets 
things wrong in many cases.    
c) Sufficient to Achieve a Necessary Sub-Goal of G 
 I believe we should abandon discussion of contrast classes and increasing 
probabilities. Instead, we should return to the intuitive, but ultimately mistaken view, that 
the goodness relation is that of achieving e. We should see if we can salvage this view 
with the addition of some further moving parts. I believe we can.  
 Let us start by revisiting the problems with the achievement of e view. According 
to this view, to X is good if it achieves e. I noted four kinds of cases where this gets it 
wrong:  (1) Where X is not good relative to e, but X achieves e, (2) Where X cannot 
achieve e, but it is good relative to e, (3) Where X is good relative to e, but is never used 
to achieve e, and (4) Where X and Y both achieve e, but intuitively, one is better than the 
other. I believe that with a few adjustments, mostly to how we conceive ends, we can 
protect a kind of achievement view from these objections. 
 The first thing we need to do is to switch from talking about X actually achieving 
e, and instead talk about X being sufficient for achieving e. This move is needed given 
how I understand ends. As I describe them, ends are abstract. There are a plentitude of 
ends that we have never even thought about, and consequently, these ends have never 
been achieved. However, I want it to be the case that there are still truths about what 
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would be good relative to these ends. So just because no one has ever had to fight off a 
wave of (non-philosophical) zombies, it is still true that certain weapons would be good 
relative to this goal, and that others are bad. Some weapons are such that using them 
would prove successful against a horde of zombies—others are not. Weapons are good 
relative to fighting off zombies when those weapons are sufficient for getting the job 
done. They do not actually ever have to do the job for them to be good towards that job. 
Understood this way, we can respond to the third type of objection to achieving views.  
We can preserve the intuition that the virtuous samurai’s sword is good, even if he never 
uses it in battle. It is good because if it were to be used in battle, it would get the job 
done.  
 Handling the other three objections requires noticing another feature of ends as I 
understand them. On my view, ends are the potential content of intentions—they are 
plans that we could decide to pursue. Now often, when talking about our ends, we do not 
bother stating all the details of the plan. We avoid doing so for two reasons. First, 
sometimes we simply do not have all the details in our mind. More often than not, our 
plans are rough sketches, and our plans are consequently somewhat flexible. It would 
thus be impossible to state all the details of the plan we have in mind. Second, and 
perhaps more importantly, it would be obnoxious and time consuming if everyone went 
around describing their goals by expressing all the excruciating details of how they plan 
on accomplishing those goals. No one has time for that! For these reasons, we often refer 
to our ends with short, pithy descriptions such as: I am going out to lunch. 
 My contention is that these pithy descriptions are just the tip of the iceberg when 
it comes to the actual content of our ends. Consider the goal of going out to lunch. When 
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I pursue this end, my plans tend to be fairly detailed. For instance, I generally want to eat 
lunch in a certain amount of time, I don’t want to travel very far to get to a restaurant, I 
only want to spend a certain amount of money, I want to enjoy my food, I want to eat 
with certain people, I want to avoid certain conversation topics, I do not want to eat at the 
same place I ate yesterday, I want to get through the meal without dribbling food all over 
myself, I do not want to choke on my food and die… etc. Each of the items in this list 
deserves to be considered part of my goal of going out to lunch. I might not even be 
aware that my goal of going out to lunch contains all of these parts. However, it is worth 
noting that if I believed that one or more of these things would not occur, I might decide 
that I cannot achieve my goal, and I might cease intending to go out to lunch. 
 My claim is that each of these sub-goals is a part of the goal I am pursuing. 
Further, were I to have a different set of sub-goals in mind, I would be pursuing a 
different goal. Thus these sub-goals are necessary parts of the ‘super-goal.’ This might 
sound counterintuitive at first. On this view, for instance, if part of my plan for lunch is 
not eating at Chipotle because I ate there yesterday, and you do not have that as part of 
your plan for lunch, then we are not pursuing the same goal. We are, however, both going 
out to lunch. That sounds a bit odd. 
 Oddness aside, the goal of going out to lunch at any local restaurant is a different 
goal from going out to lunch at any local restaurant other than Chipotle. They have 
different satisfaction conditions. I will not accomplish my goal if we eat at Chipotle, but 
you will. However, we should not thus conclude that I failed to go out to lunch.  Again, 
the label ‘going out to lunch’ can apply to a very wide variety of goals. If I am somehow 
coaxed into eating at Chipotle, it is true that I do not accomplish my original goal, but I 
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might simply switch to pursuing a very similar goal that can still be described as ‘going 
out to lunch’. I can still successfully go out to lunch, even if my original plan is foiled. 
Even though I still succeed at going out to lunch, I might nonetheless grumble as we sit 
down to lunch at Chipotle: “This isn’t exactly what I had in mind when I suggested we go 
out to lunch.”   
 Or consider two Olympic athletes about to compete in the 500-yard dash. They 
both have the goal of taking home the gold. One of them, however, is hit in the face by 
some garbage that a belligerent spectator flings onto the track. The athlete consequently 
stumbles and falls flat on her face. The other athlete goes onto win the gold. People might 
say to the winner, “Congratulations! You achieved your goal!” to which she might 
respond, “No, I didn’t,” or “Yes, but I did not intend it to happen like this.” If she were to 
say either of these things, we would come to learn that her goal was not simply to win a 
gold medal in the 500-yard dash. She intended to win it as the result of a fair race, not 
because her competitor was disadvantaged. Notice too, that if her goal is to win fairly, 
then the garbage hitting her competitor is not good relative to this goal. If, on the other 
hand, she wants to win no matter what, then the garbage hitting her competitor is good. 
 I hope that these examples suffice to show that the goals we adopt can be much 
more complicated than the pithy descriptions that we give them—they often include 
many sub-goals, the achievement of which are necessary for the achievement of the 
super-goal.203 If this is right, then we are now in a position to answer the remaining three 
objections to an achievement theory of goodness. First, it was noted that a butter knife 
can be used to cut down a redwood tree, but that intuitively, a butter knife is not good !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
203 Gilbert Harman makes the observation that our intentions are often more complicated than we 
describe them in (1976). 
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relative to that goal. If we note, however, that goals are more complicated than the labels 
we give them, this objection is easily handled.204 Cutting down a redwood tree with a 
butter knife requires a lot of time and effort. If my goal were simply to fell a redwood 
tree, then I could indeed achieve this goal with a butter knife. Odds are, however, that my 
goal of cutting down a redwood tree contains certain sub-goals about how much time and 
effort I plan to put into the endeavor. It is likely that a butter knife cannot cut down a 
redwood fast enough or with the amount of ease with which I aim to accomplish this task. 
A butter knife is not sufficient for achieving my goal.  It is thus false that a butter knife is 
good for cutting down redwoods.   
 The fourth kind of objection noted that achievement of G is binary—it either 
occurs or it does not. However, goodness comes in degrees; thus goodness cannot merely 
be achievement of goals. My view can answer this objection in two ways. First, X and Y 
might both be good relative to G, but X might be better than Y if it achieves more of the 
sub-goals of G. If we have to choose between an X and a Y, and X does more to bring 
about G than Y, we can conclude that relative to G, X is better than Y. Better to ‘kill two 
birds with one stone’ than to have to use two stones to do so. The second way that we can 
respond to this objection is to note that sometimes it is the indeterminate nature of our 
goals that explains why X is better than Y. Suppose, for instance, that my goal is to cut 
down a tree quickly. A butter knife does not achieve this goal, but perhaps, one of those 
old-fashioned, two-person saws would. A chainsaw, however, would cut down the tree 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
204 Finlay builds these restrictions into the background (2014) p.60-1. Recall that the 
‘background’ was a set of propositions B, that limited which possible world types were relevant 
when evaluating if p increases the probability of e. We only looked at world types that were 
consistent with B.   
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even quicker. The chainsaw is thus better, relative to cutting down the tree quickly, than 
the two-person saw. 
 This is not to say that more is always better. If I am looking to buy a new car 
which seats four, it does not follow that a large van that seats twelve is thus better. It 
depends on my goal. If my goal is to own a vehicle that can transport as many people as 
possible, the van is better than say, a Toyota Prius. If, however, my goal is just to be able 
to seat four people in the car, the fact that the Prius and the van both accomplish this goal 
shows that they are equally good (relative to my goal). My decision about which to buy 
would be made with respect to how the two vehicles compare in other respects. If my 
goal is to seat four, and no more than four, the van is worse than the Prius. 
 The second kind of objection noted that things that are not sufficient for achieving 
an end can still be good relative to that end. The example I gave above was that pleasant 
weather is good for a bicycle ride—but clearly it is not sufficient for a bicycle ride! To 
answer this objection, we need to fine-tune our achievement account one more time.  
Good weather is not sufficient for the achievement of a bike ride. However, good weather 
might be sufficient for a necessary sub-goal of my goal of going for a bike ride. Suppose, 
for instance, it is part of my goal that I do not want to ride in the rain. If the weather is 
sunny and pleasant, then my sub-goal of not riding in the rain will be accomplished. The 
sunny weather accomplishes this necessary sub-goal, and thus, is good relative to the 
super-goal of going for a bike ride. It is worth noting that I do not need to achieve the 
super-goal of going for a bike ride for it to be true that pleasant weather would be good 
for doing so. Remember, we are no longer talking about actual achievement of goals, but 
only of what is sufficient for the achievement of goals. Pleasant weather is sufficient for 
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achieving the goal of not riding in the rain—and thus good relative to that goal—whether 
I in fact climb on my bike and take advantage of the weather or not. 
 Finally, we need to add one more nuance to the view to block a certain kind of 
counterexample. Suppose I ate lunch at Chipotle yesterday, and I do not want to eat there 
again today. Part of my plan for going out to lunch is avoiding Chipotle. One way I could 
avoid Chipotle would be if I were suddenly and brutally murdered. My death is sufficient 
for achieving the sub-goal of not eating at Chipotle—but it is not, intuitively, good 
relative to the goal of going out to lunch today. The problem is that my death frustrates 
the achievement of many of the other sub-goals that are components of my super-goal of 
going out to lunch. I must add to my account of goodness, then, that X cannot be good 
relative to G if X frustrates a sub-goal of G. So while my death does ensure that I do not 
eat at Chipotle, it is nonetheless bad relative to my goal of going out to eat. 
 What should we say, then, about the following case: Again, I am going out to eat 
and I do not want to eat at Chipotle for the second day in a row. However, as luck should 
have it, a massive fire starts in the kitchen at Chipotle, burning the restaurant to the 
ground. Now of course the destruction of Chipotle is sufficient for achieving my sub-goal 
of not eating at Chipotle. Further, Chipotle’s destruction does not frustrate any of the 
other sub-goals of my going to eat out. Should we conclude that the destruction of 
Chipotle is good?   
 Perhaps counter-intuitively, I believe the destruction of Chipotle is good. I say 
this only because I understand that claim as restricted relative to my goal of eating out at 
any place other than Chipotle. Its destruction helps achieve that goal. However, I 
nonetheless might not ever wish for the destruction of Chipotle, and I might even declare 
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that it is a bad thing that the building burned down. Chipotle’s destruction will be bad 
relative to other goals—some that I might even care about more deeply than I do my 
getting lunch today at somewhere other than Chipotle. For instance, due to the fire, 
people were put in danger and likely even injured. Those are things that I would prefer 
did not happen! I might thus, all things considered, lament the destruction of Chipotle 
even though its destruction is good relative to a goal I am interested in pursuing. 
 In summary, the view I prefer states that X is end-relationally good relative to G if 
and only if X is sufficient for the achievement a goal G or for a sub-goal of G, while at 
the same time not frustrating any of the other sub-goals of G. This view does not fall prey 
to the sorts of objections that a naïve achievement view does. Further, it avoids both 
having to take a controversial stance on how to understand probability, and the problems 
that arise when for the view that the truth conditions of our goodness judgments be 
determined in relation to a comparison class. For instance, on my view, we could have a 
world where all steak knives are good (because they are all sufficient for achieving the 
goal (or a sub-goal) of cutting steak into bite-sized pieces). It is also possible on my view 
for there to be a world where all steak knives are bad (they fail at achieving this goal, or 
frustrate some further sub-goal). I conclude that my account of the nature of the goodness 
relation is more plausible than any of the alternatives. 
 
V. End-Relational Moral Goodness? 
Way back in the Introduction to this dissertation, I noted that for most 
philosophers, the interesting questions about the nature of goodness are in regards to 
moral goodness. In this last section, I wish to briefly discuss the plausibility of an ethics 
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that only posits end-relational goodness. Of course, fully developing an end-relational 
ethics would be its own book-length project. For the time being, I simply wish to gesture 
at what such a theory might look like. In this way, I wish to ward off the worry that an 
ethical theory that only posits end-relational goodness would lack some of the features 
that we expect of an ethical theory. I will consider three such features: (1) Universality, 
(2) Categoricity, and (3) The Priority of the Moral.  If an end-relational account of 
goodness cannot preserve these features of a morality, then an end-relational account of 
moral goodness would be a failure. 
Before looking at that, let me recall a few things that fall out of accepting an end-
relational theory of goodness. First, as I argued in Chapter Two, there is no conceptual 
connection between goodness and people’s desires, pro-attitudes, etc. Goals, as I 
understand them, are merely possible intentional plans. There are facts about what is 
good relative to these goals independent of whether or not anyone even has these goals. 
For this reason, my theory of goodness rules out non-cognitivism about goodness. 
However, my view also explains why non-cognitivism has seemed compelling to so 
many philosophers. According to my view, to judge something to be good is to judge that 
it promotes a goal. Whenever someone makes a particular goodness judgment, then, she 
does so with some goal in mind. It is very rare for people to think (and speak) about goals 
that they do not have pro-attitudes about, so generally speaking, it is rare for people to 
make goodness judgments on topics they do not care about. It is easy to confuse this near 
constant conjunction of pro-attitude and goodness judgment for a necessary connection.  
Second, as I discussed in Chapter Three, since there is no such thing as intrinsic 
goodness, a very common way of characterizing one’s moral theory is precluded. Briefly, 
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the schema for this characterization is: (a) Identify some thing or things that are 
intrinsically good, (b) declare that some set of responses to that thing or things that is 
morally required.  If my end-relational theory of goodness is correct, then this is not an 
adequate way to characterize one’s moral theory. Since nothing is intrinsically good, we 
can never satisfy the first condition (a), and thus, no moral theories of this type can be 
true. Given that there are many deontological, consequentialist, and virtue theories that 
follow this schema, the end-relational theory of goodness seems to entail that a vast 
variety of moral theories are false. That is a pretty big bullet to bite. 
 An end-relational theorist, however, can defend moral theories that are nearly 
identical to the ones mentioned above. She simply needs to construct the correlating 
theories according to a different schema—one that does not posit intrinsic goodness.  
The idea was to interpret talk of ‘intrinsic goodness’ as actually being about goodness 
relative to some special set of goals. If a compelling argument can be given, for instance, 
that pursuing happiness is a special kind of goal, then we can reconstruct a 
consequentialist ethical theory without appealing to the intrinsic goodness of pursuing 
happiness. For instance, one might claim that the pursuit of happiness is the only morally 
relevant goal. If so, then only things that promote happiness are morally good. This 
sounds, in principle, like an acceptable way to get a consequentialist theory going.  It thus 
seems that recognizing that goodness is relational is not quite the silver bullet to 
consequentialism that Foot and Thomson thought it was.205 
But could such an end-relational ethics preserve the fact that moral reasons are 
categorical?  That depends on how we understand categoricity. According to one sense of 
‘categorical,’ a reason is categorical if it holds of someone, regardless of what ends they !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
205 Foot (1985), Thomson (1994) 
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have. This notion of categoricity is contrasted with hypothetical reasons—reasons that 
hold of you only if you have certain ends. The fact that a certain kind of lumber is good 
for furniture building does not give you reasons unless you want to build furniture. The 
reasons for using that lumber are thus hypothetical. Moral reasons are said to be 
categorical.  It does not matter what goals you have, if there is a moral reason to X, then 
that reason holds of you. 
End-relational moral goodness does not ground categorical reasons in this sense.  
According to an end-relational account of moral goodness, there are certain goals that are 
the moral goals, and for X to be morally good is for X to promote one of those moral 
goals. The fact that X is morally good only gives you reason if you have the moral goal.  
The reason it gives you is hypothetical, since it would not hold of you regardless of what 
ends you have—you need to hold the moral goal for X’s moral goodness to give you 
reason. Even if the end-relationalist argues that we all in fact have the relevant moral 
goals, the reasons that X’s moral goodness generates would still be hypothetical in the 
sense we are currently discussing.   
Of course, it is open to the end-relationalist to challenge this notion of 
categoricity; there are, after all, other ways to characterize categoricity. For instance, on 
one conception of categoricity, a reason is categorical if it is, in some sense, 
inescapable.206  The thought is that when it comes to hypothetical reasons, like that a 
certain kind of lumber is good for building furniture, I can ‘escape’ this reason by not 
having the goal of building furniture. There is no similar way to escape moral reasons, so 
they are categorical.  
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
206 Finlay considers this interpretation of ‘categoricity’ in (2014) p.177. 
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Understood in this way, moral reasons grounded in end-relational goodness can 
be categorical. Here is a sketch about how reasons grounded in end-relational moral 
goodness can be inescapable. Start with the goal of being able to pursue one’s goals. This 
goal is one that we all care about, and one that we cannot help but care about. Perhaps it 
is grounded in human nature, or perhaps it is grounded in the nature of agency, but one 
thing that we all aim at is to be able to pursue goals. This goal is thus, ‘inescapable’.  
Now suppose, as I think it is quite right to, it is a necessary condition for our being able 
to pursue our goals that we have others’ cooperation. Notice that even if my goal does not 
directly require that anyone help me—for instance, say I want to go for a solitary walk 
through the woods—it does require indirect cooperation; it requires that no one interferes 
with my goal. I cannot take a solitary walk in the woods if someone decides to always 
walk two steps behind me! We now have the claim that cooperation from others is 
necessary for my achieving my inescapable goal of pursuing my goals. Finally, we can 
claim that one role that acting in accordance with moral rules plays is that it makes 
possible our shared cooperation with one another. Our cooperation is dependent on being 
able to trust one another. Without some set of moral rules stipulating how we must act 
towards one another, and unless we can expect that others will act in accordance with 
those rules, we cannot trust in one another’s cooperation.  If that is right, then the moral 
rules are necessary for cooperation,207 and cooperation is necessary for our pursuing our 
goals, and it is inescapable that we aim at pursuing our goals.  We thus have inescapable 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
207 Many moral philosophers have discussed the relation of cooperation and morality. See, for 
instance:  Hobbes (1651), Locke (1689), Rousseau (1762), Kant (1793), Rawls (1971), Gauthier 
(1986), and Copp (1997) (to name a few). 
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reasons to act in accordance with the rules of morality. Again, this is a merely a sketch, 
and would take some time to develop in more detail.208 
 If something like this sketch is correct, we can also explain why moral reasons are 
universal—that is, why they hold of everyone—and why we give priority to moral 
considerations. My claim was that everyone (or at least, all moral agents) aim at pursuing 
their goals. If doing so requires the cooperation of others, and the cooperation of others 
requires that we obey the rules of morality, then we all have reason to obey the rules of 
morality. Further, since the ability to pursue one’s goals is necessary no matter what goal 
it is that one opts to pursue, the ability to pursue one’s goal is good relative to all the 
other goals we want to pursue. If our behaving morally is a necessary condition for the 
preservation of our ability to pursue the goals we opt to pursue, then our behaving 
morally is also necessarily good relative to all the other goals we wish to pursue.  
Behaving morally is a necessary prerequisite for our ability to pursue any other kind of 
goal that we opt to. For that reason, we give moral considerations priority over others.  
 The point of this section was not to convince you that this is the correct view of 
morality. That would require much more space than this! The point of this section was to 
convince you that there could be a plausible account of morality that only posits end-
relational goodness and yet preserves the categoricity, universality, and priority of 
morality. Developing that view in any detail must be left for future work. 
 
 
 !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
208 As it stands, it seems susceptible to free-rider problems, or to the problem of people merely 
appearing to be moral, when they really aren’t. I could ensure the cooperation of others by merely 
pretending to be moral. It is thus, not necessary that I behave morally. 
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VI. Conclusion 
 The arguments of this chapter support the claim that my theory of end-relational 
goodness is more plausible than the one offered by Stephen Finlay. He and I disagree 
over (i) what things can stand in the goodness relation to ends, (ii) what ends are, and (iii) 
what the nature of the goodness relation is like. I claimed that in each of these 
disagreements, my view was more plausible than his. The conclusion of this chapter, 
then, is that if we are going to defend an end-relational theory of goodness, it should be 
one where a thing (broadly construed) is good if and only if it is sufficient for the 
achievement of a goal, G (understood as abstract plan), or for the achievement of one of 
G’s sub-goals, while at the same time, not frustrating any other sub-goals of G.  
  The arguments of the previous chapters have supported the claim that we should, 
in fact, defend an end-relational theory of goodness. We should do so because an end-
relational theory of goodness is the most plausible account of non-moral goodness. Kind-
relational and Interest-relational views of goodness are, for a variety of reasons, just not 
as plausible. If this is correct, then our use of ‘good’ in our non-moral judgments ascribes 
to things an end-relational property. Further, the word ‘good’ would ascribe the same 
attribute in moral judgments as it does in non-moral judgments, unless it is ambiguous. It 
is not ambiguous, so it does not ascribe different attributes in moral judgments than it 
does in non-moral ones. It ascribes end-relational goodness in non-moral judgments, thus, 
it ascribes end-relational goodness in moral judgments as well. 
 I conceded that if adopting an end-relational theory of goodness conflicted with 
too many of our intuitions about what we should expect from a theory of goodness, then 
all the worst for an end-relational theory of goodness! In this case, we would have reason 
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to abandon either our end-relational account of non-moral goodness, or the claim that 
‘good’ ascribes the same attribute in moral judgments as it does in non-moral judgments. 
I argued, however, that an end-relational theory of goodness does not conflict with too 
many of our commonsense intuitions. For instance, even though on the end-relational 
theory that I favor there is no such thing as intrinsic goodness, we do not have to give up 
on all the roles that intrinsic goodness plays in our theoretical and practical lives.  We can 
explain, for instance, why we have basic reasons to pursue some goals rather than others, 
without positing intrinsic goodness.  
 The theory I favor is simple, elegant, and has a great deal of explanatory power. 
Further, it opens some new and interesting ways of thinking about ethics, and how moral 
goodness relates to the goodness of parking spaces, umbrellas, etc. In short, my theory is 
a very good theory of goodness. 
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